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(영문) 대법원 1993. 6. 22. 선고 93도1035 판결
[명예훼손][공1993.9.1.(951),2199]
Main Issues

A. Requirements for the elimination of illegality by Article 310 of the Criminal Code

(b) The case holding that the illegality of defamation cannot be deemed as a publicly alleged fact, and thus, it is not justified;

Summary of Judgment

A. In order for an act of impairing a person by openly pointing out a fact to be dismissed and punished pursuant to Article 310 of the Criminal Act, if the alleged fact concerns the public interest objectively, and the fact should be objectively stated for the public interest, and the fact should be true. "the public interest" refers not only to the interests of the State, society, and other general public, but also to the interests of a specific social group or the whole members of the society, and it should be objectively determined in light of the contents and nature of the alleged fact itself. If the major purpose of the actor expressing the fact is for the public interest, the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act shall not be excluded even if there are other incidental purposes.

B. The case holding that the illegality of defamation cannot be viewed as a publicly alleged fact, and thus, it is not justified.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 310 of the Criminal Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 88Do899 decided Feb. 14, 1989 (Gong1989,445) 92Do3160 decided Jun. 22, 1993 (Gong1993, 2188)

Escopics

Defendant 1 and two others

upper and high-ranking persons

Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Attorney Ansan-il

Judgment of the lower court

Incheon District Court Decision 92No892 delivered on February 25, 1993

Text

The part of the judgment of the court below regarding defamation against the victim 1 and 2 shall be reversed, and the case concerning this part shall be remanded to the Incheon District Court Panel Division.

The remaining appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The Prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Summary of the facts charged in this case

Defendant 1 and 2 are professors of the first university established and operated by the non-indicted school foundation. Defendant 3 is co-chairperson of the second college established and operated by the same school foundation. Defendant 1 and 2 is co-chairperson of the Promotion Committee for the Normalization of the school foundation of the non-indicted 1, who is a teacher of the second college established and operated by the same school foundation. On July 18, 191, 191, at the office of the first university university professor Council located in Incheon, Defendant 1 and 2 prepared the following title: “The fact that there is 10 reasons to completely reorganize and normalize the current school foundation of the non-indicted 1, 100, 100, 100, 300, 100, 100, 30,000, 10,000, 30,000, 20, 30,000, 20, 30,000, women 2.

2. Summary of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below

The case holding that if the Defendants were to be working for the school juristic person, the first instance court decided to collect objective data on all problems of the school juristic person, including the necessity of normalization of the school juristic person, and the second instance court's appointment of the above school juristic person's assistant principal, and the second instance court's appointment of the above 10th school juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's 16th school juristic person's senior juristic person's 191, and the second instance court's appointment of the above 10th school juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's 10th day's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's 10th day's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's 10th day's senior juristic person's senior juristic person's 2.

3. Judgment of party members

A. Article 310 of the Criminal Act provides that “When an act under Article 307(1) is true and solely for the public interest, the act shall not be punished.” Thus, if an act of impairing a person’s reputation by openly pointing out a fact is objectively deemed unlawful and not punished in accordance with the above provision, the act of impairing a person’s reputation by openly pointing out a fact is objectively related to the public interest, and the actor should also indicate the fact for the public interest, and such fact should be true.

The term "public interest" refers to not only to the interests of the State, society, and other general public, but also to the interests of a specific social group or its entire members. Whether it relates to the public interest should be objectively determined in light of the contents and nature of the stated facts itself. If the principal purpose of the actor who stated the facts is for the public interest, it shall not be excluded from the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act even if there was another purpose. (See Supreme Court Decision 88Do899 delivered on February 14, 1989).

B. In the instant case, according to the facts acknowledged by the court of first instance, which the court below maintained as to the motive and circumstance of the Defendants’ distribution and distribution of the aforementioned inducements, and the contents of the above inducements, including the facts revealed by the Defendants in this case, the part concerning the crossing of teachers and assistant workers related to victims among the facts stated in the above inducements was discussed as one of the cases pointing out the problems within the school for the normalization of the school foundation 1 and the connection with the operation of private teaching institutes. It is clear that this is about the interest and interest of the general public as well as the school foundation 1’s teachers and staff, students, parents, and parents. Furthermore, as long as the Defendants distributed them only to the above inducements prepared with the intent of the Ministry of Education and other related agencies for the normalization of the operation of the school foundation 1, and the defendants distributed them to the victims’ personal reputation by distributing the above inducements, and even if the Defendants knew that they damaged the reputation of the victims, the judgment of the court below held that the Defendants’ distribution of the above inducements and interests of the school foundation 1.

C. We examine whether the following facts are true or not.

(1) According to the evidence adopted by the first instance judgment maintained by the court below, the judgment of the court below affirmed the first instance court's judgment that held that the victim 3's certificate of qualification as assistant principal was not granted and educational experience was not appointed as principal for a given period of more than a certain period, and that the principal was appointed as principal after obtaining the principal's qualification according to the method of recommendation (the expression "the appointment of letter delivery minister by the recommendation of the Teachers Qualification Examination Committee). Thus, the defendants' statement of the facts alleged by the defendant cannot be deemed as a statement of true facts (the expression "defluenceion" cannot be deemed as a statement of specific facts that undermine the people's social value or evaluation). It cannot be deemed that there was an error of

(2) However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court of first instance that held that the part concerning the victim 1 and 2 among the facts alleged by the Defendants is true.

First of all, considering the part concerning victim 1, the statement of fact that the victim 1 was issued as the principal of the fourth class school even though the victim 1 was disqualified is the victim 3, and considering the fact that the victim 1 was required to be appointed as the principal of the school under the context before and after the expression, such as the expression of "unqualified person" with respect to the victim 1, it is understood to the purport that the fact that the victim 1 was appointed as the principal of the school although the victim 1 had no legal qualification to be appointed as the principal of the school under the Education Act. According to the relevant evidence and records, it is difficult to view that the defendants did not prove that the defendants were subject to disciplinary action for the victim 21 months only based on the evidence that the victim 1 was recognized as the principal of the school by the method of the so-called recommendation examination on December 29, 1976 (the investigation record, 6 pages, 82 pages). Thus, it is difficult to view that the defendants were subject to disciplinary action for the victim 1 to the extent that it was true.

D. Nevertheless, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance which acquitted the Defendants of the facts charged on the ground that the part concerning the victim 1 and 2 among the facts alleged by the Defendants was true and is related to the public interest. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the grounds for excluding the illegality of defamation, or by misapprehending the rules of evidence, or by erroneously recognizing facts contrary to the rules of evidence, and it is evident that such illegality affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the grounds for appeal are within the scope of pointing this out.

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding defamation against the victim 1 and 2 is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The prosecutor's remaining appeal (as to defamation against the victim 3) is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon-young (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-인천지방법원 1993.2.25.선고 92노892
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