(a) Whether it is impossible to seek the revocation of adjudication on the ground of illegality in the project approval disposition itself at the stage of adjudication on expropriation;

B. Whether Article 46(2) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989) and Articles 29 through 29-6 of the former Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989) violate the principle of fair compensation as provided in Article 23(3) of the Constitution (negative)

(c) Scope of restrictions under public law to be excluded from the indemnity assessment of the land to be expropriated subject to restrictions under public law;

(d) The case holding that it is justifiable to consider the restrictions imposed by designating development-restricted areas under the Urban Planning Act prior to the implementation of the relevant public project as they are, and assess the amount of compensation of land to be expropriated without considering the restrictions imposed by designating park sites

A. The illegality of the project approval disposition itself should be disputed at the project approval phase, and at the expropriation adjudication phase where the period of dispute has already lapsed, the adjudication revocation cannot be claimed on the ground of such illegality unless there are special circumstances to deem that the project approval disposition is null and void annually.

B. Article 46(2) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989) and Articles 29 through 29-6 of the former Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989) do not violate the principle of fair compensation under Article 23(3) of the Constitution.

C. In calculating the amount of compensation for the land to be expropriated under public law, the scope of the public law limit due to the public project and other public projects shall be limited to not only the case where the public project is conducted directly for the purpose of the implementation of the public project, but also the case where the public project is incorporated into the public project for any purpose other than the original purpose of the public project. In light of Article 6(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Compensation for Loss and Compensation for Losses of Public Works, the reason for expanding and interpreting the "where the public project becomes subject to the public law limit directly for the purpose of the project is to prevent disadvantages to landowners due to the change of the project or intentional prior restriction."

(d) The case holding that in a case where restrictions are already placed on use due to public announcement under the Urban Planning Act prior to the implementation of the relevant public project, in the case of restrictions on the designation or alteration of areas, districts, zones, etc. under Section B of Chapter II of the Urban Planning Act, such restrictions are deemed to be general planning restrictions on which the purposes of such restrictions are completed in itself, and that in the case of restrictions on the installation, maintenance, and improvement of facilities under Article 2 (1) 1 (b) of the Urban Planning Act, the reasonable amount of compensation shall be determined on the basis of the price assessed according to the form of land at the time of adjudication and the current use thereof, etc., and in the case of restrictions on the construction, maintenance, and improvement of facilities under Article 2 (1) 1 (b) of the Urban Planning Act, which are publicly announced as roads, squares, parks, green areas, etc., or due to the announcement of the decision of planning concerning various projects under item (c) of the same subparagraph, they shall be deemed to be individual planning

A. Article 19(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 46(2) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989), Articles 29 through 29-6 of the former Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989), Article 23(3)(c) of the Constitution, Article 46(1) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989), Article 6(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes and Compensation

A. Supreme Court Decision 87Nu395 delivered on September 8, 1987 (Gong1987,1583) 87Nu1141 delivered on December 27, 198 (Gong1989,1141) (Gong1941 delivered on January 23, 1990) (Gong190,549). D. Supreme Court Decision 88Nu11797 delivered on July 11, 1989 (Gong1989,1259) (Gong199). Supreme Court Decision 82Nu549 delivered on May 29, 1984 (Gong1984,1197)

Plaintiff

Central Land Tribunal and one other

Seoul High Court Decision 89Gu6879 delivered on April 3, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

1. As to the ground of appeal No. 1 by the Plaintiff

The illegality of the project approval itself should be disputed at the project approval phase, and the expropriation ruling phase where the period of dispute has already expired cannot seek revocation of the adjudication on the ground of such illegality unless there are special circumstances that the project approval disposition is deemed null and void as a matter of course (Article 46(2) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989), and Articles 29 through 29-6(1) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 198), and Article 29-6(2) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 23, 1990), and Article 29-6(1) of the former Land Expropriation Act (amended by Act No. 4120 of Apr. 1, 1989) provide for the method of calculating the compensation amount before the date of the adjudication on the expropriation of this case goes against the principle of equality under the Constitution.

2. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 2 and Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 1

In calculating the amount of compensation for land to be expropriated under public law, if the restriction under public law is directly applied to the public project for the purpose of the implementation of the public project concerned, and if it is incorporated into the public project for any purpose other than the originally intended purpose, it shall be evaluated as without the restriction (Article 88Nu11797, Jul. 11, 1989). Accordingly, in light of the fact that the extended interpretation of "where the public project is restricted under public law for a direct purpose" under Article 6 (4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Compensation of Loss and Compensation of Losses Act is to prevent the disadvantage of landowners due to the change of the project or intentional prior restriction, etc., the scope of the restriction under public law due to the public project concerned and the public project for any purpose other than the original purpose is limited to the necessity of the specific restriction.

In the same purport, the court below determined a reasonable amount of compensation on the basis of the price assessed according to the form of land and the current status of use at the time of adjudication, in a case where the restriction is already made due to the designation or change of the area, district, zone, etc. under Section 2 of Chapter II of the Urban Planning Act prior to the implementation of the relevant public project, and the reasonable amount of compensation should be determined on the basis of the price assessed according to the form of land and the current status of use, etc. as at the time of adjudication, in a case where the restriction is deemed to be a general planning restriction under Article 2 of the Urban Planning Act, and where the restriction is already made due to the construction, maintenance, and improvement of facilities under Article 2(1)1 (b) of the Urban Planning Act, as a decision of planning for the installation, maintenance, and improvement of facilities under Article 2(1)1 (c) of the Urban Planning Act, as a road, square, park, green area, etc., or the restriction is deemed to be an individual planning restriction accompanying the specific project, and there is no such restriction.

Although there are provisions concerning facilities under Article 2 (1) 1 (b) of the Urban Planning Act in Section 2 of Chapter II of the same Act, the designation of specific facilities-restricted areas, such as factories, schools, central wholesale markets, etc., under Article 20 (1) of the same Act shall not be limited to the establishment of such specific facilities, and the designation of specific facilities-restricted areas, such as factories, schools, and central wholesale markets, in itself, shall be deemed a general planning restriction in the sense that the purpose of restriction is completed and specific projects are not accompanied by the completion of such specific facilities. Article 20-2 (3) of the same Act is merely a permit provision that certain facilities may be installed

3. As to the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 2

It was true that the non-party, who was adopted by the court below at the time of May 11, 1990, changed the form and quality of land for the construction of a military unit with respect to the land in this case as argued in the theory of lawsuit as of May 11, 1990. However, in light of the appraiser's appraisal result (Records 245), it was found that the non-party excluded development gains or restrictions from the expropriation and conducted retroactive price appraisal at the time of the appraisal as of November 12, 198, which was the date of the appraisal decision, and there was no evidence to view that there was no such change of land shape and quality for the construction of a military unit as above as of November 12, 198 as the price calculation factor of the land in this case. Accordingly, we cannot accept the argument that there was an error in violation of the rules of experience or rules of evidence in the process of the court below'

4. Therefore, the appeal is without merit, and all costs of appeal are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, who are the losing parties and each of the Defendants.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)