A. The meaning of Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings "where the debtor deems it appropriate to resist the existence or scope of the obligation" and "the reasonable scope"

(b) The case affirming the judgment of the court below which held that the debtor's defense disputes over a considerable period from the date of delivery of a copy of complaint until

A. Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed that the debtor has a reasonable ground for a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation," it shall be deemed that there is a reasonable ground for the debtor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, the issue of whether the debtor's argument is reasonable or not is related to the fact-finding and its evaluation by the court concerning the case in question. Meanwhile, the latter part of Article 3 (2) provides that "the reasonable extent" means "the reasonable period for the debtor to dispute" and "the period for the debtor to dispute at the fact-finding court (the first instance court or the appellate court) of the case in question shall be deemed to be the time until the judgment of the fact-finding court is rendered. Thus, the application of Article 3 (1) of the same Act cannot be excluded from the application of the same Act for any reason after the pronouncement of the ruling, but if the judgment at that court is made only before the judgment of the court

B. On the ground that the first instance court accepted the plaintiffs' claim and rejected the plaintiffs' claim, and in case where the court below reversed the judgment of the court below prior to remand as a result of the plaintiffs' appeal and rendered a judgment that accepted the plaintiffs' claim after remanding the case, it is reasonable to view that there was a reasonable ground to see that there was a dispute over the existence or scope of the defendant's claim, and since the defendant's claim was contrary to the previous Supreme Court precedents regarding related or similar cases, it is reasonable to see that the defendant's claim was returned to the same purport, it is reasonable for the court below to dispute about the existence or absence of the obligation, and furthermore, the court below ordered the payment of damages at a rate of 5 percent per annum as prescribed in the Civil Act from the day following the date of delivery of a copy of complaint to the date of delivery of a copy of complaint, and 25 percent per annum as prescribed in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings until the date of completion of the appeal.

(b)Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings;

A. Supreme Court Decision 83Meu875, 876, 877 decided Feb. 14, 1984 (Gong1984, 502) (Gong1987, 1058)

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee

Attorney Choi Young-hoon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant of Korea Airport Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na4297 delivered on May 3, 1994

Supreme Court Decision 93Da14110 Delivered on December 28, 1993

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "when an obligor is deemed to have a reasonable ground for a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation," it refers to the time when the obligor's argument in a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation is deemed to exist. Thus, the issue of whether the obligor's dispute is reasonable or not is related to the fact-finding and its evaluation by the court concerning the case in question. On the other hand, "the reasonable extent" in the latter part of the same Article refers to "the reasonable period for the obligor's dispute" and "the period during which the obligor may dispute at the fact-finding court (the first instance court or the appellate court) of the case in question shall be deemed to be the time until the pronouncement is made at the fact-finding court (the first instance court or the appellate court). Thus, it shall not be excluded from the application of Article 3 (1) of the above Act for any reason after the issuance of the complaint or other equivalent document to it is delivered to the obligor, and if the judgment at that court is made prior to the court (see, per party).

According to the records, the issue of whether the remuneration provision of the defendant Corporation for the payment of retirement allowances is valid to the workers, and whether there was an implied consent or ratification of the workers' consent, and whether there was a rationality in social norms instead of the workers' consent is disputed, and the court below rejected the plaintiffs' claim before remanding the case. The court below rejected the plaintiffs' claim after accepting the plaintiffs' claim. Accordingly, if the judgment of the court below prior to remand was reversed as a result of the plaintiffs' appeal, and the judgment citing the plaintiffs' claim was rendered at the court below after remanding the case, it is reasonable to view that there was a reasonable ground to dispute about the existence or scope of the defendant's obligation to pay compensation if it was accepted by the court below prior to remand. Accordingly, it is reasonable to view that the defendant's claim was contrary to the previous Supreme Court precedents concerning the related or similar cases, and it is reasonable to view that the court below's judgment after remanding the case as to whether the defendant's obligation to pay compensation exists or not, and there is no error of law by the court below's order to remand the above two-year interest rate per annum.

The issue points out the equity with other relevant or similar cases, or the fact that the defendant did not appeal in such cases, but it cannot be said that such circumstance is directly related to the determination of whether there are reasonable grounds for the defendant to resist the existence or scope of the obligation in this case.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)