A. Violation of disposition regarding confinement, seizure, etc. at an investigative agency and grounds of appeal

B. Whether the witness at the request of the defendant was not examined as evidence

C. Whether other anti-proof evidence is allowed in addition to the protocol of trial as to litigation procedures

D. The error of the defendant's occupation, etc. in the judgment and the grounds of appeal

(e) Whether the judgment of the first instance court is appropriate, in which part of the detention days before sentencing is not included in the original sentence;

F. Whether Article 57 of the Criminal Act, which permits a total sum of the days of detention, is unconstitutional

A. Unless a violation of a disposition regarding confinement, seizure, etc. in an investigative agency affects the conclusion of the judgment, this does not constitute an independent ground for appeal.

B. The court may not conduct an investigation when it considers the evidence requested by the defendant unnecessary. Thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful on the ground that the court below did not conduct an investigation of evidence against the witness who requested the defendant.

(c) With respect to all the litigation procedures, it is proved that the trial proceedings have been in progress as recorded in the protocol of the trial, and the counter-proof by other data is not allowed.

D. The judgment document contains errors in the Defendant’s occupation, etc., and such errors cannot be deemed to have affected the conclusion of the judgment.

E. Even if the judgment of the first instance court did not include part of the detention days prior to the sentencing of the defendant in the original sentence, it is a matter belonging to the discretion of the judgment court, and thus, it cannot be said that there was an error of interpreting Article 57 of the Criminal Act.

F. The provision of Article 57 of the Criminal Act, which allows only a part of the detention days prior to a judgment by the court at its discretion, is not against the principle of equality under the Constitution or the principle of guaranteeing the right to a trial, or the right to a trial, etc.

(d)Article 383(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Articles 295 and 296(c) of the same Act. Article 56(f) of the same Act. Article 57 of the Criminal Act. Articles 11, 27(3) and 27(4) of the Constitution.

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 90Do646 delivered on June 8, 1990 (Gong1990,150). Supreme Court Decision 4286Do187 delivered on March 2, 1954, 83Do1473 delivered on July 26, 1983 (Gong1983,1387), Supreme Court Decision 77Do814 delivered on April 26, 197, 83Do1419 delivered on July 12, 198 (Gong1983,120 delivered on April 8, 1986). Supreme Court Decision 87Mo19 delivered on August 19, 198 (Gong1987,1161) and 88Do1989 delivered on August 26, 198 (Gong1984, Sept. 29, 209)

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 93No1944 delivered on August 17, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

65 days of detention after an appeal shall be included in imprisonment with prison labor for each crime under subparagraph 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

Concerning misunderstanding of Facts

According to the evidence of the first instance court as cited by the court below, the court below's decision that recognized the defendant's criminal facts of each of the instant public conflicts or attempted public conflicts is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misconception of facts by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error of law. The argument is without merit.

The assertion that there is an error of denial of a witness's application for detention procedures, etc. in an investigation agency

The fact that a disposition on confinement, seizure, etc. issued by an investigative agency is unlawful does not constitute an independent ground for appeal, unless such an error affects the conclusion of the judgment, and the court does not investigate the evidence requested by the defendant when it deems it unnecessary. Thus, it cannot be found that the witness requested by the court below was unlawful on the ground that the court did not examine the evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do646, Jun. 8, 1990). The argument is without merit.

As to the assertion of lack of right to prosecution

As in the theory of the lawsuit, even if the defendant who was the suspect was not present at the prosecutor's office without the attendance of the prosecutor, and the prosecutor made an interrogation protocol by questioning the defendant who was the suspect according to the prosecutor's order and signed and sealed by the prosecutor's assistant, the prosecution procedure against the defendant pursuant to the investigation procedure cannot be deemed null and void in violation of the provisions of the law. The judgment of the court below to the same purport is right and void,

With regard to the assertion that there is an error of not making a decision on rejection for appointment of a public defender

According to the records, it is clear that the court of first instance has notified the defendant of the decision to dismiss the defendant's request for appointment of public defender or special counsel on the second trial date. There is no reason for the argument

As to the assertion that there was an error in trial proceedings such as granting the last right to make a statement

According to the records of each of the trial records in the first instance court and the lower court, it is clear that the Defendant notified the Defendant that he may ask for an opinion on the result of examination of evidence and apply for evidence. It is evident that he provided an opportunity to make a final statement. As to all these litigation procedures, it is proved that the procedure of trial has been in progress as recorded in the trial records, and it is not allowed to give counter-proof by other data (see Supreme Court Decision 89Do2304, Feb. 27, 1990). We cannot accept the discussion guidance

As to the assertion that there was an error in declaration of judgment

Article 146 of the Regulations on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a sentence of a judgment shall be pronounced within 14 days from the date of closing the argument, and even in the case of a brupt case or other special circumstances, the provisions of Article 146 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that the period of time shall not exceed 21 days, does not coincide with the so-called sadic provision, and it cannot be deemed that such an error affected the result of the judgment by erroneously stating the defendant's occupation, etc. in the written judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 79Do456, Apr

On the assertion that the protocol of trial has no admissibility;

The defendant can request the perusal of the protocol of trial only if there is no defense counsel (Article 55(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act). According to the records, it is evident that the defendant of this case was appointed a public defender in the original court. Thus, the court below's decision which rejected the defendant's request for perusal of the protocol of trial cannot be used as evidence of guilt is without merit.

In regard to the assertion that the total number of days of pre-trial detention was erroneous,

Even if the judgment of the first instance did not include part of the detention days prior to the judgment of the defendant in the original sentence, it belongs to the discretion of the judgment court, and thus, it cannot be deemed that there was an error of application of the interpretation of Article 57 of the Criminal Act (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do353, Apr. 26, 1991).

In addition, all arguments that the provisions of Article 57 of the Criminal Act, which allow only a part of the detention days prior to the imposition of judgment, violates the principle of equality under the Constitution or the principle of presumption of innocence or the principle of guarantee of the right to a trial against a criminal defendant, are merely independent opinion and cannot be accepted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 67Do304, Apr. 4, 1967; 89Do1711, Oct. 10, 1989).

On the argument of unfair sentencing

In this case where a sentence of less than 10 years is imposed against the defendant, the argument that the sentence of the court below is too heavy cannot be viewed as a legitimate ground for appeal.

Any other argument by the defendant against internal tax payment may not be asserted as the grounds of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and part of the detention days after the appeal shall be included in the imprisonment with prison labor for each crime of Article 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance according to Article 24 of the Special Act on Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings. It is so decided as per Disposition

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)