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(영문) 대법원 2015.12.10 2015다235186
유체동산인도
Text

The portion of the lower judgment concerning delay damages shall be 21,649,910 won per annum from April 22, 2014 to August 21, 2015.

Reasons

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment on the grounds of appeal, the lower court, on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, determined that the Defendant is obligated to deliver the instant steel bars, which were not returned according to the Plaintiff’s instructions, among the government-funded materials used for the instant construction and remaining after being used for the instant construction, but the Defendant was unable to perform its duty to deliver the instant steel bars, and thus, was obligated to pay the Plaintiff the amount equivalent to the market price of

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court’s measure is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules

2. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Ex officio Proceedings on Compensation for Delay Damages (hereinafter “Special Cases Act”) provides that “Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment of fact-finding court declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to a reasonable extent,” thereby excluding the application of the provisions of Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Compensation for Damages, which provides for special cases concerning statutory interest rates which serve as the basis for calculating damages due to the nonperformance of the obligation.” Thus, Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Legal Proceedings provides that “where it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation to perform” refers to cases where the obligor’s assertion is acknowledged to have a reasonable ground for the obligor’s assertion as to the existence or scope of the obligation to perform the obligation. Whether it is reasonable for the obligor to oppose

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