[1] The meaning of "where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation" and "reasonable scope" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

[2] The case reversing and losing the judgment below on the ground that the application of Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is erroneous

[1] Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed that it is reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation," it shall be interpreted that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, the issue of whether it is reasonable for an obligor to dispute as above is a matter of fact-finding and its evaluation by the court concerning the case in question, and on the other hand, "the reasonable extent" in the latter part of Article 3 (2) refers to a reasonable period of time until the obligor's dispute is declared as a fact-finding court (the first instance court or the appellate court). Thus, the application of Article 3 (1) of the same Act cannot be excluded for any reason after the pronouncement of the decision, but if the obligor's decision is made from the day following the delivery of the complaint or other equivalent document to the obligor before the pronouncement of the decision in the court, the court may set a reasonable period of time to dispute properly.

[2] In a case where both the plaintiff and the defendant filed an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment against the plaintiff was rendered prior to the remanding of appeal by both the plaintiff and the defendant, but the judgment of the court below was reversed as a result of the plaintiff's appeal and the plaintiff's appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance was partially accepted in the judgment of the court of first instance after the remanding of the appeal, the judgment below reversed and reversed the judgment of the court below on the ground that there are reasonable grounds for dispute as to the existence or scope of the defendant's obligation to pay damages for delay at the rate of 25 percent per annum from the following day of the judgment of the court of first instance until the reversal of the judgment, on the ground that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of

[1] Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings / [2] Article 3(2) of the Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Da23827 delivered on October 13, 1992 (Gong1992, 3129), Supreme Court Decision 94Da2942 delivered on November 11, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3267) / [1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Da1876 delivered on May 26, 1987 (Gong1987, 1058), Supreme Court Decision 94Da56234 delivered on February 17, 1995 (Gong195, 1420), Supreme Court Decision 94Da47728 delivered on March 24, 1995 (Gong195, 1731)

Industrial Bank of Korea (Attorney Seo-gu et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Rocheon-gun (Attorney Hwang Sung-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Supreme Court Decision 93Da46544 Delivered on March 17, 1995

Daejeon High Court Decision 95Na2485 delivered on October 19, 1995

Of the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance, the damages for delay of KRW 100,950,030 as cited by the court of first instance shall be reversed. Of the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance which constitutes the above reversal, the part ordering payment of the above amount in excess of five percent per annum from December 15, 1992 to March 17, 1995, and twenty-five percent per annum from the next day to the full payment date shall be dismissed. The remaining appeal shall be dismissed. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be five percent, and the remainder shall be borne by the plaintiff, respectively.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

In the occurrence of the instant damages, the lower court recognized that the Plaintiff erred as stated in its holding, and therefore, did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to comparative negligence, such as the theory of lawsuit, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s comparative negligence ratio exceeds 40%. There is no reason to discuss.

2. On the second ground for appeal

A. The court below held that the defendant has the obligation to pay damages to the plaintiff in addition to the damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum from April 16, 1993 (the next day of the judgment of the court of first instance) to the full payment date as to the amount of KRW 100,950,030 cited in the court of first instance out of KRW 121,140,036.

B. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed reasonable to dispute the existence or scope of an obligation until the obligor declares the existence of such obligation, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to a reasonable extent." Thus, Article 3(1) of the same Act provides special cases concerning statutory interest rates which serve as the basis for calculating the amount of damages due to nonperformance of monetary obligation can be excluded." Thus, it is interpreted that "if it is deemed necessary for the obligor to dispute the existence or scope of such obligation" as provided in Article 3(1) of the same Act provides that "if it is deemed that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of such obligation, it shall be interpreted that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument regarding the existence or scope of such obligation, it shall be deemed that the fact-finding of the court concerning the case in question and its evaluation thereof shall be a matter pertaining to the determination of the existence or scope thereof, and on the other hand, "the reasonable extent" in the latter part of paragraph (2) refers to 97.

C. However, according to the records, with respect to the plaintiff's claim for damages of this case, the first instance court ordered the plaintiff to pay damages of 100,950,030 won and damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum from December 15, 1992 to April 15, 1993, which is the next day of the first instance court's order for delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case to 10,950,030 won, and damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum from the next day to the next day. The plaintiff's appeal was accepted before the remand, and the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff was reversed as a result of the plaintiff's appeal, and the defendant accepted part of the plaintiff's appeal against the first instance court's 121,140,036 won, and with respect to the amount cited in the first instance court's judgment from 150% to 90% per annum 192.15% per annum, respectively, the defendant's 192.5% per annum.

D. However, if the defendant's assertion was accepted by the court below prior to the remanding of the case as above, it is reasonable to view that there was a reasonable ground for the defendant to dispute about the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment is reversed, but the court below ordered the payment of damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum from the day following the judgment of the court of first instance to the amount of KRW 100,950,030, which is the 100,950,030, which is the 100,000,000, which is the 100,000,000, which is the 25,000,000, which is the 20,000,

E. Therefore, among the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court below, the part against the defendant as to damages for delay of KRW 100,950,030 cited by the court of first instance is reversed, and this part is sufficient to directly judge by the party members, and therefore, it is decided to make a self-market in accordance

As duly determined by the court below, the defendant is obligated to pay 121,140,036 won to the plaintiff. However, since a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation to pay damages is deemed to have considerable grounds, the damages for delay shall be 100,950,030 won which the court of first instance accepted among the above money, the damages for delay shall be 5% per annum under the Civil Act from December 15, 1992, the next day of the delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case to March 17, 1995, which is the date of the judgment of remand, from March 15, 1992, and the damages for delay shall be 20,190,006 won from the next day of the return to the full payment date, the damages for delay shall be paid within the scope of 15% per annum under the Civil Act from the next day of the judgment below to December 15, 192, and the damages for delay shall be paid within the limit of 25% per annum from the above.

3. For the foregoing reasons, the part of the Defendant’s appeal concerning delay damages for KRW 100,950,030 cited by the first instance court among the Defendant’s appeals is partly reasonable. As such, the remaining appeals shall be reversed as above. The remaining appeals shall be dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices who reviewed the application of Articles 89, 92, and 96 of the Civil Procedure Act with respect to the bearing of total costs

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)