[1] In a case where a confession of facts charged was made during the public prosecutor's examination and the defense counsel was denied at the time of cross-examination, whether it can be judged by the summary trial procedure (negative

[2] In a case where the first instance court decides to judge through a simple trial procedure and denies the evidence admissible as evidence in the appellate court pursuant to Article 318-3 of the Criminal Procedure Act, whether the evidence may be admitted as evidence in the appellate court (affirmative)

[3] Criteria for determining the danger of "hazardous goods" under Article 3 (1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

[4] Whether the court of final appeal rendered a non-scheduled sentence against a minor who had been a minor at the time of the judgment of the appellate court but has become an adult (affirmative)

[1] Although the prosecutor stated that all facts charged are different from facts when the prosecutor examines the facts charged, if the defense counsel denies the criminal intent or the facts charged, the facts charged is not subject to a trial by a simple trial procedure, and therefore, the remaining evidence except the defendant's statement in the court is not admissible as evidence for guilt unless the admissibility of evidence is granted through legitimate investigation of evidence by general procedure, rather than a simple trial procedure.

[2] In a case where a defendant confessions the facts charged in the court of first instance and decides that the court of first instance should judge it according to the simplified trial procedure, and accordingly, the court of first instance has no objection to the defendant or his defense counsel when it gives evidence specified in the judgment of first instance as evidence, and it is admissible as evidence pursuant to the provisions of Article 318-3 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In a case where the court of first instance examines evidence in such a way as deemed reasonable, even if it denies the crime in the family appellate court, the evidence that could have been admitted as evidence in the court of first instance can be admitted as evidence in the appellate court, so the evidence that the court of first instance had already been admissible

[3] The danger of "hazardous goods" under Article 3 (1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act shall be determined according to whether the other party or the third party could feel the danger of murder immediately when using the goods in light of social norms according to specific cases.

[4] Since the subject of a trial in the court of final appeal is to review the legitimacy of the judgment at the time of the judgment at the court of final appeal, the decision at the court of final appeal does not constitute an error of law by rendering the judgment at the court of final appeal on the ground that the defendant who was a minor has

[1] Article 286-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Articles 318-3 and 364 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act / [3] Article 3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act / [4] Articles 2 and 54 of the Juvenile Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 81Do775 delivered on June 9, 198 (Gong1981, 1467) Supreme Court Decision 95Do1859 delivered on November 10, 1995 (Gong195Ha, 397) Supreme Court Decision 95Do297 delivered on December 12, 1995 (Gong1996Sang, 456), 95Do183 delivered on March 12, 1996 (Gong196, 196, 196) 97Do1979 delivered on July 28, 198 (Gong196, 1323, 1969) 97Do1979 delivered on March 16, 196 (Gong1981, 1423, July 28, 198)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Jin-jin

Chuncheon District Court Decision 97No546 delivered on December 4, 1997

The final appeal is dismissed. 39 days out of detention days after the final appeal shall be included in the original sentence.

1. We examine the grounds of appeal by a state appointed defense counsel.

A. On the third ground for appeal

In light of the records, the evidence specified in the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the judgment below shall not be deemed to have any error of misconception of facts or incomplete hearing due to a violation of the rules of evidence or alleged facts in the judgment of the court below, which found that there

B. On the first ground for appeal

When the prosecutor examines the facts charged, if the defendant stated that all the facts charged are different from the facts, but the defense counsel denies the criminal intent or the facts charged, the facts charged is not subject to a trial by a simplified trial procedure, and therefore, the remaining evidence except the defendant's statement in the court is not admissible as evidence through legitimate evidence examination conducted by the general procedure, not through a simple trial procedure, unless the admissibility of evidence is granted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Do775, Jun. 9, 1981; 95Do297, Dec. 12, 195; 95Do1883, Mar. 12, 1996).

However, according to the records, the first instance court's statement that the defendant was not guilty when the prosecutor examines the facts charged at the trial date of the second instance court, and that when the defense counsel examines the facts on the second trial date, the court below stated that the degree of violence is insignificant but minor, but the degree of violence is contrary to the facts charged (No. 93 pages of the trial record). Accordingly, the first instance court decided that the defendant was led to confession of the facts charged, and that the defendant and the defense counsel did not raise any objection, and there was no further statement denying the facts charged (In addition, according to the entries in the first and second trial records of the court, according to the court's first and second trial records, the defendant stated that the first instance court's statement at the trial date of the court of the first instance is not different from the facts, and that there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the facts charged or in the misapprehension of credibility of the trial procedure of the first instance court's judgment, it cannot be deemed that there is no doubt that the court below's judgment and the first instance court's ground for appeal cannot be accepted.

In addition, since the defendant made confession of the facts charged in the first instance court and decided that the first instance court should judge it by the simplified trial procedure, and accordingly, the first instance court's objection to the evidence specified in the first instance court's judgment is inadmissible pursuant to the provisions of Article 318-3 of the Criminal Procedure Act because there is no objection by the defendant or his defense counsel, and evidence is admissible pursuant to the provisions of Article 318-3 of the Criminal Procedure Act, even if he denies the crime in the first instance court's domestic appellate court, the evidence that could have been admitted as evidence in the first instance court's domestic appellate court can be admitted as evidence even in the appellate court (Article 364 (3) of the same Act) since the evidence which had already been admissible in the first instance court's court's first instance court's court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's first instance court'

B. On the second ground for appeal

The danger of "hazardous goods" under Article 3 (1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act should be determined by whether the other party or the third party would promptly feel the danger of death in light of social norms, depending on specific cases (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Do2527, Dec. 27, 1991; 96Do3411, Feb. 25, 1997). According to the facts established by the court below, the defendant et al., was at the time of the part of the victim's body and her body and her face with the pipe and her face with each item, and it was just for the court below to see that the defendant et al.’s failure to disclose the whereabouts of other trillion staff members, and in such a case, the other party or the third party might have caused the danger of death by carrying with him, and thus, the other party or the third party cannot be found to have committed an error in the misapprehension of legal principles as seen above.

C. On the fourth ground for appeal

In the case of this case where imprisonment with labor for less than 10 years is imposed, the grounds of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles, incomplete hearing, and inconsistent reasoning, which are alleged as the grounds of appeal, cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal.

2. The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

Since the subject of a trial in the final appeal is to examine the propriety of the judgment at the time of the judgment of the appellate court, since the defendant who was a minor at the time of the pronouncement of the judgment of the court below does not constitute an error of law in the pronouncement of an irregular sentence by the court below on the ground that he became an adult after the final appeal was made (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 83Do2557, Dec. 27, 1983; 85Do1053, Jul. 9, 1985). Thus, the ground of appeal that the defendant brought an appeal to receive a regular sentence upon the completion of his majority on February 16, 1998 cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and the thirty-nine days of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)