[1] The elements of self-defense

[2] The meaning and criteria for determining "a serious fact", "public interest", and the meaning of "the purpose of slandering people" as stipulated in Article 309 of the Criminal Code, which are requirements for the exclusion of illegality under Article 310 of the Criminal Code

[3] The meaning of "when it comes to the public interest" as a serious fact under the proviso of Article 251 of the Public Official Election and Prevention of Unlawful Election Act

[4] The case holding that the act of physically obstructing another candidate's speech at the joint speech meeting place of the candidate for the election of public officials does not meet the requirement of self-defense

[1] For a certain act to be recognized as a self-defense, it must be reasonable to protect the present infringement of one’s own or another’s legal interest. Therefore, it is not recognized as self-defense against an unlawful legitimate infringement, and whether the act of defense is socially reasonable should be determined by taking into account all specific circumstances, such as the type, degree, method of infringement, and type and degree of legal interest to be infringed by the act of defense.

[2] For the purpose of not punishing a person by publicly pointing out a fact, the publicly alleged fact is related to the public interest when it appears objectively, and an actor is also required to indicate the fact for the public interest. It is not only true, or at least there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged fact is true, or that there is a reasonable ground to believe such fact. Here, the term "material fact" means the fact that the material part is consistent with objective facts in light of the overall purport of its contents. In addition, the term "public interest" includes not only the fact related to the interests of the State, society, and other general public, but also the interest and interest of a particular social group or its entire members, and the issue of whether the alleged fact relates to the public interest is also related to the public interest, and as such, in light of the contents and nature of the publicly alleged fact, the scope of publication of the relevant fact, the other party's method of expression itself, etc., and if there is no subjective motive or reason to defame the public interest by comparing it with the subjective purpose of Article 10 or 30 of the Criminal Act.

[3] Even if an act of slandering a candidate is an act of slandering a candidate, illegality is excluded (the proviso of Article 251 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Unlawful Election Act). Here, the phrase “the fact alleged in this context conforms to the truth” refers to only if the important part is consistent with objective facts and is sufficient and detailed, and even if there is a little difference or somewhat exaggerated expression, and the time for the public interest is not always a motive superior to the private interest, even if there is both parties, and if there is a reasonableness, it is recognized.

[4] The case holding that where the contents of the speech made by the candidate Gap at the joint speech meeting place of the candidate for the election of public office fall under the requirement of defamation or candidate secret against other candidate Eul, but its illegality is denied, the act of physically obstructing Gap's speech was committed not only against Gap's unlawful infringement, but also against Gap's unlawful violation, such as cutting Eul's microphone during the campaign speech and taking a bath, etc., but also the act of physically obstructing Gap's speech did not meet the requirement of self-defense, since it did not meet the requirement of self-defense

[1] Article 21 of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 309 and 310 of the Criminal Act / [3] Article 251 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Illegal Acts / [4] Article 21 of the Criminal Act, Article 237 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials

[1] Supreme Court Decision 84Do683 delivered on June 12, 198 (Gong1984, 1239) Supreme Court Decision 92Do1520 delivered on September 25, 1992 (Gong1992, 3052) Supreme Court Decision 92Do2540 delivered on December 22, 1992 (Gong1993, 657) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Do158 delivered on October 9, 1998 (Gong198, 2715 delivered on June 8, 199) 209Do2998 delivered on April 29, 205 (Gong1999, 1437 delivered on June 29, 200)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Han Man-chul

Seoul High Court Decision 2003No230 delivered on May 30, 2003

The appeal is dismissed.

1. For a certain act to be recognized as self-defense, it must be reasonable and reasonable to protect the present infringement of one’s own or another’s legal interest. Thus, it is not recognized as self-defense against an unlawful legitimate infringement. Whether a defense act is socially reasonable should be determined by taking into account all specific circumstances, such as the type and degree of the legal interest infringed by the act, the method of infringement, and the type, degree, etc. of the legal interest to be infringed by the act of defense (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Do683, Jun. 12, 1984; 92Do1520, Sept. 25, 1992; 92Do2540, Dec. 22, 1992).

In addition, for the purpose of not punishing a person by openly pointing out facts, the publicly alleged facts are related to the public interest, and an offender is also required to indicate such facts for the sake of the public interest, and the alleged facts are true or, at least, there are reasonable grounds to believe such facts. Here, the term "material facts" means facts that are consistent with objective facts in light of the overall purport of its contents. In addition, the term "public interest" includes not only those related to the public interest of the State, society, or other general public, but also those related to the interest and interest of a specific social group or its entire members. Whether the alleged facts relate to the public interest or not, but also those related to the public interest, such as the scope of the other party to whom the facts were published, and the method of expression itself, and if the alleged facts are likely to be damaged or damaged by such expression, it means that the material facts are consistent with objective facts, and thus, it means that there is no other subjective motive or purpose than 90 of the Criminal Act, and it is also 900 of the Criminal Act’s subjective interest.

In addition, even if an act of slandering a candidate is an act of slandering the candidate, it is justified if the alleged facts are consistent with the truth and for the public interest (proviso of Article 251 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Unlawful Election), and the facts alleged in this context conform to the truth is sufficient if the material facts are consistent with the objective facts when examining the overall purport of the contents, and there is a little difference or little exaggeration in the detailed contents, and even if it is not always a motive for the public interest, there is both parties at the same time and if there is reasonableity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Do977, Jun. 28, 1996; 97Do9566, Jun. 10, 197; 99Do4260, Apr. 25, 200; 200Do469, Apr. 9, 202).

2. 원심은 그 채용한 증거들에 의하여, 공소외 1은 2002. 6. 9. 11:27경부터 양전초등학교 운동장에서 개최된 개포3동 구의원 후보자 합동연설회장에서 3명의 후보자 중 피고인, 공소외 2에 이어 연설하게 되어 20분의 연설시간이 배정된 사실, 공소외 1은 연설 중반부에 "소위 자치단체장 장학생이라는 이름표를 달고 다니는 소신이 없고 정치꾼 같은 행세를 하는 그런 구의원은 절대 배제해야 한다."는 취지의 발언을 하였고, 연설 후반부에 "우리 개포3동에는 작년 8월부터 구의원이 없다. 개포3동 구의원이 강남구청 홈페이지에 모 여성의원에 대한 명예훼손 및 성희롱 발언내용을 게재하였다. 피해 여성의원의 고소로 서울경찰청에서 수사한 결과 개포3동 구의원으로 밝혀졌으며 개포3동 구의원은 구속을 면하려는 갖은 노력 끝에 합의조건으로 강남구민과 피해 여성의원에게 강남신문을 통하여 사직광고를 내고 사퇴하였다."는 취지의 발언을 하였는데, 위 발언 도중 피고인은 선거관리위원회 직원을 부르며 위 발언의 제지를 구하다가 위 발언이 끝나자 "날조된 거야."라고 소리치며 연단으로 올라가 연설중인 공소외 1을 밀치고 연설마이크를 가로막은 후 공소외 1이 들고 있던 연설자료인 강남신문을 빼앗으면서 "이 신문내용은 날조다. 마이크 껐어 이 새끼야, 죽으려고 이거. 너 조작된 거 가지고.... 이게 조작된 거야."라고 소리치며 약 1분 30초간 공소외 1의 연설을 방해한 사실, 그 후 공소외 1은 다시 연설을 시작하여 연설을 마친 사실을 인정하고, 이에 기하여 피고인의 위와 같은 연설방해행위는 위 중반부 연설내용을 저지하기 위한 것이 아니라 위 후반부 연설내용을 저지하기 위한 것이라고 판단한 다음, 위 증거들에 의하면, 피고인은 2001. 봄경 강남구청 홈페이지 게시판에 익명으로 강남구 구의원인 공소외 3이 가정을 외면한 채 같은 구의원인 공소외 4와 부적절한 관계에 있다는 취지의 글을 게시하고, 2001. 7.경 같은 게시판에 위 공소외 4 명의로 위 공소외 3이 남의 남편이나 넘보는 문란한 여자라는 내용의 글을 게시하여 동료의원인 공소외 3의 명예를 훼손하였다가, 공소외 3의 고소에 의하여 명예훼손 등 혐의로 수사를 받게 되었던 사실, 피고인은 위와 같이 수사를 받게 되자, 2001. 8.경 피고인의 구의원직 사퇴 및 사죄광고 게시를 합의의 선행조건으로 내세운 공소외 3의 요구에 따라, 같은 달 22. 의회에 사직서를 제출한 데 이어, 같은 달 말경 근거 없는 허위사실을 인터넷상에 유포하여 명예를 훼손한 데 대하여 공소외 3에게 사죄하는 내용의 사과문을 강남신문에 게시하였으며, 그 후 공소외 3과 합의가 이루어져 고소가 취소되었던 사실을 인정할 수 있으므로, 공소외 1이 적시한 위 사실은 진실에 부합하고, 그 후 피고인이 행정법원에 신청한 의원직사직허가집행정지신청이 받아들여져 복직이 되었다 하더라도 발언의 전체적인 취지에 비추어 볼 때 공소외 1이 적시한 사실이 진실이 아니라고 할 수 없으며, 그 내용 또한 유권자들로 하여금 피고인의 공무담임자로서의 적격성을 가늠하는 데에 유용한 자료로서, 상대후보자의 평가를 저하시켜 스스로가 당선되려는 사적 이익 못지 않게 유권자들에게 상대후보자의 자질 등에 대한 충분한 자료를 제공함으로써 적절한 투표권을 행사하도록 하려는 공공의 이익도 상당한 동기가 되었고, 적시한 위 사실의 내용 등에 비추어 볼 때 공공의 이익과 사적 이익이 동시에 존재하고 거기에 상당성도 인정되므로, 공소외 1의 연설 중 위와 같은 내용을 적시한 것이 명예훼손 또는 후보자비방의 구성요건에 해당된다 하더라도 형법 제310조 또는 공직선거및선거부정방지법 제251조 단서에 의하여 그 위법성이 조각된다 할 것이어서 공소외 1의 위 사실적시가 부당한 침해라고 할 수 없을 뿐만 아니라, 피고인이 공소외 1의 연설을 임의로 방해한 것은 정당방위의 요건인 상당성을 결여한 행위에 해당한다는 이유로, 정당방위를 내세우는 피고인의 주장을 배척하였다.

In light of the records and the legal principles as seen earlier, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and there are no errors in violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete deliberation, or misapprehension of the legal principles as to self-defense, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal. In addition, according to the records, the defendant did not assert even the court below that his act constitutes a self-help or a legitimate act, and in light of the above facts, the defendant's act does not constitute a self-help or a legitimate act. Thus

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)