A. Determination criteria for medical malpractices

(b) The case holding that there is a medical negligence in which the fetus continues to deliver the fetus in an unreasonable way without preparing for the possibility that it may be suspected that a doctor in charge of giving birth, in the event that the fetus was damaged by brain damage and the cerebral cerebral cerebral macys have occurred;

C. The case holding that even if the above "B" contributed to brain damage, the court below's negligence on the part of the doctor's contribution to the 50% of the degree of contribution to the Improperism is unlawful.

(a) The doctor shall have the reasonable discretion to choose the method of treatment that it considers appropriate in accordance with the patient’s situation, the present level of medical care, and his knowledge and experience in providing medical treatment, and any one of them shall not be deemed to have been justified and any other measure shall not be deemed to have been negligent in doing so, unless it exceeds the reasonable scope.

B. The case holding that there was a medical negligence in which a fetus had to take charge of giving birth to a doctor in charge of giving birth when a fetus was damaged and a cerebral cerebral macy is caused by brain damage, and a doctor in charge of giving birth seems to be likely to have a possibility of a state of depression, imbalance, or a state of imbalance, where the fetus might normally have a state of depression, but no such possibility was anticipated at all, and no preparation was made, and only a part shall proceed by means of an ordinary mass delivery without making four minutes measuring every five minutes of the heart for a period of two delivery, without making four minutes measuring four minutes of the cardiopulmonary macy, in the case where the fetus was in a state of cerebral macy or any other similar condition, it is unreasonable to give birth to a doctor in charge of giving birth, which is the method of procedure to avoid the fetus, in the case where the fetus is immediately in a state of depression, imbalance, or any other similar condition.

C. The case holding that the court below held that the decision of the court below to consider the degree of contribution by the doctor's negligence as 50% as the degree of contribution to the ties of the ties is unlawful since the fetus suffered from brain damage and the fetus suffered from cerebral ties, mainly due to the continuous continuation of the operation for the long time of the pregnant or nursing woman, or in a similar condition, it is deemed that the operation by the doctor's negligence is due to unreasonable continuation of the operation for the long time of the pregnant or nursing woman, or in a similar condition.

Article 750 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Do3199 decided Jun. 12, 1984 (Gong1984, 1320) (Gong1369 decided Jan. 20, 1987)

Plaintiff 1 and four plaintiffs et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant 1 Incorporated Foundation, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee and one other, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee)

Busan High Court Decision 88Na3888 delivered on May 29, 1991

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff 1 and 2 against the defendant 1 foundation is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.

The appeals against the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the remaining appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed, and this part of the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

As to Defendant 2’s ground of appeal

1. In light of the records, the court below's fact-finding or decision that did not recognize defendant 2's liability for tort is acceptable, and there is no violation of law such as theory of lawsuit.

2. According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the plaintiff 2 was a woman of 150§¯ in the height of 150§¯, and there was a 3.59 kilogramm in the body of early childbirth, and the plaintiff 1, the second child, was pregnant for three months from April 27, 197 to the hospital in the management of the incorporated foundation (hereinafter the defendant corporation), who was found to have been examined by the defendant 2, who was the father and the head of the division, and the third examination was conducted on August 6 of the same year, and it was found that the plaintiff 2 did not know about the second birth of the xar in the way of delivery, and that the second birth of the xar in the way of giving birth, and it was difficult to find that the first birth of the xar in the way of giving birth to the plaintiff 2, who did not know about the second birth of the xar in the way of giving birth, and that it was not a second birth of the xar in the case of the defendant 2, who did not know that the first birth.

3. A doctor shall have the reasonable discretion to choose the method of treatment that it considers appropriate in accordance with the patient's situation, the present medical level, and his knowledge and experience. Unless it goes beyond the reasonable scope, any one of the results of treatment shall not be deemed to have been justified and any other measure shall not be deemed to have been negligent (see Supreme Court Decision 82Do3199, Jun. 12, 1984).

Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

As to the ground of appeal against Defendant Corporation

1. For the above reasons, in light of the medical level and the actual condition of delivery recognized by the court below at the time of the plaintiff 1's childbirth, the court below's disposition which did not recognize that the non-party did not attempt only a subdivision by means of the first regrasium as requested by the plaintiff 2 constitutes a medical negligence as the elements for establishing the tort of the non-party, cannot be deemed unlawful, and the non-party cannot be viewed as an unlawful act by infringing the patient's right to self-determination without fulfilling his duty to explain as a doctor.

2. However, according to the court below, the non-party was found to have been in charge of giving birth to the plaintiff 2, who was hospitalized at the above hospital on August 14, 197 and transported to a mountain room on the day immediately before that time. In this case, the plaintiff 2 was thought to have extreme pain and delayed delivery of the fetus more than ordinary one, and the non-party requested that this request be executed on the non-party 2, but it was thought that the possibility of subfertilitying due to the 1stmath of the 7th of the 1st of the 1st of the 6th of the 1st of the 1st of the 7th of the 2nd of the 1st of the 7th of the 197th of the 197th of the 3rd of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 7th of the 1st of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 3th of the birth.

3. The above circumstances are as follows: (a) Plaintiff 2 was examined three times prior to delivery, notified of the possibility of fertility caused by king, and (b) was to be a pregnant woman to make safe delivery, such as requesting only the part by king. Rather, at the hospital of the Defendant corporation, it was accepted or disregarded by the hospital of the Defendant corporation. In addition, according to the court below acknowledged as the court below, there was a case where the bareboat cable was reduced in the item of an embryo during delivery (the booming phenomenon) and such a case is 2.7% (the 20% in the case of a single reduction, 2.5% in the case of a second reduction, and 0.2% in the case of an ordinary one), and there is no problem arising from the difference between 0 and 0% in the case of an average, and thus, it is unreasonable for the court below to deem that there was a difference between 0 and 0% in the situation of the Plaintiff’s 20-hour surgery and the 5% increase in contribution or decrease in the Plaintiff 1’s surgery.

4. In light of the records, there is no error in the court below's calculation of consolation money against plaintiffs 3, 4, and 5, and the plaintiffs' attorney did not make any other assertion as the ground of appeal on this part.

5. Therefore, the arguments are reasonable to the extent mentioned above.

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant corporation against the plaintiff 1 and 2 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. The appeal against the defendant 2 and the appeal against the remaining plaintiffs is dismissed. The costs of appeal against this part are assessed against the plaintiffs. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)