A. The meaning of "date when a tort was committed" under Article 766 (2) of the Civil Act and the starting point for the proceedings of extinctive prescription

(b) Whether it can be deemed that the employer has approved the liability for damages, where the employer provides an employee with the certification necessary for receiving the industrial accident insurance benefits;

A. In relation to the claim for damages arising from a tort, "the date when the tort was committed", which serves as the starting point of the extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, means the time when it can be said that the occurrence of the result of the damage caused by the tort is realistic. The extinctive prescription runs from the time when it can be deemed that the damage caused by the tort is realistic regardless of whether the victim knew or could have anticipated the occurrence of the damage.

B. Where an employee demands the certification necessary for receiving industrial accident insurance benefits, the company's certification as an employer under Article 34 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act or the company's liability for damages against an employee cannot be deemed to have been approved only by supporting the procedure of claiming insurance benefits under Article 34 (1) of the same Enforcement Decree.

A. Article 766(2) of the Civil Act; Article 168 subparag. 3 of the Civil Act; Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 88Meu25168 delivered on January 12, 1990 (Gong1990, 457)

[Judgment of the court below] The plaintiff 1 et al. and four plaintiffs et al.

Twin Construction Co., Ltd.

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na31318 delivered on November 26, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the Plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal.

1. In the claim for damages arising from tort, "the date when the tort committed", which serves as the starting point of the extinctive prescription under Article 766 (2) of the Civil Act, means the time when the damage resulting from the harmful act could have actually occurred. In this case, as recognized by the first instance court, as the court below accepted on May 29, 1981, where the plaintiff 1 received medical treatment, such as surgery, by suffering from the injury of the 4, 5th protruding signboard escape certificate, due to the accident in this case, if the above injury occurred later, the court below affirmed the part of the judgment below that held that it is reasonable to view that the damage resulting from the above injury was actually suffered as at the time of May 29, 1981, and that the damage was caused by the harmful act in this case, as at the time when the plaintiff suffered from the injury of the 4, 5th damaging signboard escape certificate, and the method and process of treating the above injury, and that the above injury was caused by the harmful act in this case.

In addition, the extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, unlike the extinctive prescription under Article 766(1) of the same Act, runs from the time when it can be deemed that the damage was actually caused by the harmful act regardless of whether the victim knew or could have anticipated the occurrence of the result of the damage. Thus, the extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act of the claim for damages of this case is just and the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to whether the Plaintiffs could expect the occurrence of the harm caused by the above injury at the time of the accident.

Ultimately, there is no reason to argue that the judgment of the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, when the defendant company, around January 29, 190, received additional medical care with regard to the protruding premium in the name of the above plaintiff 4 and 5 which occurred again as above, the court below stated that the above plaintiff company's application for additional medical care submitted to the Ministry of Labor pursuant to Article 8 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, which had been employed by the previous defendant company, proved that the above plaintiff had been hospitalized in spine on May 29, 1981, which was the time when the plaintiff was employed by the previous defendant company, and it cannot be viewed that the above plaintiff's claim for additional medical care with regard to the above plaintiff's average wage in the name of the above plaintiff under Article 10-2 (4) of the Enforcement Decree was just and there was no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the above plaintiff's liability for compensation with respect to the above plaintiff's injury under the above provision of Article 10-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)