(a) Form occupying roads by the State or local governments;

(b) Whether unjust enrichment is established where a local government occupies and manages another's land as a road without lawful compensation procedures;

(c) In the case of paragraph (2) above, the calculation basis of unjust enrichment;

A. The form of possession of a road by the State or a local government is divided into possession and possession as a road management authority. In fact, if the existing road is determined to publicly approve routes under the Road Act or a road zone is constructed by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act, possession as a road management authority may be recognized starting from the time of the existing road. However, even if the construction of a road is not performed by the State or a local government, it may be deemed that the existing road is under the de facto control of the State or a local government, and is still in the form of a road by carrying out construction on the private land which is actually common or not common for the general public, or is still in the form of a road, and then, it shall be deemed that the existing road is under the de facto control of the State or a

B. If a local government occupies land as a site without following lawful compensation procedures such as the Urban Planning Act or the Road Act, the route of the said road has been designated as a general national highway, and regardless of whether the road is subject to the application of the Road Act, it is occupied and used without any legal ground between landowners. As to the site of the road, even if the exercise of private rights is restricted under Article 5 of the Road Act, this does not preclude the exercise of private rights that conflict with the management and use of the road as to the road under the Road Act, and it does not preclude the exercise of private rights that conflict with the management and use of the road.

C. In the case of paragraph (b) above, the basic price of the land in order to calculate the amount of unjust enrichment shall be appraised according to the actual situation at the time when the land was incorporated into the road without considering the situation where the land was incorporated into the road, and it shall be appraised according to the actual conditions of the land at the time of its incorporation, and the land owner acquired it with the knowledge that the land was subject to restrictions on the exercise of private rights at the time of its acquisition. In addition, the expected interest rate to calculate the rent of the land shall be determined by taking into account the rate of national and public bonds, the long-term loan interest rate of banks, the ordinary interest rate of banks, the normal interest rate of real estate transactions, the rate of rent rates as stipulated in the State Property Act and the Local Finance Act, etc. In light of the private roads, etc. stipulated in Article 6-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act

A. Article 192(b) of the Civil Act; Article 245(1)(c) of the Civil Act; Article 741 of the Civil Act; Article 6-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Compensation

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da21206 delivered on September 24, 1991 (Gong1991, 2607) 91Da35649 delivered on October 27, 1992 (Gong1992, 3242) 92Da3415 delivered on February 23, 1993 (Gong1993, 1063) b. 87Da931 delivered on November 22, 198 (Gong1989, 16) 88Da606 delivered on November 24, 1989 (Gong198, 298), 90Da5795 delivered on March 12, 191 (Gong1991, 164) 192Da1293939 delivered on March 19, 192 (Gong199, 194) 193Da1294949 delivered on March 129, 19294)

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Jeonyang-si Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na6346 delivered on April 16, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

1. We examine the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal.

The form of occupation of a road by the State or a local government can be divided into possession as a road management authority and possession as a de facto controlling entity. In fact, if the existing road is determined by the Road Act, or a road zone is constructed by the implementation of an urban planning project under the Urban Planning Act, possession as a road management authority can be recognized starting from the existing road. However, even if the construction of a road is not conducted by the State or a local government under the Road Act, it shall be deemed that the existing road is under the de facto control of the State or a local government, and it shall be deemed that the existing road is under the de facto control of the State or a local government, and it shall be deemed that the road is under the de facto control of the State or a local government (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da21206, Sept. 24, 191; 91Da35649, Oct. 27, 1992).

The precedent of a party member is not appropriate in this case.

In addition, the plaintiff filed an appeal on the part of the judgment below regarding the claim for confirmation of ownership, but the ground of appeal does not clarify the ground of appeal on the ground of appeal. Therefore, this part of the appeal is without merit. All of

2. The Defendant’s grounds of appeal (the grounds of appeal on supplement are to the extent of supplement) are examined.

With respect to No. 1:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the above land belongs to the river area by recognizing the fact that the defendant occupied the land as the road site by the evidence, and the above land belongs to the river area. In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no

With respect to the second ground:

The acquisition of real estate ownership by the completion of prescription or donation contract at the time of the enforcement of the Gu Resident Act shall lose its validity unless the registration pursuant to the contract is made by December 31, 1965, and the ownership shall be lost, and only the right to claim the transfer of ownership due to the completion of prescription or donation shall have the right to claim the transfer of ownership (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 67Da163, Apr. 4, 1967; 68Da2051, Oct. 14, 1969; 86Meu2218, Jul. 7, 1987).

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct and there is no violation of law as otherwise pointed out.

The precedent of a party member is not appropriate in this case.

With respect to the third point:

Since easements are used as real rights to use another person's land for the benefit of his own land for a certain purpose and based on the relationship between dominant and dominant estate, the defendant should assert that there is a dominant land in which the defendant gains convenience through the passage of the above land in order to claim the right of passage over the above land in this case.

In the same purport, the lower court’s rejection of the Defendant’s assertion on the Defendant’s right of passage on the ground that there was no assertion or proof as to the existence of the dominant station, and the location of the road alone, as otherwise alleged, cannot be deemed to have been proven as above.

In addition, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the misapprehension of legal principles, as otherwise alleged in the above, since the judgment of the court below is justified, since the acquisition of real rights to real estate is invalidated due to the completion of prescription unless the registration is made by December 31, 1965 when the right to real estate was acquired due to the completion of prescription at the time of the enforcement of the Gu residents' law, and it is impossible

With respect to the fourth point:

As determined by the court below, if the defendant occupies the land in this case without following lawful compensation procedures under the Urban Planning Act or the Road Act, the route of the road has been designated as a general national highway and regardless of whether the road is subject to the application of the Road Act, the defendant occupies and uses it without any legal ground between the plaintiff and the land owner. As to the site constituting the road, even if the exercise of private right is restricted under Article 5 of the Road Act, this does not preclude the exercise of private right against the management and use of the road as to the road under the Road Act, and it does not preclude the exercise of the right to claim a return of unjust enrichment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 82Da846, Dec. 14, 1982; 87Da205, Sept. 13, 198; 87Meu205, Nov. 22, 198; 87Da931, Nov. 22, 1988).

The precedent of a party member is not appropriate in this case.

With respect to the fifth point:

The judgment of the court below is justified in its reasoning that there is no evidence that the purchase of the land of this case by the plaintiff is the fictitious sale by false marking or that it is for the trust of lawsuit. In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is justified and there is no violation of the rules of evidence as pointed out

With respect to the sixth Ground:

In the same way as the court below found, the defendant has a duty to return unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent amount to the plaintiff. The basic price of the land of this case to calculate the unjust enrichment amount shall be appraised according to the actual situation at the time of incorporation without considering the situation of the land transferred into the road, and it shall not be viewed differently due to the fact that the plaintiff acquired the land at the time of incorporation into the road site with the knowledge that the above land was subject to restrictions on the exercise of private rights at the time of acquisition of the land of this case. Furthermore, the expected interest rate for calculating the rent of the land shall be determined by taking into account the rate of national and public bonds, the long-term loan interest rate of the bank, the ordinary interest rate of the city, the normal interest rate of real estate transaction, the rate of loan fee determined by the State Property Act and the Local Finance Act, etc. In addition, considering the land of this case as stipulated in Article 6-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Compensation for Public Loss and Compensation for Losses, not the estimated transaction price within the limit of 1/5 of the normal market price of neighboring land (see Supreme Court Decision 292Da3929292.2.293292.

In light of the records, it is apparent that the appraisal report of the first instance court and the lower court is calculated based on the basic price and expected interest rate of the land of this case determined according to the above appraisal methods. Therefore, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles as pointed out in the measures that calculated unjust enrichment against the land of this case based on the above appraisal results.

All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-sung (Presiding Justice)