A. The meaning of "the date when the tort was committed," which is the starting point for extinctive prescription, in the case of a tort at time between the harmful act and the damage.

B. The meaning of “the day on which the damage became known” under Article 766(1) of the Civil Code

A. In the case of damage claim based on a tort at an interval of time between the harmful act and the actual damage caused by it, the meaning of "the date on which the tort was committed", which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, shall be deemed to have been realized after that, when it can be deemed that the damage, which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, was actually realized after that, in other words, when the damage, which is the potential only in a conceptual and dynamic state, would have actually occurred. Therefore, in the case where the victim whose registration of creation of a neighboring mortgage was cancelled on the premise that the issuance of proof by the head of Dong was due to the public official's negligence, in order to seek damages due to the loss of the security right against the market, the date on which the damage was committed, which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, can be deemed to

B. It is reasonable to interpret Article 766(1) of the Civil Act to mean that it does not simply mean that the existence of the occurrence of damages is known, but rather, that a harmful act may bring a lawsuit against it as a tort.

(a) Article 766(2) of the Civil Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 77Da1894, 1895, 79Da684 delivered on December 26, 1979, Supreme Court Decision 69Da1113 delivered on October 11, 198, Supreme Court Decision 75Da233 delivered on March 25, 1975, Supreme Court Decision 88Da28211 delivered on January 12, 1990

Seoul High Court Decision 2001Na11448 delivered on August 2, 200

Attorney Han-chul, Counsel for the defendant-appellant in Daegu Metropolitan City

Daegu High Court Decision 87Na1242 delivered on September 2, 1988

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

As to the Defendant’s Attorney’s ground of appeal:

According to the facts established by the court below, with respect to the real estate in this case owned by the non-party 1, the non-party 2 was issued a certificate of the same person under the name of the head of Dong 1 in Namsan Daegu, Daegu, and filed an application for correction of the name on January 22, 1976. On January 23, 1981, the plaintiff, who transacted with the non-party 2, had believed the above registration and subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming the cancellation of the registration of the establishment of a neighboring real estate with the above non-party 1 knowing that the above non-party 1 had known the above registration and filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff for cancellation of the registration of the establishment of a neighboring real estate, but the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for damages under the premise that the non-party 1 had been extinguished on November 12, 1985 through the cancellation of the registration of the establishment of a neighboring real estate in this case from the expiration of the period of 10 years to August 12, 1986.

In the case of damage claim based on a tort at time between the harmful act and the actual damage occurred as in the case of this case, the meaning of the date on which the tort, which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, was committed, should be deemed as the time when it can be deemed that the damage, which is the starting point of the statute of limitations, was actually realized after the occurrence of the damage, if it can be said that the damage, which is the potential only in a conceptual and dynamic state, was realized (see Supreme Court Decision 77Da1894, 1894, 1895, 79Da684, Dec. 26,

The above right to collateral security should be cancelled only when the judgment against the plaintiff became final and conclusive on August 1, 1986, since the plaintiff's duty to cancel the registration of the establishment of the above collateral was finalized by the judgment against the plaintiff around October 11, 1988. In this regard, the court below is justified in rejecting the defendant's defense for extinctive prescription.

In addition, it is reasonable to interpret that Article 766(1) of the Civil Act should not simply mean that the facts of the occurrence of damages are known, but it is reasonable to interpret that the harmful act is a tort and that the harmful act may seek compensation for damages caused by such tort (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da1113, Jan. 26, 1971; Supreme Court Decision 75Da233, Mar. 25, 1975). In the case of this case, the plaintiff was aware of the occurrence of damages only when the judgment ordering the cancellation of the registration of creation of a neighboring mortgage became final and conclusive, so the judgment of the court below to the same purport shall not be deemed to contain a misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit, just

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)