[1] The limitation of discretion in disciplinary action against public officials

[2] The standard for determining whether a disciplinary action against a public official is an illegal disposition beyond the scope of discretion

[3] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which held that the dismissal disposition against the police officer who caused a traffic accident while driving under the influence of alcohol 0.10% during the hours of temporary work was abused or abused by discretionary power

[1] Whether a disciplinary measure should be taken against a person subject to disciplinary action, who is a public official, is at the discretion of the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure. However, if the disciplinary measure taken as an exercise of discretionary power has considerably lost validity under the social norms, and it is deemed that the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure abused the discretionary power assigned to the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure, such

[2] If a disciplinary action against a public official has considerably lost validity under the social norms, it should be determined that the contents of the disciplinary action can be objectively and objectively unreasonable in determining the disciplinary action by comprehensively taking into account various factors, such as the contents and nature of the misconduct causing the disciplinary action, administrative purpose to be achieved by the disciplinary action, criteria for the determination of disciplinary action, etc.

[3] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which held that a disciplinary action against a police officer who drinking at a nearby restaurant during his/her resting working hours and driving his/her own car in a drinking condition of 0.10% alcohol concentration in blood, and killed and injured many people in collision with a taxi at the intersection where he/she is in a multi-section, was abused or abused within the scope of discretion.

[1] Articles 56, 58(1), 61, 63, 67, 78(1), and 79 of the State Public Officials Act, Articles 2-2 and 3 of the State Public Officials Service Regulations, Article 18(2) of the Police Officials Act, Article 9 of the Police Officials Service Regulations, Articles 1 [general administrative disposition] and 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [2] Articles 56, 58(1), 61, 63, 67, 78(1), and 79 of the State Public Officials Act, Articles 2-2 and 3 of the State Public Officials Service Regulations, Article 18(2) of the Police Officials Act, Article 9 of the Police Officials Service Regulations, Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [general administrative disposition] Articles 273 and 68(1) of the State Public Officials Act, Article 78(2) of the State Public Officials Act, Article 78(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 90Nu8954 delivered on July 23, 1991 (Gong1991, 2257), Supreme Court Decision 94Nu4622 delivered on June 10, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1969), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu18727 delivered on April 26, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1748), Supreme Court Decision 96Nu302 delivered on July 12, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 2518), Supreme Court Decision 96Nu15763 delivered on January 24, 197 (Gong197, 667)

Plaintiff

The Commissioner of Gangwon-do Local Police Agency

Seoul High Court Decision 97Gu9040 delivered on July 31, 1997

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the plaintiff was appointed as a patrol officer on October 5, 191 and was on duty at the 1995 Police Station, the plaintiff was temporarily on July 2, 1996 when she had been on duty at the 5-year stop from October 3, 1996 to 01, while she was on duty at the 7-year stop stop, and the plaintiff was on duty at the 22-15-year stop stop, and was on duty at the 5-year stop stop stop, and the plaintiff was on duty at the 0:45-year stop, and was on duty and was on duty at the 7-year stop stop stop, and the plaintiff was on duty at the 1-year stop stop and was on duty, and the plaintiff was on duty at the 1-day stop and was on duty at the 1-day stop, and the plaintiff was on duty at the 1-day stop and 20-day stop.

However, the disciplinary action should be taken at the discretion of the disciplinary authority when the disciplinary action is taken against a public official. However, if the disciplinary action as the exercise of discretionary authority considerably lacks validity under the social norms, it can be deemed unlawful. If the disciplinary action against a public official considerably lacks validity under the social norms, it should be determined that the disciplinary action is objectively unreasonable in light of various factors such as the content and nature of the misconduct causing the disciplinary action, the administrative purpose intending to achieve the disciplinary action, the criteria for the disciplinary action, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Nu15763, Jan. 24, 1997; 96Nu302, Jul. 12, 1996; 90Nu8954, Jul. 23, 1991).

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)