(a) If the collective agreement provides that the preparation and revision of the rules of employment requires the labor union’s consent, consultation, or hearing procedures, the validity of the amended rules of employment in violation of such provision;

(b) The nature of the dispatch instruction at the passenger transport business entity and whether the rejection thereof constitutes a ground of dismissal;

(c) Criteria for determining whether to engage in unfair labor practice, and whether it constitutes unfair labor practice where disciplinary dismissal is dismissed due to justifiable grounds for dismissal of disciplinary action;

(d) In a case where an employer, who is required to take appropriate measures against a person under disciplinary action expelled from a trade union, solicits the person under disciplinary action to withdraw his or her expulsion and compromise before the disciplinary action is taken, whether the expulsion was conducted with undue labor practices that control or intervene in the organization and operation of the trade union

A. In principle, since an employer has the authority to prepare and revise the rules of employment, the employer may prepare and revise the rules of employment according to his/her intent. Even if the collective agreement provides that the employer shall obtain the consent of the trade union concerning the preparation and revision of the rules of employment, obtain consultation with the trade union, or hear their opinions, the validity of the rules of employment shall not be denied on the ground that it prepared and revised the rules of employment without such consent, consultation, or hearing of opinions, unless the conditions of employment under the rules of employment are modified disadvantageously to the previous workers.

B. In the case of a company that operates passenger transport business, the employer's act of dispatch or dispatch order to a driver who is an employee on board is an order for normal performance of duties. Thus, barring any special circumstance, a driver who is an employee must comply with such order, and the rejection is not a performance of the employee's duty to provide labor, which is an essential and basic duty under a labor contract, and it is not a default, but a reason for dismissal is generally a reason for dismissal. In a collective agreement, the collective agreement provides that "the company shall make a decision after hearing the opinion of the union in advance with respect to the suspension, dismissal, temporary retirement, pay, punishment, dispatch, and all other personnel principles of a member on board."

C. Unlike the ground of dismissal on the face when an employer dismisses a worker, if it is found that the worker was dismissed on the ground that the worker performed a legitimate act for trade union affairs, it shall be deemed unfair labor practices. Whether the worker actually constitutes a ground of dismissal and the worker's justifiable act for the worker's trade union affairs shall be deemed unfair labor practices. Whether the employer actually constitutes a ground of dismissal and the worker's justifiable act for the worker's trade union affairs, the time of dismissal, the relationship between the employer and the union, the imbalance between sanctions against the union members and non-members in the same case, the compliance with disciplinary procedure, the abuse of discretion in disciplinary action, and all other circumstances in which the existence of an unfair labor practice can be presumed, shall be determined by comprehensively examining and assessing the grounds for dismissal and the worker's reasonable act for the worker's trade union affairs, and as long as disciplinary action was done on the ground of legitimate grounds of disciplinary action, it does not constitute unfair labor practices by abuse of the

D. Prior to the progress of the disciplinary proceedings on the workers expelled in a trade union, the chairman of the company is aware that he made a statement to the effect that “the expulsion is to be withdrawn. If the expulsion is withdrawn, it shall be shipped on behalf of the company.” However, it shall not be deemed that the company controlled or intervene in the organization or operation of the trade union in its collective agreement pursuant to the provision that “the company shall immediately dismiss the worker when he refuses to join or withdraws from the trade union, and in the case of a person expelled in the trade union, unless there is any particular obstacle to business, the company shall take appropriate measures against the worker whose expulsion is taken by the trade union, and if a trade union does not take any action following the expulsion of the trade union against the worker, the company that is likely to have adverse effects on the relationship with the trade union.” If it appears that the expulsion is made by the purport that the disciplinary action is withdrawn on behalf of the worker, it shall not be deemed that the worker controlled or interfered with the organization or operation of the trade union.

A. Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act and Article 36(b) of the Trade Union Act. Article 27(1)(c) of the Labor Standards Act; Article 39 Subparag. 1(d) of the Trade Union Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 93Nu21514 delivered on August 23, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2534), 94Nu576 delivered on September 13, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2654) (Gong194Ha, 2654). Supreme Court Decision 87Nu818 delivered on February 9, 198 (Gong198, 532) 93Nu4595 delivered on December 10, 1993 (Gong194Sang, 371), 94Nu3940 delivered on August 26, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2548)

Plaintiff

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

New Transportation Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu33130 delivered on January 28, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the sixth ground for appeal

As a matter of principle, since an employer has the authority to prepare and revise the rules of employment, an employer may prepare and revise the rules of employment according to his/her intent (wholly Inserted by Act No. 45165, Dec. 22, 1992; Act No. 45165, Dec. 2, 1992); and even if the collective agreement provides that a trade union shall obtain consent to the preparation and amendment of the rules of employment, obtain consultation with the trade union, or hear opinions with the trade union, the validity of the rules of employment shall not be denied on the ground that the preparation and amendment of the rules of employment without such consent, consultation, or hearing of opinions, unless

This is because it is unfair to deny the validity of the rules of employment prepared and amended in violation of the above procedures, as a result, it is not different from compelling the conclusion of a collective agreement in the preparation or revision of the rules of employment.

In addition, Article 36 of the Trade Union Act can not be applied to the standards for working conditions and other workers' treatment prescribed in the rules of employment against those prescribed in the collective agreement. As seen above, the above provisions cannot be applied to the provisions for hearing opinions under the collective agreement.

In addition, the lower court determined the instant decision on review on the premise that the rules of employment of the new transportation company (hereinafter referred to as the “participating company”) of the Defendant’s Intervenor was valid, and therefore, it cannot be said that the lower court erred by failing to deliberate on the validity of the rules of employment. There is no reason to discuss.

2. On the second ground for appeal

A. In the case of an enterprise operating passenger transport business, the employer's act of dispatch or dispatch order to a driver who is an employee on board is an ordinary order to perform his duties. Thus, barring any special circumstance, a driver who is an employee must comply with such employer's order to provide labor, which is an essential and basic duty of the employee under a labor contract, and the refusal is not a default, but a reason for dismissal is generally a ground for dismissal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Nu576, Sept. 13, 1994; 93Nu21514, Aug. 23, 1994). Article 53 of the collective agreement of the participant company provides that "the company shall make a decision in advance on the suspension, dismissal, temporary retirement, pay-off, reward, dispatch, and other personnel principles of the participant company" and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the intervenor's order against the plaintiff is unfair.

B. According to the records, there is no evidence to deem that the end of February 20, 1990 prepared and submitted by the Plaintiff in relation to a traffic accident at around 22:30 on February 20, 199 as a disciplinary action, and thus, the Intervenor’s act of taking the said traffic accident as a ground for dismissal does not contravene the principle of res judicata or the principle

C. The court below's finding of the documents containing the disposition that the plaintiff sought revocation as evidence is for the purpose of recognizing the background of the disposition. Thus, it cannot be said that there was an error in violation of the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence, and the evidence No. 3 cannot be said to be credibility due to its assertion. There is no reason to interpret the above.

3. On the third and fourth grounds

According to the records, the judgment of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff was absent from work without permission for at least six days on February 20, 1990, since the accident caused by the plaintiff while driving a vehicle at Busan 1ba3136 around 15:30, and the plaintiff was investigated by an investigation agency on April 7, 199, and the plaintiff was returned to the workplace immediately after being investigated by the investigation agency on April 23, 199, and was returned to the driver's license, and the plaintiff was absent from work without permission for at least six days without returning to the workplace on May 3, 1992. On May 3, 1992, the decision of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law as the theory of the lawsuit.

In addition, Article 52 of the collective agreement on the argument of the lawsuit is merely a provision that limits the exercise of civil rights against workers who caused an accident in connection with a traffic accident while employed workers, or the exercise of rights to indemnity against them, and it is not a provision that limits the disciplinary action against workers who caused an accident. Thus, it cannot be said that the court below erred in interpreting the provisions of the collective agreement, and it cannot be said that the court below did not take disciplinary action against other workers who caused an accident, as alleged in the plaintiff's theory, on the ground that the plaintiff's initial inquiry did not take three times of a traffic accident into account the fact that another worker who caused an accident should take three times of a traffic accident together

4. On the first and fifth grounds for appeal

A. Unlike the grounds for dismissal in the dismissal of a worker, in substance, if an employer is deemed to have dismissed the worker on the ground that the worker performed a legitimate act for trade union operations, it shall be deemed unfair labor practices. Whether the worker actually performed a legitimate act for the worker's trade union operations constitutes a ground for dismissal, the employer's reasonable act for the worker's trade union operations, the time of dismissal, the relationship between the employer and the union, the imbalance between sanctions against the union members and non-members in the same case, the compliance with the disciplinary procedure, the abuse of disciplinary discretion, and all other circumstances to presume the existence of unfair labor practices (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu3940 delivered on Aug. 26, 1994; 93Nu495 delivered on Dec. 10, 1993). It shall not be determined that the worker's act constitutes an abuse of disciplinary authority under the above disciplinary action (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Nu188889, Aug. 26, 1998).

B. According to the records, the plaintiff's assertion that the intervenor company deposited with the head of the Trade Union at the time of expulsion of the plaintiff at the time does not have any evidence to acknowledge it. On the other hand, prior to the proceeding of the intervenor's disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff, the non-party subordinate to the non-party subordinate to the plaintiff, the chairperson of the intervenor company, the plaintiff's proposal that "if the expulsion is withdrawn, it shall be placed in advance for the plaintiff." If the above expulsion is acknowledged, it shall be placed in advance for the plaintiff company, but it shall be deemed that the intervenor company's act of dismissal or dismissal cannot be seen as legitimate in the above case's disciplinary action against the plaintiff's intervenor's employer's rejection or withdrawal of membership of the trade union (see evidence A-3) pursuant to Article 2 (3) of the collective agreement of the intervenor company.

C. In addition, according to the records, the plaintiff, who is not an executive officer of a trade union, filed a petition with the Busan District Labor Office around March 31, 1992 on the grounds of the following: (a) the effect of Non-party Hahn, who is the representative director of the intervenor company, due to the lack of school expenses, etc. (see evidence 5-2). (b) The above submission of the petition cannot be deemed as a trade union activity in its nature, and it does not seem to have been given implied delegation or authorization of the trade union; and (c) it is proved that there was no suspicion of any investigation result (see evidence 17). Thus, it cannot be deemed as a legitimate trade union activity (see evidence 17).

In addition, even though the plaintiff attempted to leave the place of a trade union as of July 1991, he did not have the qualification to leave the place of a trade union (refer to the evidence No. 24-3 of this case) since one year has not passed since he was employed in accordance with the election management regulations at that time, he voluntarily renounced the plaintiff's act of leaving the place of a trade union (refer to the evidence No. 24-3 of this case). Thus, there is no evidence to deem that the intervenor's act of leaving the place of a trade union was a legitimate union activity of the plaintiff, even if the intervenor's act of leaving the place of a trade union, and there is no evidence to deem that the intervenor's act of leaving the place of a trade union was suspected of the plaintiff's act. Since the local labor union on March 21, 1992 attempted to exercise the control power over unit labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's labor union's distribution without the participant's approval.

Therefore, considering the fact that most of the Plaintiff’s alleged activities are difficult to be seen as legitimate union activities, and that the dismissal of this case cannot be seen as abuse of the disciplinary authority in light of the content and frequency of the act of misconduct, which is the ground for dismissal of this case, it is difficult to accept the entries in Gap’s No. 6-1 and No. 7 to the effect that the Intervenor Company dismissed the Plaintiff due to the Plaintiff’s active commission of cooperative activities, and that the entries in Gap’s No. 6-2 and No. 7 are difficult to easily accept. In addition, the part of the Plaintiff’s statement in the Plaintiff’s Claim No. 6-

D. Accordingly, the court below held that the dismissal of the plaintiff did not constitute an unfair labor practice, on the ground that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the dismissal of the plaintiff in this case was an unfair labor practice committed as a retaliation against the plaintiff's active labor union activity, and that the dismissal of the plaintiff did not constitute a ground for dismissal under Article 69 of the Rules of Employment, and that the act of internal entry and disturbance, three times within a year, constitutes a ground for dismissal under Article 69 of the Rules of Employment, and that the dismissal of the plaintiff did not abuse the right of disciplinary action, and that the dismissal of the plaintiff in this case did not constitute a ground for dismissal under Article 4, 16, 24, and 25 of the Rules of Employment, and that the dismissal of the plaintiff in this case did not constitute an unfair labor practice, and that the dismissal of the plaintiff in this case does not constitute an unfair labor practice, and that the defendant's decision rejecting the plaintiff's request for remedy is legitimate. The decision of retrial is without merit.

6. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)