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(영문) 대법원 1997. 4. 11. 선고 97도88 판결
[명예훼손][공1997.5.15.(34),1516]
Main Issues

[1] Grounds for rejecting the illegality of defamation

[2] The standard for determining whether the crime of defamation constitutes a public interest, which is a ground for denying illegality

[3] The case holding that the act of indicating the facts about the elected person by standing as the chief director throughout the period before and after the election of the chief director of the Korea Korean Association of Meritoriouss constitutes an unlawful act for the public interest, even if the personal motive was somewhat different

Summary of Judgment

[1] In order for an act of impairing a person’s reputation by openly pointing out a fact to be dismissed and punished pursuant to Article 310 of the Criminal Act, the alleged fact is related to the public interest and the actor should also indicate the fact for the public interest, as well as the alleged fact is true or, at least, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged fact was true and that the actor was believed to be true, and that there is reasonable grounds to believe it.

[2] In the case of paragraph (1) above, the term "public interest" refers to not only the public interest of the State, society, and other general public, but also to a specific social group or the whole members thereof. Whether it is related to the public interest should be objectively determined in light of the contents and nature of the stated fact itself. The application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act shall not be excluded even if the main purpose of the actor expressing the fact was for the public interest, even if there was an incidental purpose.

[3] The case holding that the illegality of the act of indicating the facts about the elected person who was candidate as the chief director throughout the period before and after the election of the chief director of the Korea Korean Association of Meritoriouss is dismissed as it is for the public interest even if the personal motive was somewhat different

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 310 of the Criminal Act / [2] Article 310 of the Criminal Act / [3] Article 310 of the Criminal Act

Reference Cases

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Do3160 delivered on June 22, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2188), Supreme Court Decision 93Do1035 delivered on June 22, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2199) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 93Da18389 delivered on November 26, 1993 (Gong194Sang, 194Ha, 2573 delivered on August 26, 1994) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 88Do899 delivered on February 14, 198 (Gong1989, 445) / [196Do3979 delivered on September 16, 1995] Supreme Court Decision 94Do3979 delivered on October 36, 1996 (Gong1949, 1945).

Defendant

Defendant 1 and one other

Appellant

Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Attorney Orat-law

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul District Court Decision 96No2268 delivered on November 27, 1996

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 310 of the Criminal Act provides that an act of impairing a person’s reputation by openly pointing out facts shall be related to the public interest when objectively seen that the alleged facts relate to the public interest, and thus, an actor shall also indicate the facts for the public interest. In addition, the alleged facts are true or at least the actor believed to be true and have reasonable grounds to believe such facts (see Supreme Court Decision 94Do237 delivered on August 26, 1994). The term “public interest” includes not only the public interest of the State, society, and other general public, but also a specific social group or its entire members’ interest. Whether it is related to the public interest shall be objectively determined in light of the content and nature of the alleged facts itself. If the major purpose of the actor’s statement of facts is for the public interest, the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act may not be excluded even if there was an incidental purpose (see Supreme Court Decision 94Do235 delivered on June 26, 193).

In light of the records, the court below held that Defendant 1’s act of defamation around December 8, 1993 constitutes a case where there is a considerable reason to believe that Defendant 1’s act of defamation constitutes a true fact under Article 310 of the Criminal Act or a fact that is true, and that Defendant 1’s act of violation of the law constitutes a violation of the law concerning defamation of the Republic of Korea Association, and thus, Defendant 1’s act of violation of the law concerning defamation of the public interest by urging representatives of the Korean Association, and thus, Defendant 1’s act of violation of the law concerning defamation of the public interest, such as defamation of the public interest, is consistent with objective facts in the important part, and Defendant 1’s act of violation of the law concerning defamation of the public interest, and thus, Defendant 1’s act of violation of the law concerning defamation of the public interest as stated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act, even if the above non-indicted 1’s act of violation of the law concerning defamation of the public interest, as it does not constitute an act of defamation of the public interest.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울지방법원 1996.11.27.선고 96노2268
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