(a) The burden of proving the possession with respect to the prescriptive acquisition;

B. In a case where the possessor denies the title of the possession alleged as the possessor, whether it can be seen as the reversal of the presumption of the possession with intention to own or as the possession with intention to own (negative)

C. Whether the possessor can be deemed as the possessor in a case where the possessor makes a purchase proposal after the expiration of the acquisition period (negative)

A. In the case of acquisition by prescription, the existence or absence of an intention, which is the requirement for possession with intention of possession, must be determined by the nature of the source of possessory right which objectively causes the acquisition by possession. However, if the nature of the source of possessory right is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have possession with intention of ownership pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Therefore, the possessor does not have the responsibility to prove that he/she is possession with intention of possession with the nature of the source of possessory right. The possessor bears the burden of proof

B. Even in cases where the possessor asserts the right of possession, such as the purchase and sale or donation, but this is not recognized, the presumption of possession with the sole reason that the possessor is not recognized as the possessor cannot be reversed or deemed as the possession with the nature of the possessor’s source of possession.

C. Even if the possessor suggests the purchase of land to the other party after the expiration of the acquisition period, the possessor generally attempts to purchase the land to resolve the dispute between the owner and the other party even after the completion of the acquisition period, it cannot be deemed that the possession of the said possessor is the possession of the said land, solely on the fact that he/she made such a proposal.

(b)Article 197 and Article 245 of the Civil Code;

Supreme Court Decision 65Da1875 Decided November 23, 1965, 65Da1836 Decided January 25, 1966, 76Da2742,2743 Decided March 22, 197, 68Da729 Decided June 18, 1960, 76Da1886,1887 Decided July 14, 1981

The number of soldiers of the clan members of the Republic of Korea shall be the number of soldiers of the clan;

Han River Farmland Improvement Association Attorney Lee Han-soo et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 82Na1092,1093 Decided October 28, 1982

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In the case of acquisition by prescription, the existence or absence of the intention, which is the requirement for possession with intention of possession, shall be determined objectively by the nature of the source of possessor’s right which is the cause of acquisition by possession: Provided, That if the nature of the source of possessor’s right is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have possession with intention of ownership pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, and therefore, the possessor does not have the burden of proving that he/she is possession with intention of possession by himself/herself, and the other party who asserts that

Therefore, even in cases where the possessor asserts the right of possession such as the purchase and sale or gift by himself, but this is not recognized, the presumption of possession with the sole reason that the possessor is not recognized as the possessor cannot be deemed to be reversed or as the possessor with the nature of the possessor’s source of right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 65Da1875, Nov. 23, 1965; 68Da729, Jun. 18, 1968; 76Da86,1887, Mar. 9, 1976; 80Da2289, Jul. 14, 1981; 78Da1888, Jul. 28, 1981).

Unlike the previous opinion on the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, a party member has expressed his/her opinion that the possessor who asserts possession with no presumption of possession with respect to the nature of the source of possession right has the burden of proving the nature of the source of possession right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 66Da2049, Oct. 25, 1967; 66Da2049, Oct. 25, 1967; 4294Da941, Feb. 8, 1962; 74Da945, Aug. 30, 1974; 81Da99, Dec. 8, 1981).

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below asserted that the defendant opened a water pumping station, waterway, its site, and road leading to a water pumping station from April 9, 1923 to a water pumping station, and occupied it in a peaceful manner with the intention of possession up to 20 years, and the prescriptive acquisition has been completed as of April 9, 194 when 20 years elapsed by ombudsman. However, even though the above possession of the defendant is recognized, it is not recognized that the defendant purchased or expropriated the land of this case, but it is recognized that the defendant refused to purchase or expropriate the land of this case from around 1963 to 1973. Thus, the fact that the defendant used the land of this case for the above period cannot be deemed to have occupied it with the intent of possession of the owner of the right to possession of the land of this case by nature of the defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise, the above defendant's assertion based

However, as seen above, insofar as it is recognized that the Defendant occupied the instant real estate during the period of original adjudication, as long as it is presumed that the Defendant possessed it with the intention to own, the Defendant is presumed to have occupied it. Therefore, the Defendant is not liable to prove that the cause of possession of the instant real estate was a sale or expropriation without the burden of proof, and it cannot be deemed that the Defendant did not possess it with the nature of the possessory right by virtue of the nature of the possessory right.

In addition, even though the defendant proposed the purchase of the land in this case to the plaintiff after the expiration of the acquisition period as at the time of the original adjudication, the possessor generally seeks to purchase the land in order to resolve the dispute between the owner and the owner even after the expiration of the acquisition period, it cannot be deemed that the defendant's possession is the possession of the defendant with the fact that he/she proposed such purchase (see Supreme Court Decision 65Da1836, Jan. 25, 1966).

3. Ultimately, the judgment of the court below on this issue is justified, since it is against the interpretation of the party members' case law regarding the burden of proof of possession with respect to the burden of proof of possession with respect to the acquisition by prescription, which is the requirement for acquisition by prescription.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court for further proceedings. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park So-young (Presiding Justice) Lee So-young (Presiding Justice) Lee So-young, Kim So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young