A. The meaning of "where the debtor deems it appropriate to resist the existence or scope of the obligation" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

B. The meaning and examples of the "reasonable extent" of the above Article of the law

C. Purpose of legislation under Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings

A. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation," the term "when there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation." Thus, the issue of whether it is reasonable to dispute above is the fact-finding and evaluation of the court as to the case in question.

B. The "reasonable scope" in the latter part of the same paragraph is not "the scope of the obligor's obligation to resist" but "a reasonable period of time for the obligor to resist". Thus, it is reasonable that the obligor's defense at the fact-finding court of the relevant case shall be deemed to be until the time of rendering a judgment at the fact-finding court of the relevant case, and for any reason subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment, it shall not be excluded from the application of Article 3 (1) of the same Act. The fact-finding court mentioned above shall be the first instance court or the appellate court of the relevant case. Thus, the court may set a reasonable period of time for the defense at the time of rendering a judgment at the court of first instance or the equivalent document delivered to the obligor, and therefore the appellate court may determine the scope of time for the defense at the time of rendering a judgment at the court of first instance or before and after the judgment at the court of first instance. In addition, since the above legal principles are applied to each subject matter of lawsuit in an objective consolidation lawsuit, it may be different from the application of Article 3 (1) of the same

C. The purport of Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is to realize the statutory interest rate in the civil law that is much less than the public interest rate of financial institutions and allow creditors to receive compensation for actual damage from the delay of performance after filing a lawsuit against the creditors, while preventing the debtor from delaying the repayment of obligations or delaying the lawsuit, or abusing his right to appeal using a low statutory interest rate in the civil law, and to cope with fluctuations in economic conditions by delegation of the statutory interest rate to the Presidential Decree. Accordingly, with respect to the default of monetary obligations, the statutory interest rate in Article 3(1) of the above Act is deemed to have both the function of the creditor's interest rate for compensating for actual damage and the penal function in bad faith with respect to the obligor. Meanwhile, since Article 3(2) of the above Act has the above function, it is reasonable for the debtor to fully apply the penal interest rate in the lawsuit to the case where it is deemed reasonable to avoid the exercise of his right of defense within the scope of the above statutory interest rate.

[Judgment of the Supreme Court: Change in the Supreme Court Decision 84.07Meu365; 86.3.11.3.229, etc.]

Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Promotion of Legal Proceedings

A. Supreme Court Decision 83Meu875, 876, 877 delivered on February 14, 1984 (amended by Supreme Court Decision 84Meu365 delivered on July 10, 1984) (amended by Supreme Court Decision 85Meu229 delivered on March 11, 1986)

[Judgment of the court below]

The Bank of Korea, Inc.

Seoul High Court Decision 85Na3844 decided July 25, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

For this reason, the judgment of the court below held that the defendant is liable to pay damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum, which is the legal interest rate under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, from November 29, 1983 to July 25, 1986, which is the date of the declaration of the judgment of the court below, for the damages for delay from November 29, 1983 to July 25, 1986.

Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the adjudication of the fact-finding court declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent of reasonable grounds." In this context, the term "if the obligor deems it reasonable to resist the existence or scope of the obligation" means the time when there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation (see Supreme Court Decision 83Meu875, 876, 8777, Feb. 14, 1984). Accordingly, the issue of whether the obligation is not raised is the fact-finding and its evaluation by the court as to the case in question.

However, when it is deemed reasonable to dispute as above, the latter part of Article 3 (2) of the above Act only provides that "no provision of Paragraph (1) shall be applied within the reasonable scope", and it seems that there are many different opinions about the scope of exclusion from the application of the statutory interest rate under Paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the above Act, along with a pool of "the reasonable scope".

In light of the above, the above "reasonable scope" is not "the scope of the obligor's obligation to resist" but "the reasonable period of time for the obligor to resist". Thus, it is reasonable for the obligor to resist at the fact-finding court of the case to regard the period until the time of sentencing at the fact-finding court of the case in question, and for any reason, after the pronouncement of the case, it cannot be excluded from the application of Article 3 (1) of the above Act. Furthermore, the fact-finding court mentioned above should be the first instance court of the case in question or the appellate court of the case in question. Thus, the court may set a reasonable period of time in dispute at the time of sentencing at the court of first instance or the equivalent document delivered to the obligor. Thus, the appellate court may determine the period of time without asking the court of first instance or before and after the judgment at the court of first instance, and in case of an objective consolidation lawsuit, the above legal principles are applied to each subject matter in question, so it can be different from the application of Article 3 (1) of the above Act in accordance with the claim amount.

This is because, at first, Article 397 of the Civil Code provides that the amount of damages for non-performance of monetary obligation shall be calculated at the statutory rate of 5% per annum, and that the obligee does not need to prove the damages and that the obligee does not protest against the absence of negligence, unlike other kinds of claims in the special context of monetary obligation, there is no room for the impossibility of performance. Thus, the obligee's satisfaction and the obligor's delay are limited to delay of performance and there is no room for the impossibility of performance. Therefore, in accordance with the statutory interest rate, the statutory interest rate is determined by the Civil Code or the Commercial Code, since it is determined by the purchasing power rather than the face value commonly used for the actual value of money, so it is difficult to cope with the actual condition such as change in economic situation or expansion of currency. Accordingly, under the circumstances that the statutory interest rate of a financial institution did not reach the public interest rate of the financial institution, loan interest rate, or inflation rate, it inevitably causes a delay in the obligee's actual damage to the obligor, thereby causing an unreasonable delay in the performance of the obligee's right to appeal.

Therefore, the purport of Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is to realize the statutory interest rate of a financial institution which is much less than that of a financial institution's public interest interest so that a creditor may be compensated for actual damage resulting from the delay of payment even after filing a lawsuit against the creditor. On the other hand, the debtor shall be prevented from delaying repayment of an obligation in bad faith or delaying a lawsuit, and from abusing his/her right to appeal by delegation of the statutory interest rate to the Presidential Decree. On the other hand, with respect to the default of monetary obligations, the legal interest rate of Article 3 (1) of the above Act is also deemed to have the function of the creditor's interest rate for compensating for actual damage as well as the function of penal provisions against malicious debtors. On the other hand, Article 3 (2) of the above Act has the above function of Paragraph (1) of the above Article, so it is reasonable for the debtor to fully apply the interest rate of the penal provisions to a case where it is deemed reasonable for him/her to respond to the lawsuit, and thus, it may reduce the obligor's right of defense.

In this regard, as long as the existence or scope of the obligation is declared in the fact-finding court, applying the rate of interest under Article 3(1) of the above Act, which has the penal nature of the delay of performance thereafter, is too unreasonable, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the obligor is harsh or unreasonable. In addition, if the judgment is made before the fact-finding court, it is necessary to determine the scope of excluding the application of Article 3(1) of the above Act in consideration of all the circumstances revealed in the pleading, it is consistent with the legislative intent and interpretation of the above law.

If the legal interest rate as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the above Act is set at any time or in full, the period during which the obligor may dispute is at the time a fact-finding court rendered a judgment, and even though the court rendered a judgment ordering the obligor to perform the obligation with the purpose of penal provisions, the legal interest rate as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the above Act does not apply to the obligor, as seen above, because the obligor does not make a pool of "the scope of obligation to dispute" as above, and the obligor does not apply the legal interest rate as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the above Act with the intent of penal provisions.

Therefore, the previous precedents of the party members (see Supreme Court Decision 85Meu229, Mar. 11, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 84Meu365, Jul. 10, 1984) purported that Article 3(1) of the above Act shall not apply even after the judgment of the fact-finding court ordering the obligation of performance, regardless of the term “the reasonable period of time”, if it is deemed reasonable for the defendant to resist the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, it goes against the opinion expressed earlier.

Therefore, the court below is just in holding that the defendant is liable to pay damages for delay at the rate of five percent per annum from the civil interest rate from the date of the plaintiff's claim to the date of the declaration of the judgment below, and twenty-five percent per annum under Article 3 (1) of the above Act from the next day to the date of full payment, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles of Article 3 (2) of the above Act as asserted.

The assertion is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges except for the opinion of the Supreme Court Justices Choi Jae-ho and the like separate opinion of Park Jong-ri.

The opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court are as follows.

Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that creditors may be compensated for actual damage caused by delay of payment even after they have filed a lawsuit with respect to any creditor after the legal interest rate of a financial institution is more realistic than the public interest rate of the financial institution. On the other hand, the debtor is prevented from delaying repayment of obligations or delaying the lawsuit, and from abusing his right to appeal using a low legal interest rate of the civil law, and it is intended to flexibly cope with changes in economic conditions by delegation of the statutory interest rate to the Presidential Decree. On the other hand, with respect to the default of monetary obligations, the legal interest rate of Article 3(1) of the same Act is deemed to have both the function of compensating for actual damage of creditors and the function of penal provisions against malicious debtors. In principle, Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that in principle, since the debtor has the above function, it is reasonable to fully apply the rate of penal provisions with respect to the case where it is acknowledged that it is reasonable for him to respond to the lawsuit, and therefore, it may entirely reduce the exercise his right to defense.

However, Article 3(1) of the above Act provides that the exclusion from application of Article 3(2) of the above Act provides that "if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment of fact-finding court declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered, the provision of paragraph (1) shall not apply within a reasonable scope," and there are many opinions regarding the scope of the period during which the application of the statutory interest rate under Article 3(1) of the above Act can be excluded, together with the interpretation of the "reasonable scope".

However, the majority opinion argues that the scope of the period during which the application of Article 3 (1) can be excluded is limited to the period prior to the pronouncement of fact-finding trial by limiting the scope of the above period until the pronouncement of fact-finding trial, and that the application cannot be excluded for any reason for the period after the pronouncement of fact-finding trial. However, I cannot agree with this opinion.

The grounds of the majority opinion are that the term "reasonable scope" in Article 3 (2) of the above provision should be interpreted as "a considerable period for an obligor to resist", and the period for an obligor to resist at the fact-finding court of the relevant case shall be deemed to be the time until the judgment of fact-finding court of the relevant case is rendered. However, if the majority opinion changed that "a considerable period for an obligor to resist" is "a considerable period for an obligor to resist", it shall be understood as "a considerable period for an obligor to do litigation to resist" if it is interpreted that "a considerable period for an obligor to resist" is "a considerable period for an obligor to resist". However, it is difficult to interpret Article 3 (2

In the above-mentioned case, Article 3 (2) of the above-mentioned provision provides that the provision of Paragraph (1) shall not apply within the "reasonable scope" and does not specify the period of application. However, although the former part of the above provision provides that "before the judgment of fact is rendered," it is difficult to view that the above-mentioned provision limits the scope of a period of time during which it does not apply if the context was examined before and after the above

Of course, in light of the spirit of the special provisions of Article 3(1) of the same Act to realize the interest rate and protect good creditors, if the legal interest rate in the civil law is much less than the real interest rate, a dispute is terminated as long as the judgment declaring the existence of performance obligation is rendered at the trial stage of the fact-finding court even though there is a substantial reason for the obligor to resist at the trial stage, so it is the opinion of the majority opinion that the special provisions in the civil law should be applied at all times after the sentence is made is reasonable in the justice and equity, and that this is consistent with the legislative intent of the above special provisions.

However, there is a special case, however, there may be cases where the above opinion is too harsh to a good debtor and may result in a result contrary to justice and equity, and considering that the rate of interest rate of the above special case is 25 percent per annum, the above special case is currently being applied.

Therefore, unlike the majority opinion of Article 3 (2) of the Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Disputes, I think it would be desirable to interpret it as "the scope of a dispute that the court deems reasonable and within the period of time that the court considers reasonable," and to interpret it as "the scope of a dispute that the court considers reasonable," and it would be desirable to set the way to determine the period of exclusion in the discretion of the court.

If such interpretation is premised on the premise, if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute, the court before and after the pronouncement of the judgment at a fact-finding court, like the opinion of the majority opinion, may apply the legal interest rate in civil cases, and the fixed interest rate in civil cases, regardless of whether it is before and after the pronouncement of the judgment at a fact-finding court, and therefore, the court may, at its discretion, apply the legal interest rate in civil cases in a certain period after the pronouncement of the judgment at a fact-finding court. Furthermore, such flexible position may lead to the conclusion that it is possible to divide and apply the legal interest rate in civil cases and the fixed interest rate in special cases for a certain period after the pronouncement of the judgment at a fact-finding court, and that such

The opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court are as follows.

As to the judgment of the court below ordering the defendant to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum and 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment, the plaintiff's appeal to the court below ordering the payment of damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum is without merit. It is consistent with the majority opinion that the plaintiff's appeal to the defendant is reasonable to apply the legal rate of 25% per annum from the day after the date of the judgment of the court of first instance. However

Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc.”) can be summarized as follows: (a) where a judgment ordering the performance of a pecuniary obligation is rendered, the interest in arrears shall be raised from the following day after the date of delivery of a complaint; and (b) where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist in the lawsuit, the legal interest rate stipulated under Article 397 of the Civil Act is fixed at 5 percent per annum; and (c) the obligor does not intend

Thus, the purport of the above special law is to recognize the special exception of Article 397 of the Civil Act on statutory interest rate, which serves as the basis for compensation for damages resulting from the default of monetary obligations, in order to overcome such unreasonable reality. In other words, it is reasonable to recognize the exception because the debtor who fails to perform monetary obligations, has to receive a delivery of the complaint and receive a clean refund, but he/she has to pay interest at a rate of 5 percent per annum, in addition to interest at a rate of 5 percent per annum, even though he/she has to do so, he/she will delay the lawsuit without any reason, which is the legislative purpose of promoting the realization of the rights of the creditor by making it possible for the creditor to promptly respond to the creditor's lawsuit, and to resist the existence or scope of the obligation by responding to the creditor's lawsuit, it is too reasonable to recognize the exception because there is no exception because it is too high interest.

However, while recognizing the exception, Article 3(2) of the above Act limits the time limit of "before the judgment of fact is pronounced," and it causes confusion in the interpretation of the above provision. First of all, it is a problem from how to connect the words "by the debtor to the judgment of fact-finding which declares the existence of the obligation to perform as a fact-finding court" to the words "before the judgment of fact-finding court is pronounced." In other words, it is necessary to read "where it is deemed appropriate to dispute until the judgment of fact-finding court is pronounced, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply," or "where the judgment of fact-finding court is declared, it is not applicable" and "the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not be applied."

In addition, the provisions of Paragraph 1 above shall not be applied, but there are problems such as whether to apply "the reasonable limit", and if so, the term "the reasonable limit" also means "Ison."

If the judgment of the court below was read as the last statement, "the provisions of Paragraph (1) shall not apply until the judgment of the court of fact is rendered", it is interpreted that the interest rate of Paragraph (1) shall be 20 percent per annum in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (Presidential Decree No. 10240) before the judgment of the court of fact-finding is rendered, but after the judgment of the court of fact-finding is rendered, the provision of Paragraph (1) shall be applied, and the interest rate of Paragraph (1) shall be 25 percent per annum in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (1) of Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (Presidential Decree No. 10240) shall not apply to the case where it is deemed that there is a dispute over the judgment of the court of fact-finding.

The fact-finding court of the statement that it is until the judgment of the fact-finding court is rendered is a term distinct from the court of final appeal, which is a legal trial, and refers to the first and second instances, i.e., the court of final appeal, which recognized legal issues and factual issues. Although the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal, declares the existence of the duty of performance, is not only reversed and remanded, but also able to reverse the judgment based on facts recognized by the court of final appeal, so it is difficult to say that it is accurate from the restriction of the judgment of fact-finding when interpreting it as in the former. Accordingly, it is reasonable for an obligor to submit means of attack and defense as to the existence or scope of the duty of performance to the court of final appeal and to resist until the judgment is rendered. Accordingly, the provisions of paragraph (1) should be excluded. It is concluded that the first paragraph (2) is a series of cases where it is deemed reasonable to dispute at any time from the subject of the "debtor", which comes from the first head of the first paragraph (2).

Then, even if "if it is deemed reasonable to dispute", it does not apply the provision of Paragraph 1 of the match, but rather does not apply "within the reasonable limit". This is a very diverse provision, and it is thought that confusion in the interpretation of the starting point of the interest in arrears is not attributable to this sub-paragraph. It is reasonable to exclude the provision of Paragraph 1 in full as long as it does not apply the provision of Paragraph 1 within the reasonable limit, it can be considered as "within the reasonable limit" or "within the reasonable period of debt" or "within the reasonable period of debt and its considerable amount of debt". The majority opinion states that "within the reasonable limit" not "within the scope of obligation of performance" but "within the reasonable period of time for the obligor to dispute", it cannot be excluded from the application of Paragraph 1 for any reason after the fact-finding court declares that "within the reasonable limit of time for the obligor to dispute", and further, if the delivery of the complaint by the court at the trial court at the trial court at the trial, it can be determined properly within the reasonable limit of the period of time.

However, it is desirable for such interpretation to be faithful to the legal text, but it is only a studio that is close to the language that lacks clarity, which is the most important requirement of the law. In other words, a few examples of the Civil Act and the Commercial Act are "reasonable period" (Articles 131, 381, 143(2), and 650 of the Civil Act), "reasonable period of redemption" (Articles 203(3), 325(2) of the Civil Act), "reasonable security (Articles 26 and 522 of the Civil Act, Article 176(3) of the Commercial Act," "reasonable value" (Article 266(2) of the Commercial Act, Article 758(1) of the Commercial Act, and Article 405(2) of the Commercial Act, and it is unreasonable to apply the provision to the court within the scope of reasonable scope of application, such as "reasonable amount of discretion" as stated in the Majority Opinion.

If it is recognized that it is reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation, there is no reason to impose sanctions such as compensating the obligor for the overdue interest at a high rate.

This is an interpretation consistent with the legislative purpose.

In particular, in a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages caused by an accident, the obligor is against large-amount of compensation. Therefore, it is reasonable to proceed in the lawsuit to the extent that the existence of liability for compensation and the scope of compensation up to the scope of compensation is less than the percentage, and it is likely that such a party’s compensation for damages would not result in unfairly restricting the fairness, which is one of the fundamental ideology of the civil trial. Therefore, in a case where the remaining creditors who judged based on the order of judgment lose all or some of them, the obligor’s defense would not lead to a conclusion that the obligor’s defense would be unreasonable.

Justices Kim Yong-chul (Presiding Justice)