[1] The requirements for recognizing beneficiaries who gain profits from the commission of the crime of occupational breach of trust and third parties closely related thereto as co-principals with the perpetrator of the crime of occupational breach of trust

[2] The case holding that the crime of occupational breach of trust is not recognized as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust on the ground that the beneficiary who obtained a profit from the crime of occupational breach of trust and the third person closely related thereto, as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust, and as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust, actively participated in the whole process of the act of breach

[3] Whether it can be recognized as a co-principal without modification of an indictment for a single criminal offense (affirmative with qualification)

[4] The case holding that there is no risk of disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his right of defense even if the defendant's sole criminal defendant was admitted as a joint criminal without amendment to a bill of amendment

[5] The method of proving intention in the crime of occupational breach of trust

[6] Whether an auxiliary agency may be the subject of occupational breach of trust (affirmative)

[7] Whether a father in a chain of command and command in the course of performing his/her duties is expected not to participate in a criminal act committed by a workplace company (affirmative)

[8] Criteria for determining whether the amount received by a public official constitutes a bribe with a quid pro quo relationship

[9] The meaning and method of solicitation for a prior acceptance of bribe

[10] The subject of ownership of a promissory note upon receipt of discount (=the truster)

[1] In order to recognize a beneficiary who benefits from the commission of the crime of occupational breach of trust or a third party closely related thereto as a joint principal with the perpetrator of the crime of occupational breach of trust, it is insufficient to acquire profits by taking advantage of the perpetrator’s act of breach of trust passively even though the perpetrator’s act constitutes the act of breach of trust against the principal who is the victim. It is necessary to actively participate in the act of breach of trust by inducing the perpetrator of the act of breach of trust or participating in the whole process of the act of breach of trust.

[2] The case holding that the crime of occupational breach of trust is not recognized as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust on the ground that the beneficiary who obtained a profit from the crime of occupational breach of trust and the third person closely related thereto, as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust, and as a co-principal in the crime of occupational breach of trust, actively participated in the whole process of the crime of occupational breach

[3] In a case where the court recognizes that the defendant was prosecuted for a single crime in collusion with another person, it cannot be said that there is a need to amend the bill of indictment in a case where it is not likely that the defendant would have any substantial disadvantage in exercising his/her right of defense by causing a misunderstanding.

[4] The case holding that there is no risk of disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his right of defense even if the defendant's sole criminal defendant was admitted as a joint criminal without amendment to indictment in light of the defendant's arguments and

[5] The intention of the crime of occupational breach of trust is established in combination with the perception that the person handling another's business affairs would inflict property damage on the principal and that the intention of pecuniary gain of one's own or a third party is in violation of his/her duty. In a case where the defendant does not make a confession by asserting that he/she committed an act at issue for his/her own interest, the intention, motive, etc., which is a subjective element of the crime of occupational breach of trust, should only be used to prove an indirect fact that has considerable relation with the intention due to the nature of the object in proving it. However, there is no other way to reasonably determine the link of fact based on the sound observation or analysis ability based on normal empirical rule.

[6] In the crime of occupational breach of trust, a person who administers another's business as an inherent authority does not limit the person to handle the business, and includes a person who directly or indirectly takes charge of the business as an auxiliary agency of the person.

[7] It cannot be said that there is no possibility of not participating in the act of law on the ground that the subordinate officers who participated in the act of law are in the relation of command and command in the course of performing their duties.

[8] Whether the amount received by a public official constitutes a bribe with a quid pro quo relationship should be determined by considering all the circumstances such as the contents of the public official's official duty, the relationship between the provider of the job and the beneficiary, whether there exists a special relationship between the parties, the degree of interest and the situation and time of receiving the benefit. In light of the fact that the crime of bribery is protected by the legal interest of the fair performance of duty and the trust of the society, the issue of whether the public official's receiving the benefit is doubtful of the fairness of the performance of duty and the fairness of the performance of duty from the general public is also the standard for determining the nature

[9] The prior acceptance of a bribe under Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code requires the acceptance of a solicitation, contrary to the case of a simple acceptance of a bribe. Here, the solicitation refers to the request of a public official to perform a certain duty, and it is not asked whether the act of a certain duty is unlawful, and the solicitation must not be explicitly stated.

[10] Where a promissory note is delivered for discount and the trustee has discounted the promissory note, the amount incurred therefrom shall be returned to the truster if the discount was made, and the promissory note itself shall be returned to the truster if the discount was impossible or the intention to discount was withdrawn. The ownership of the promissory note shall be deemed to exist on the truster unless there are other special circumstances, while the promissory note is under the possession of the trustee, and the trustee shall be deemed to keep

[1] Articles 30, 355 (2), and 356 of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 30, 355 (2), and 356 of the Criminal Act / [3] Articles 298 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [4] Article 298 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [5] Articles 355 (2), and 356 of the Criminal Act / [6] Articles 35 (2), and 356 of the Criminal Act / [7] Article 12 of the Criminal Act, Articles 355 (2), and 356 of the Criminal Act / [8] Article 129 of the Criminal Act / [9] Article 129 (2) of the Criminal Act / [10] Article 35 (1) of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 74Do245 delivered on June 10, 197; 82Do180 delivered on July 12, 198; 82Do189 delivered on July 12, 198; 89Do819 delivered on September 3, 197; 9Do299 delivered on September 29, 197; 98Do299 delivered on September 29, 197; 98Do1969 delivered on June 3, 197; 98Do299 delivered on June 16, 197; 98Do199 delivered on September 16, 200; 9Do197 delivered on September 29, 200; 9Do1979 delivered on May 28, 199

Defendant 1 and five others

Defendants and Prosecutor

Law Firm Magsan, Attorneys Park Gyeong-tae et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 98No3365, 99No81, 99No812, 99No812, April 29, 199, 98No365-1, 99No253 delivered on April 29, 199

All appeals filed by Defendant 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and by the Prosecutor against Defendant 1 and 2 are dismissed. Among the detention days after the appeal, 75 days each shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence, and 65 days for Defendant 6 shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant 2’s grounds of appeal

In order to recognize a beneficiary who benefits from the commission of the crime of occupational breach of trust or a third party closely related thereto as a co-principal with the perpetrator of the crime of occupational breach of trust, it is insufficient to have acquired profits by passively taking advantage of the act of breach of trust with the awareness that the act of the perpetrator constitutes the act of breach of trust against the principal who is the victim. It is necessary to actively participate in the act of breach of trust by inducing the perpetrator to commit the act of breach of trust or participating in the whole process of the act of breach of trust (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 74Do2455, Jun. 10, 1975; 89Do1417, Jun. 8, 190).

In light of the evidence duly examined and adopted at the first instance court, Defendant 2 entered into a trust agreement with the victim Korean real estate trust company (hereinafter referred to as the "Korea"), which was the representative director, on March 8, 1996, with the joint executor of the present apartment development project, and received a total of KRW 34 billion as advance payment, and KRW 30 billion as advance payment. Although the financial assistance of the non-indicted 1 corporation was not improved, the non-indicted 1 corporation did not receive any further financial assistance based on the above 40 billion apartment loan, the court below's decision that the non-indicted 1 corporation was not able to obtain financial assistance from the non-indicted 1 corporation and the non-indicted 1 corporation's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 1 corporation's non-indicted 1's new financial assistance for the purpose of acquiring new apartment loan funds, and it was not possible to obtain additional financial assistance from the non-indicted 1 corporation's company's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3 corporation's new financial assistance for the above 1000 billion won.

Furthermore, considering the degree and contents of the defendant 2's involvement in the above facts, the above defendant was merely aware that the above defendant 3, 4, and co-defendant 1 et al. committed an act of occupational breach of trust with respect to only one part of the defendant 3, and he was actively involved in the above defendant 3, non-indicted 4, and non-indicted 1 et al. by inducing the above defendant 3, non-indicted 2 et al. to engage in an act of occupational breach of trust or participating in the whole process of the act of occupational breach of trust. In light of the objective situation at that time, the crime of occupational breach of trust has already been committed by the non-indicted 1 or non-indicted 2 et al. to cause unfair profits and damage to one part of the deceased, and there is no change in the situation such as the aggravation of economic situation after the judgment below that recognized the defendant as an accomplice in the crime of occupational breach of trust is justifiable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of an act of occupational breach of trust or its intent.

There is no reason for all arguments.

2. As to Defendant 3’s grounds of appeal

A. First point (misunderstanding of the legal principles as to the amendment of indictment and the scope of adjudication) and second point (misunderstanding of the legal principles as to the causal relationship of the crime of breach of trust)

In a case where the court acknowledges that a person prosecuted for a single crime committed the same crime in collusion with another person, it cannot be said that a modification of indictment is necessary in a case where the defendant is not likely to have any substantial disadvantage in exercising his/her right to defend himself/herself (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do1977 delivered on May 28, 191).

According to the evidence adopted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below, around February 5, 1998, Defendant 3 convened the board of directors of Hansung and provided 1,702,80 shares of the non-indicted 3 corporation as security, and separately acquired the obligation of KRW 10 billion to Chungcheong Bank of the non-indicted 1 corporation, and decided to lend KRW 12 billion to the non-indicted 1 corporation. Defendant 3 retired on February 10, 1998 and delivered the remainder of the debt acquisition and the remainder of the loan to Chungcheong Bank to the non-indicted 3 as a witness of the non-indicted 3, who was the non-indicted 1, who was the non-indicted 3, who was the non-indicted 3, at the time of the above financial assistance. However, it was acknowledged that the non-indicted 3, who was the non-indicted 1 and the non-indicted 1, who was an executive, actively participated in the above examination by attending the board of directors meeting of the non-indicted 1, who was the non-indicted 3's position.

In light of the above facts, the above act of breach of trust is deemed to have been committed in collusion with the non-indicted 3. On the other hand, considering the contents of the argument and the process of proof of the defendant 3 in the process of the original trial of this case and the first instance trial of this case, even if the court below acknowledged that the defendant 3 conspired with the non-indicted 3 and committed the above facts in collusion with the non-indicted 3 without any changes in the indictment, it cannot be deemed to be a case where there is a possibility of causing disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of the above defendant's right of defense. Thus, the court below's disposition in this part is just and there is no error of law as to

In addition, as seen above, the acceptance of obligation and the delivery of loans made after the retirement of Defendant 3 have already been specifically scheduled through the resolution of the board of directors on February 5, 1998, and thus, it cannot be exempted from the liability for the crime of occupational breach of trust on the ground that some execution was made after the retirement of the above defendant. Even if the board of directors held on February 19, 1998, which was after the above retirement of the above defendant, re-resolutions the assumption of obligation to the Chungcheong Bank, on the ground that it was merely a procedure for the re-verification and enforcement of the assumption of obligation with the resolution on February 5, 1998, and it cannot be deemed that the causal relationship between the above defendant's act and the result of the breach of trust has been reduced. Thus, this part of the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the causal relationship with the crime of occupational breach of trust.

There is no reason for all arguments.

B. Three points (misunderstanding of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence collection), and Four points (misunderstanding of legal principles as to the intent to commit a crime of breach of trust)

In full view of the evidence adopted by the court of first instance, when Defendant 3 provides funds to Nonindicted Co. 1 or construction of Nonindicted Co. 2 for the purpose of advance payment, material cost, loan, guarantee of payment, etc., the court below held that it is sufficient to recognize all the charges against the above Defendant, including that Defendant 3 convened the board of directors on the day without notifying other directors, etc. of the bill in advance, and provided funds to Defendant 3 and 4, if there is any objection against the financial support, it is sufficient to acknowledge the whole charges against the above Defendant, with the purport that the above funds to be used for the apartment construction related to the trust agreement are mainly used for the repayment of loans to Nonindicted Co. 4, with the knowledge of the fact that it violated the relevant statutes or business process regulations, and that there is no error of law that misleads the facts in violation of the rules of evidence.

On the other hand, the intention of the crime of occupational breach of trust is established in combination with the perception that the person handling another's business affairs causes property damage to the principal and that the intention of his or her or a third party's pecuniary gain is in violation of his or her duties. In a case where the defendant does not make a confession by asserting that he or she committed an act at issue for his or her own interest, the subjective element of the crime of occupational breach of trust is that he or she committed an act at issue, the method of proving indirect facts that have considerable relation with the intention due to the nature of the object should be used in proving it, but there is no other method than reasonably determining the link of facts based on the sound observation or analysis power based on normal empirical rule (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Do163, Jun. 27, 1997; 8Do1523, Nov. 22, 198).

However, Defendant 3, who had been unable to receive more financial assistance from Korea and Japan after having taken office as an executive officer, requested the above defendant 2 to obtain financial assistance through a close-friendly relationship with Korea, and in violation of the relevant statutes or business process regulations, the defendant 3 provided financial assistance to the non-indicted 1 corporation or the non-indicted 2 corporation construction in violation of the relevant business process regulations. Thus, in light of the facts established by the court below, the court below's determination as to the crime of breach of trust is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the facts alleged in the judgment below, since the defendant 3 decided to provide financial assistance equivalent to 2.0 billion won without considering the circumstance of the payment guarantee or the circumstance that excessive advance payment was paid without the letter of guarantee of the Housing Mutual Aid Association in relation to the apartment business, or the security value of the central treasury shares that the defendant 1 provided as security, and the circumstances leading to the commencement of financial assistance, etc. in light of the facts established by the court below.

There is no reason for all arguments.

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant’s female species and their defense counsel

A. First point (misunderstanding of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence collection and misunderstanding of legal principles as to the criminal intent of breach of trust)

In full view of the evidence adopted by the court of first instance, the court below held that it is sufficient to recognize all the charges against the above defendant, such as providing large amount of financing in violation of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes or business process regulations, knowing that the above funds to be used for apartment construction pursuant to the trust contract are mainly used for the repayment of loans to the central treasury when it provides funds for the development trust 3 division of Han Jae-gu as the defendant in the development trust of Han Young-do and the construction of the non-indicted 1 corporation or the non-indicted 1 corporation, as the head of the above company. Such fact-finding by the court below is just and there is no error of law by misconception

On the other hand, it can be sufficiently recognized that the above defendant had the intention of occupational breach of trust when comprehensively and comprehensively considering the facts established by the court below in light of the background leading up to the payment guarantee or the circumstance leading up to excessive advance payment without the letter of guarantee of the Housing Mutual Aid Association in relation to the national technical financing of technology apartment business. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is just and there is no violation of the law of misunderstanding the legal principles as to the crime of occupational breach of trust

There is no reason for all arguments.

B. Second point (misunderstanding of legal principles as to the possibility of a substitute, incomplete hearing, and mistake of facts)

In regard to the crime of occupational breach of trust, a person who administers another's business is not limited to a person who performs such business as an inherent authority, and includes a person who directly or indirectly takes charge of such business as his/her subsidiary organ (see Supreme Court Decision 81Do203, Jul. 27, 1982). As such, the workplace's superior officer is in a command and command-in-fact relationship with his/her superior officer who takes part in the act of law, and there is no possibility that he/she will not take part in the act of law (see Supreme Court Decision 86Do614, May 27, 198).

According to the evidence adopted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below, Defendant 3 was in charge of working as the 3 head of Hancom Development Trust Co., Ltd. and the 1st executive director Co., Ltd., and was in charge of working as a member of the Trust Business Deliberation Committee, which is composed of the chief of the working division, participated in the prior deliberation as a member of the Council of Korea, although the decision making important is decided by the board of directors of Hancom, and participated in the prior deliberation and the proposal was presented to the board of directors to report and express his opinion, and has the authority to make a decision within a certain period, and it is recognized that the above defendant was directly in charge of the business related to the payment guarantee for national technical financing, the conclusion and advance payment of construction contracts and the payment of construction contracts related to construction related to Hancom, and the provision of funds under the name of the material cost related to Hancom, and in light of these circumstances, the above defendant was justified in the misapprehension of legal principles or the possibility of execution of such business as Defendant Co., Ltd., the executive director.

There is no reason to discuss.

(c) Point 3 [Judgment of 1. A. (1) of the facts constituting the crime of the Seoul District Court Decision 98 Gohap596, etc.]

In light of the record, on December 24, 1996, prior to the payment guarantee for the Korean Technology Finance, the Korea Technology Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Korea Technology Finance Corporation") already made a similar guarantee with the limit of 12 billion won in the establishment of a pledge, and on March 25, 1997, the Korea Technology Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Korea Technology Finance Corporation") agreed to the establishment of a pledge with the limit of 14 billion won in the National Technology Finance. On March 25, 1997, the Korea Technology Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Korea Technology Finance Corporation") made a payment guarantee with the loans of 11.4 billion won from the Korean Technology Finance, but it is recognized that the payment guarantee for the Korean Technology Finance was different from the creditors, so it cannot be deemed that the Korea Technology Finance Corporation has the same nature as the Korea Technology Finance Corporation's repayment guarantee for the new obligation of the Korea Technology Finance Corporation, and thus, the Korea Technology Finance Corporation has the same nature as the Korea Technology Finance Corporation's payment guarantee for the new obligation.

In the same purport, the judgment of the court below which found the defendant guilty on all the above facts constituting the crime is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, misapprehension of the legal principle, or incomplete hearing. However, the court below did not make an explicit judgment on the above purport of the defendant's appeal, but it did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principle, as long as the court below did not make an explicit judgment on the above purport of the defendant's appeal, and as long as the above argument cannot be accepted as being seen earlier, it cannot be accepted, it cannot be said that there was a violation of the law of omission

Therefore, there is no reason for this part of the discussion.

4. As to the prosecutor's grounds of appeal on the non-guilty part of the defendant Lee Jae-gil (Seoul District Court 98 Gohap596, 1.B. Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes)

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, even after considering the evidence examined and adopted by the court of first instance, the court below acknowledged that the defendant Lee Jae-gil ordered the Lee Jae-J, a birth, to raise funds for the repayment of loans to the National Treasury, and that the Lee Jae-J entered into a trust contract with Korea and the above Lee Jae-J to use the funds for the purpose of raising the funds, but all the above Lee Jae-J was in charge of the above Lee Jae-J, and the above defendant Lee Jae-J was in charge of the above Lee Jae-J, and the above defendant Lee Jae-J was not involved in the above duties and did not know detailed contents of the above duties. However, on February 198, 198, the court below determined that the above Lee Jae-J's request of the above Lee Jae-J was to provide the stocks of the National Treasury owned by the defendant Lee Jae-J as collateral and confirmed his intention as collateral, and rejected the above defendant Lee Jae-J's statements in the prosecutor's office, as stated in the facts of the defendant Lee Jae-J's objection.

As seen earlier, in order to recognize a beneficiary or a third party closely related to the beneficiary as a joint principal offender with the executor of the breach of trust, it is necessary to actively participate in the act of breach of trust by inducing the executor of the breach of trust or participating in the entire process of the breach of trust. As seen in paragraph (1) of the above, unlike the above Lee Jae-in Department, which has been in contact with Defendant 3, etc. from the beginning, and has been involved in the whole process of the violation of trust, it is merely to the extent that he had been aware of the overall contents by receiving a report from the above Lee Jae-chul, or holding consultation about about the process, and it cannot be deemed that he actively participated in the act of breach of trust of Defendant 3 in the above process of the violation of the rules of evidence. Thus, the court below's finding of facts and its judgment based on the above facts are acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts, such as misconception of facts, etc.

There is no reason to discuss.

5. As to the ground of appeal by Defendant Park Chang-chul

The court below determined, based on its adopted evidence, that the defendant Park Jong-chul had not made efforts to take office as the next Korea Appraisal Board, which was a vice president of the Korea Appraisal Board, and that the defendant Lee Jae-chul demanded KRW 50 million as activity expenses while making a false statement to that effect, and that the above Lee Jae-chul borrowed KRW 20 million from others and provided it constitutes a crime of fraud. The court below's findings of fact and decision are just and there is no error of law of misunderstanding of facts as pointed out in the arguments.

6. As to the ground of appeal by Defendant lehee’s defense counsel

A. First point (misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles due to violation of the rules of evidence concerning the crime of bribery and the prior bribery)

Whether the amount received by a public official constitutes a bribe in a quid pro quo relationship is determined by considering all the circumstances such as the contents of the public official’s duties, the relationship between the official duties and the benefit provider, whether there exists a special relationship between the two parties, the degree of interest, the circumstances and timing of receiving benefits, etc. In light of the fact that the crime of bribery is the legal interest protected by the legal interest and the fairness of performing duties and the trust of the society, the issue of whether the public official’s receipt of benefit is doubtful as a result of the public official’s receipt of benefit constitutes a basis for determining the fairness of performing duties (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do3113, Mar. 10, 198). Article 129(2) of the Criminal Act requires that the prior acceptance of a bribe, unlike the case of a simple bribery. Here, the solicitation means to request a public official to perform a certain act of duty, and thus, whether the act of performing duties is unlawful or not, it does not necessarily require an explicit solicitation.

The court below, based on the evidence of the first instance court, found that the defendant Yoon-hee had received KRW 50,00 from the above Lee Jae-gun at the beginning of June 195 that he had received a request from the above Lee Jae-gun to change the specific use area of the apartment project so that he can obtain approval for the apartment project from the Lee Jae-gun as soon as possible. On the other hand, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the fact that he had received KRW 20,00 in the supply of water to sell apartment units and approval for the project at the time of his office from Kim Jae-sik-sik, and the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the fact-finding that he had received 20,000 won in addition to the fact that he had received 20,000 won in exchange for the above fact-finding, Kim Dong-dong, the maximum red, and the fact-finding that he had received the above money from the defendant Lee Byung-hee in return for the above fact-finding.

B. Second point (misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence as to occupational breach of trust, misunderstanding of legal principles as to the criminal intent of breach of trust)

The court below acknowledged the fact that the budget was disbursed in order to compensate for the dredging expenses by the defendant Yoon-hee, who is the Yongsan market, even though he was not obliged to compensate for the dredging expenses by the evidence adopted by the court of first instance, and determined that the above defendant's act constitutes an occupational breach of trust against the defendant's occupational breach of trust. The court below's findings of fact and decision are just and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the criminal intent of occupational breach of trust due to the violation of the rules of evidence or the violation of the rules of evidence as pointed out.

7. As to the ground of appeal on the prosecutor's non-guilty part of the defendant Lee Jae-chul

The court below found, based on the evidence of the court of first instance, that the non-indicted 1 maintained the bill at the discount rate of 1,173,150,00 won at the face value of the non-indicted 1 corporation's issuance of the bill at the time of the transfer of the bill, and ordered the discount of the bill through the new franking, which is the manager of the management division of the actual flaco corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "actual flaco") on May 29, 1995, the above new flaco to deliver the bill to the subordinate flaco, and issued the above new flaco to the above new flaco with the above new flaco at the time of the issuance of the bill to the above new flaco, that the above flaco did not receive the above flaco's discount from the above Kim flaco, but did not receive the above flaco's discount from the above new flaco to the above new flaco.

In cases where a promissory note is delivered for discount and the trustee has withdrawn his/her intention to discount the promissory note, the amount incurred thereby shall be returned to the truster of the promissory note itself if the discount is impossible or discounted, and ownership of the promissory note shall be deemed to exist to the truster, and the trustee shall be deemed to keep the promissory note only in accordance with the purport of the consignment (see Supreme Court Decision 82Do3079, Apr. 26, 1983). According to the above facts, inasmuch as the parties’ transfer to the Republic of Korea agreed to cancel the discount agreement with Kim Jong-tae and receive the said promissory note, and even as the new discount is not yet made, the said promissory note shall be returned to Kim Tae-tae, so even if Defendant Lee Jae-chul, who is in the position to receive the said discount with the actual right holder of the said promissory note, has failed to comply with the procedure to return it in succession, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the return of the promissory note or any other unlawful method of embezzlement.

There is no reason to discuss.

8. Therefore, all appeals filed by the Defendant Lee Jae-chul, Defendant 3, Park Jong-young, Park Byung-hee, and Prosecutor Park Jae-hee, and each appeals filed by the Prosecutor against Lee Jae-hee are dismissed. As to the Defendant Lee Jae-in, Park Jong-young, and Park Byung-hee, some of the days of detention after the appeal shall be included in each original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-hee (Presiding Justice)