Main Issues
A. Whether the division of a church is recognized in a case where some of the members remain in the previous church, while the remaining members have passed a resolution on the change of the affiliated church and join a new religious order (affirmative)
B. Whether the ownership of the properties of the previous church (=collective ownership of the members at the time of the division) and one church consisting of the remaining members can seek an inspection of the properties of the church against the other church, in case where there is no provision regarding the reversion of the properties of the church upon the division of the church (negative)
C. Whether the provision that "any person who fails to adopt or leaves the school shall not have the right to use the property," among the religious order constitution to which the previous school association belongs, has binding force in a case where the previous school association is divided into two churches by withdrawing the school group and organizing a new church after going through a new religious order (negative)
D. In a case where a church is divided, whether only the members at the time of the division have the right to use and benefit from the properties of the previous church (negative)
Summary of Judgment
A. While some of the members of a church belonging to the same church still remain in the previous church, in case where the remaining members agree to change the church to which they belong and join a new religious order, the previous church has been divided into two churches belonging to the previous church consisting of the new church belonging to the new religious order and the remaining members.
B. In a case where one church is divided into two churches, if the church is divided into two churches, the church's property belongs to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division, and the members can use the church's property which is the object of collective ownership within the scope of the activities of each church, since the legal nature of the previous church belongs to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division, unless otherwise stipulated in advance about the ownership of the church in preparation for the cases where the church is divided into two churches, and in general, the church's property belongs to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division, and the members can enjoy profit from the use of the church's property which is the object of collective ownership within the scope of the activities of each church. Therefore, even if the name of the church's property registered
C. In a case where the previous church's constitution provides that "any person who does not adopt or leave the doctrine or laws of the church shall not have the right to use the property which belongs to the church," the relationship between the church and the affiliated church shall be established within the extent that the basic independence of the church is recognized, and the basic property of the church shall be deemed to have the intention of the members to own and use the church for himself/herself, unless there are special circumstances, and in the principle of the freedom of religion, the members of the church may withdraw or change the affiliated church, and as long as they do not withdraw from the church, they shall not lose the status of the members of the church, in light of the above provision, not only the members of the previous church themselves lose the status of the members of the church, but also the cases where the previous church is divided into two churches by leaving the affiliated church and forming a separate church.
D. In light of the characteristics of a church, if the members of a church continuously change and either party, each divided church can accept new members, and after the division, only the members at the time of the division shall not be entitled to profit from the use of the properties of the previous church.
[Dissenting Opinion 1]
Although the division of a church is recognized, if a church which is a single collective ownership organization is divided into two churches, it is reasonable to view that the properties belonging to the previous collective ownership organization are jointly owned by each church, and each church's co-ownership belongs to each church and its members in the form of collective ownership after the division. In this case, it is the most reasonable to determine the share of each church by the ratio of the members who have the right to use and benefit from the properties jointly owned at the time of the division, i.e., the number of the members of each church.
[Dissenting Opinion]
A. The Civil Act recognizes the withdrawal of a member of an incorporated association or the dissolution of an incorporated association, but it does not recognize the division of an incorporated association that is divided into two corporations and that the members of an incorporated association continue to exist independently. Accordingly, in the case of a division of an incorporated association, it does not provide for the reversion of the property of the previous incorporated association. Therefore, it is not reasonable to recognize the division of an incorporated association that has no capacity to have the same substance as that of the incorporated association even if it is actually divided, there is no room to recognize the division within the legal meaning, and even if such division is recognized, there is no provision to apply directly to the property reversion relationship and other legal relations in the case, and there is no provision to apply by analogy as well as the applicable
B. In a case where a church is actually divided, it is appropriate to apply mutatis mutandis Article 78 of the Civil Act concerning the resolution of the dissolution of an association so that a resolution to move to a different religious order may be passed with the consent of not less than 3/4 of the registered members at the joint council of the branch church which can be called the general council of an association. If the church legitimately changes the church members according to the total of the members, the properties of the previous church which belongs to the collective ownership of the changed members shall belong to the collective ownership of the changed members, and in a case where a new church occurs due to the collective withdrawal of the members without the above legitimate procedure, all properties collectively owned by the previous members shall remain jointly owned by the members of the previous church which maintains the consistency with the previous church, and a new church or its members which is not legally related to the previous church shall not have rights in any form.
[Reference Provisions]
Articles 275 and 276 of the Civil Act
Reference Cases
A.B. (B) Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1197 Decided March 22, 198 (Gong1988, 669) (Gong1989, 412).B. Supreme Court Decision 86Ma478 Decided February 30, 1987 (Gong1987, 1512) Decided February 8, 1985 (Gong1991, 586) Decided December 21, 1990
Plaintiff-Appellant
Attorney Kim Yong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee
Defendant-Appellee
[Judgment of the court below] The plaintiff-appellant and the plaintiff-appellant shall be the plaintiff-appellant and the plaintiff-appellant shall be the plaintiff-appellant of the plaintiff-appellant.
Judgment of the lower court
Busan High Court Decision 89Na6457 delivered on December 7, 1990
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.
Reasons
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2
According to the evidence of the city church, since February 27, 1967, the non-party 1 left the above church's association with the non-party 2, who is the owner of the above church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's management of the non-party 1's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's pre-existing church's 90 members' pre-existing church's pre-existing church's dissolution.
In addition, Article 94 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, which provides that "a person who does not adopt or has left the Korea Egyptian Association or the laws and regulations shall not have the right to use the property" shall not be entitled to use the property in the case of the division of the above church. Therefore, as to the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant church does not have the right to use and benefit from the church of this case, the relationship between the church and the church with the church of this case shall be established within the extent that the basic independence of the church is recognized, and the basic property of the church shall be deemed to have the intention to own and use the church for the members of the church, and in light of the principle of the freedom of religion, the members of the church may withdraw or change the church of this case, and as long as the church does not leave the church itself, the above provision does not lose the status of the members of the church of this case, it shall not be a case where the members of the previous church lose their status as members of the church, but it shall not be deemed that they join the previous church and shall not be binding in this case where the church of this case.
In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the division of a church, or as to the interpretation of Article 94 (3) of the above Constitution or private autonomy, which is a non-corporate association, by misapprehending the legal principles as to the division of a church, or failing to make an incomplete deliberation as to the requirements for the division, the lack of reasons, or the interpretation of Article 94 (3) of the above Constitution or private autonomy. The arguments are without merit.
2. As to the third ground for appeal
Each divided church can accept new members in light of the characteristics of the church, so following the division does not necessarily have the right to use and benefit from the properties of the previous church only for the members at the time of the division (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu197 delivered on March 22, 198; 87Meu3037 delivered on February 14, 1989).
The court below's decision to the same purport and rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant church is an organization consisting of the newly admitted members after the division, not only the members at the time of the division, and therefore it is proper to reject the plaintiff's assertion that the use of the properties and the right to benefit from the properties of the previous church cannot be asserted, and there is no violation
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal except for the dissenting opinion by Justice Lee Chang-chul, Justice Yoon In-hoon, and Justice Kim Sang-won.
Justices Lee Chang-chul's dissenting opinion is as follows.
1. The issues in this case are whether to recognize the division of a church in the branch church (hereinafter only referred to as a " church"), which is the individual church of the German society, and how to determine the ownership of the properties belonging to the previous church after the division, if recognizing the division.
The previous precedents have recognized the division of a church, and the majority opinion in this case also follow the previous opinion. Since the previous precedents provide the requirements for the division, there is no defect that excessively expanded interpretation of the concept of the division because it is a vague and abstract, it is in line with the majority opinion that recognizes the division of a church in conclusion.
Next, in case where a church is divided, the majority opinion also regards the ownership of the church properties as belonging to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division according to the opinion of the previous precedents, but this point is not acceptable, and therefore I want to express the dissenting opinion.
First of all, regarding the division of a church, I will look at the division of the church and the reversion of the church property in the case of the division.
2. The church is the integration of the members based on the religious doctrine (Dulma) and the religious activity pattern, which is a common religious ideology, and is basically a religious organization, on the other hand, has the organization and functions as a social organization, such as setting up a joint decision-making body of the representative and members, and managing property.
The above nature of a church as a social organization is difficult to be defined as a single church, but the precedents have taken full account of the fact that the individual church of the religious community of the religious community in this case has the substance of an association (the association), and as to this opinion, there is a counterargument that the basic elements of a church should be viewed as a foundation on the ground that it is in an operating organization centered on the contributed property rather than human-combined property. However, considering that the church is a religious organization of the members, it is reasonable to regard the nature of the social organization as an association.
If the collective nature of a church is set up as a religious organization and an association, the disputes in the church may be divided into a religious organization dispute and an association dispute.
Since the foundation of a church as a religious organization is a common doctrine and worship, if there is a dispute over the doctrine and worship between the members, so that they lose the foundation of their commonity and form a separate religious organization, the previous religious organization is not extinguished and it is inevitable to be divided into a separate religious organization.
However, inasmuch as a church is basically a religious organization, and an association is nothing more than a legally assessed assessment of the character of the social organization, as long as the basic religious organization is divided, the formation of the association is also evaluated as divided accordingly. If a church is divided, the rights and obligations belonging to the previous church shall be deemed to be divided into the two divided churches, and the rights and obligations belonging to the previous church shall be deemed to be divided into co-ownership and comprehensive succession.
The establishment, existence, and extinction of an association granted to a legal entity shall be governed by the provisions of Acts, and in principle, the provisions concerning an association shall apply mutatis mutandis to an association with no legal capacity. However, since an association with no legal capacity is different in its organization and composition and the provisions concerning an association cannot be applied uniformly, if the foundation of an association is a religious organization, it shall not be deemed that the division of an association is contrary to the nature of an association with no legal capacity, even if it is recognized according to its characteristics.
As above, in a case where a church is divided into two parts due to a dispute over doctrine and worship, only one party who has a legitimacy and only the other party shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the previous church, while maintaining the consistency with the previous church, does not have any opinion that the other party shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the previous church. However, the existence of legitimacy as to doctrine and worship which is the foundation of a religious organization is a matter of religious religion that cannot be examined by judicial power. In other words, the law cannot enter the order.
In addition, even though the subject of the dispute is not directly related to the doctrine and worship, the dispute about the change of the religious order to which the individual church belongs should be considered as a dispute related to the doctrine and the worship. However, even in this case, in our country, the church dispute is not a dispute about the doctrine or the worship but a dispute about the operation of the church or the personnel affairs, etc. in lieu of the dispute about the doctrine or the worship. However, in most cases, even though some of the members leave the religious order to which the previous church belongs and join another religious order, the dispute is caused by the formation of the dispute, even though it comes from the passive reason unrelated to the doctrine and the worship, it should be considered as a dispute related to the doctrine and the worship, so long as the form of the change of the church group was taken, it shall be considered as a dispute related to the doctrine and the worship, therefore, it shall not be decided whether the church division is a legitimate or not.
In the opinion that recognizes the division of a church, there is a view that the division should be recognized only when it can be evaluated positively from the legal order, such as that the cause of the religious order change is not accepted by the request for correction of the moral status of the members of the existing church or the head of the church. However, since the loss of the common nature of the doctrine and the worship, which is the requirement of the division, is a requirement that is not superior to the moral value concept, it is not correct to consider the moral value factors such as the reputation of the pastor or the head.
Meanwhile, disputes related to the maintenance and existence of an association, such as church's properties, operation, or personnel, which are not disputes of religious organizations as above, should be dealt with by the principle of majority, the method of dissolution, and the method of liquidation in accordance with the general legal principles of an association, so there is no room for recognizing the division of an association due to such disputes.
3. However, the opinion denying the division of a church is generally based on the legal principle that recognizes the division of an association in addition to the dissolution and the liquidation which are recognized as the grounds for the extinguishment of an association under our organization law, and that the division of an association is a anti-value concept; second, the decision-making of an association applies the principle of majority, so a minority who does not receive the result of the majority does not withdraw, but can not be divided into two churches; third, the court's approval of the division of a church would encourage the division of a church, which results in the promotion of the division of a church.
However, as seen earlier, the first point is based on the premise that the church is a religious organization based on the common doctrine and worship, and that the legal provisions on the extinction of an association should be applied to the church as they are, however, on the premise that the legal provisions on the extinguishment of an association should be applied to the church as they are, however, on the premise that the theory of an association applied mutatis mutandis to the aspect of the association should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the characteristics of the basic religious organization, and on the contrary, it is not reasonable to deny the legal phenomenon of the division of a church that exists in reality in order to apply the general theory on the extinction of an association uniformly to the church that is a religious organization. Moreover, in that the division brings about the extinction of an existing organization, it goes beyond the meaning of the concept of anti-valueing under the organization law by classifying the division as it is different from the dissolution of an existing organization.
The second point is that the principle of majority decision-making, which is the decision-making method of the general association, cannot be applied to disputes concerning the doctrine and worship of the church, which is a religious organization.
The principle of majority is not only against the essence of the religion, but also against the principle of freedom of religion that a minority's opinion should be buried in the majority's opinion because the minority is buried in the majority and that only a majority opinion is decided by the opinion of the organization itself. Since it is against the principle of freedom of religion, the principle of majority shall not apply to the decision-making of a religious organization related to the doctrine of doctrines and worship.
Therefore, even if a dispute over doctrines and worship arises by a majority of the members, such decision is merely a expression of majority opinions and cannot be the whole intent including the minority. Thus, if the majority of the members who did not accept a majority opinion voluntarily secedes from the religious organization, but they claim to share the rights and interests enjoyed within the previous religious organization with the substance as a separate religious organization, then the previous religious organization is eventually divided into two religious organizations based on a separate doctrine and worship.
Third, since there has been a division of a church before the public health unit and the precedents of the members recognized the division of a church, it is not only inconsistent with the logic that the court recognizes the division of a church and encourage the division as a result, but also it is nothing more than the unproof trend that the phenomenon of the division of a religious organization can be resolved or reduced by the court without recognizing the division of a church.
Moreover, it is pointed out that the phenomenon of pluralization, which is referred to as a characteristic of modern religion, is not only a religious factor but also a cause for extra-cultural factors. As the division of a church is related to the diversification of religion, it is not a nature that can suppress judicial power by intervention.
4. As seen above, in the case of recognizing the division of a church, the previous precedents and the majority opinion concerning the reversion of the church properties shall be deemed to belong to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division.
However, it means that the division of a church means that one church is divided into two separate churches, and the previous church does not exist due to its extinction, while recognizing the division, the logic that the status of the previous church as collective ownership organization still remains and it belongs to the collective ownership of the members of the previous church is contradictory.
As a form of ownership of an unincorporated association, the competence of management and disposal in the capacity of ownership belongs to a single organization as a single right, and the competence of use and disposal belongs to an organization as an individual right to each member, and thus, is in the form of ownership premised on the existence of a collective ownership organization. Therefore, if the previous collective ownership organization ceases to exist due to division, the right to manage and disposal belonging to the previous organization as well as the right to benefit from use belonging to its members is no longer likely to exist.
However, if the division of a church is deemed as the dissolution of an association and the previous church continues to exist as an organization in the course of liquidation until the completion of liquidation, it may be deemed that the collective ownership of the previous church continues even after the division, but as the church has already been divided into two separate churches which are not identical with the previous church, the rights and duties belonging to the previous church shall be comprehensively succeeded to the division of each divided church. Therefore, in the case of such comprehensive succession, the previous church shall be deemed extinguished without the liquidation procedure.
In addition, the view that deeming that it belongs to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division as in the majority opinion is actually not only to waive the disposal of the church properties after the division and to leave it in the situation at the time of the division. This is because it is difficult to continue to exist as a single church due to disputes arising from the church disputes in the church, and it is difficult to expect that as a member of each church at the time of the division, those who were the members of the previous church at the time of the division constitute a single church and constitute a joint resolution on the management of the church properties.
Therefore, if a church which is a group of collective ownership is divided into two collectively owned churches, it is reasonable to regard that the properties belonging to the previous group of collective ownership are jointly owned by each church, and each church's co-ownership belongs to each church and its members in the form of collective ownership after the division. In this case, each church's co-ownership ratio is the most reasonable to determine the proportion by each church of the members who have the right to use and benefit from the properties jointly owned at the time of the division, i.e., the number of the three members of each church, and as long as it is deemed to be jointly owned, the matters concerning the management of the jointly owned properties shall be determined as a majority of the share in accordance with the provisions concerning joint ownership under the Civil Act, and if the co-ownership is not desired, the co-ownership relation may be terminated by
5. Ultimately, the previous precedents on the reversion of the properties at the time of the division of a church shall be amended. Accordingly, in this case, inasmuch as the court below recognized that the previous church members of the Korean Buddhist Temples Association of Busan, Busan, was divided into the plaintiff church and the defendant church at the time of the division, the court below should have determined the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim, considering that the majority of the right holder who can determine the management activities of the church building of this case, which is the co-owned property under Article 265 of the Civil Act, is one of the majority right holder, who can determine the management activities of the church building of this case, at the time of the division.
The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Yoon-tae and Justice Kim Sang-won is as follows.
In a case where some of the members of a church who belong to a different religious order want to remain in the previous religious order, the original church is divided into two churches which belong to the previous religious order by the members who agree to move to the new religious order, and in a case where a church is divided into two churches which belong to the new religious order, the original church shall be deemed to belong to the new religious order, and in a case where the church is divided into the original church, the church shall be jointly owned by the members at the time of the division and shall be jointly owned by the members at the time of the division (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4289Sang182, Dec. 13, 195; Supreme Court Decision 4293Sang395, Jan. 11, 1962; Supreme Court Decision 70Da2478, Dec. 9, 197; Supreme Court Decision 97Da1984, Apr. 28, 2098; Supreme Court Decision 2008Da1979886, Apr. 28, 197, 197
Therefore, the Civil Act recognizes the withdrawal of the members of an association or the dissolution of an association other than property, but it does not recognize the division of an association as an independent association, and therefore there is no provision on the legal relationship of an association under the Civil Act. Therefore, if some of the members of an association oppose the original purpose of the association or the articles of association and form two corporations independently, it is difficult to find the legal relationship of an association as well as the legal relationship of an association under the Civil Act by analogy, unless there is a resolution to dissolve the division of an association. However, our Civil Act recognizes the withdrawal of the members of an association or dissolution of an association as two corporations, and there is no provision on the reversion of the properties of the previous association in the case of the division of an association. Therefore, even if there is two corporations, it is difficult to find the legal relationship of an association as well as the legal relationship of an association established in the way of the division of an association, which is not the case of the division of an association, as well as in the case of the actual legal relationship of an association.
Furthermore, there is a problem of how to deal with the legal relations in the case of the division of a church. This is considered to be in accordance with the method of analogicalizing the provisions concerning incorporated associations in the Civil Act, with due regard to the formation of the church, the method of operation and the cause of the division of the church. Even though the church refers to the division of a church, there are several types of forms, depending on the relationship with the previous church, such as whether the church belongs to a different religious order, whether the previous church belongs to the previous church, and whether the previous church can be divided into itself, and there are different legal regulations according to each form of the church, and if some of the members of the church in this case move to move to the previous church and leave the different religious order and a church is divided by joining the different religious order, it is not possible to separate the previous church from the previous church for the purpose of leaving the religious order, and therefore, it is not possible to recognize the division of the previous church as a part of the members of the previous church that does not belong to the previous church and therefore, it is not possible to maintain its consistency with the previous church.
However, if the Civil Act can change the articles of association, including the purpose of a corporation, and furthermore, if it is inferred that an incorporated association can dissolve the corporation itself by the resolution of a general meeting, it shall be deemed that the act of changing the religious order, such as leaving the affiliated church through a certain procedure with the total of the members, shall be permitted. However, although the procedures for changing the articles of association or dissolution of an incorporated association are stipulated in the Civil Act, there is no provision in the Civil Act regarding the change of the church belonging to the church, nor there is no provision regarding the change of the church belonging to the church, nor there is no provision regarding the relation that can expect or allow the above change of the religious order in accordance with the municipal ordinances and rules of the church itself. Therefore, there
With respect to this point, among the precedents of the members, the members state that the freedom of religious order to move to the different order by the members is required by the general opinion of the members or by all the members of the church (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 67Da2202, Dec. 18, 1967; Supreme Court Decision 78Da716, Oct. 10, 197; Supreme Court Decision 79Da1664, Feb. 12, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 81Da276, Sept. 22, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 84Da730, Feb. 8, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 90Da8558, May 28, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 70Da2202, Oct. 10, 197; Supreme Court Decision 79Da2730, Feb. 27, 1985).
First, the amendment of the articles of incorporation of an incorporated association requires the consent of at least 2/3 of all the members (Article 42(1) of the Civil Act), and an incorporated association is prohibited from passing a resolution for dissolution without the consent of at least 3/4 of all the members (Article 78 of the Civil Act). However, from a legal point of view, a church's change to a different religious order is separated from a branch church that belongs to the previous church and is organized into a new religious order that belongs to the new religious order. Therefore, since a church belongs to the previous church, it is not only to change the articles of incorporation of an incorporated association, but also to dissolve the church itself that belongs to the previous church.
Therefore, it is reasonable to apply Article 78 of the Civil Code to the resolution to dissolve an incorporated association in this case so that it can pass a resolution to move to a different religious order with the consent of not less than 3/4 of incumbent members at the joint council of the branch church that can be called the general assembly of an incorporated
In addition, the Joint Council here is not composed of all the members, unlike the general assembly of an incorporated association, but it is composed of only the defects of the branch church (Article 86 (1) of the above Constitution). Therefore, regarding the qualifications of members, it is necessary to respect the municipal ordinances and rules of the relevant church and apply them.
Furthermore, the above joint councils should be convened through legitimate procedures.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (Article 86(2)), the Joint Council shall convene a meeting by a resolution of a party council (Article 86(2)), so the Joint Council for resolution to move to a different order shall also undergo such procedures. However, if there is a petition of at least 1/3 of the defect in the religious order, a joint council shall be convened (Article 86(3)). Therefore, if the chairperson of a party does not take the procedure to convene a joint council notwithstanding such petition, the petitioner may convene the meeting by analogy of Article 70(3) of the Civil Act with the permission of the court, by analogying Article 70(3) of the Civil Act.
If the church is changed lawfully according to the above total of the members, the properties of the previous church, which belongs to the collective ownership of the members of the previous church, shall belong to the collective ownership of the changed church members (it shall be deemed that the previous church is bound by the total of the members and the new church is a member of the newly organized church, even in the case of the members who do not agree with the alteration of the church and intend to continue the church to remain in the previous religious order without the alteration of the church.)
However, even though a church has been divided into two different churches which actually belong to a different religious order without such legitimate procedure, as mentioned above, there are only one church which remains in the previous church in the legal evaluation as well as only one church which remains in the previous church, and the other church is a newly organized church only with the members who withdraw from the previous church and is irrelevant to the previous church. Therefore, if only a new church occurs due to the collective withdrawal of the members, all properties owned by the members of the previous church shall remain in the collective ownership of the members of the previous church, and if the previous church and the new church or its members who are not legally related to the previous church shall not have rights in any form.
In addition to the above precedents, it is reasonable to abolish or change all the precedents of party members differently from the purport of the above judgment.
The court below should have deliberated whether the defendant church belongs to a different religious order while leaving the previous religious order, and as a result, it should have confirmed which the plaintiff church and any of the defendant church maintain the consistency with the previous church and continue to own the properties of the previous church. However, the case of this case should be recognized as the division of a church, and unless otherwise provided, it is determined that the properties of the previous church belong to the collective ownership of the members at the time of the division and the members can use and benefit from the church properties subject to the collective ownership right within the scope of the activities of each church. Therefore, the court below's rejection of the plaintiff's claim on the premise that only the plaintiff church members are the collective ownership right holders of the properties of the previous church is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles concerning the division of the church and the reversion of the properties of the church, and the plaintiff church's argument pointing this out is justified.
For the above reasons, we cannot agree with the opinion that the majority opinion adopts, and the judgment of the court below that the same purport should be reversed.
Chief Justice Lee Yong-ju (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice)