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(영문) 대법원 1994. 3. 22. 선고 93도3612 판결
[살인,살인미수,폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반,도로교통법위반][1994.5.15.(968),1373]
Main Issues

A. Purpose of the crime of murder;

B. Whether Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act also applies to the relationship between another defendant or suspect who has an accomplice relation with the defendant

C. Criteria for determining causation between the act of murder and death

Summary of Judgment

A. The intent of the crime of murder is to recognize and check the fact that the victim might die due to his own act, and it is not necessary to wish or aim at the victim’s death, and it is also sufficient to do so, not with conclusive intention, not with intention.

B. Article 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies not only to cases where the interrogation protocol of the accused prepared by investigation agency other than the prosecutor is used as evidence of guilt, but also to cases where the interrogation protocol of the accused or the suspect prepared by investigation agency other than the prosecutor is used as evidence of guilt against the accused.

C. Since the commission of murder does not constitute the only cause or a direct cause for causing the death of the victim, it shall not be deemed that there exists a causal relationship between the commission of murder and the death of the victim, even if there exists another fact between the commission of murder and the death of the victim, unless it is merely a matter that can normally be predicted that such fact directly causes the death of the victim.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 250 of the Criminal Code. Article 13(a) of the Criminal Code. Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Article 17 of the Criminal Code

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 87Do1091 Decided July 21, 1987 (Gong1987, 1435) (Gong1987, 1435) 87Do2564 Decided February 9, 1988 (Gong198, 548) (Gong1988, 1050). Supreme Court Decision 86Do1783 Decided November 11, 1986 (Gong1987, 47), Supreme Court Decision 87Do1020 Decided December 22, 1987 (Gong198, 378), Supreme Court Decision 92Do442 Decided April 14, 192 (Gong1962, 1947) (Gong1647), Supreme Court Decision 283Do2845 Decided 2582, 1982).

Escopics

Defendant 1 and five others

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendants

Defense Counsel

Attorney Oh Byung-ray

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 93No670 delivered on December 10, 1993

Text

1. Of the judgment below, the part concerning Defendant 2 is reversed, and the case concerning this part is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

2. All other Defendants’ appeals are dismissed.

3. The number of days under detention after the final appeal shall be 95 days in each original sentence to the defendant 3 and 4;

Reasons

1. Determination on the first ground for appeal by the Defendants and their defense counsel

The judgment of the court of first instance affirmed by the court below. After the defendants conspired with the non-indicted 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, etc. and decided to take a retaliation against the employees of other causes of violence, such as the non-indicted 5, 6, etc. who were arrested and abused by the defendants, the victim's 302 visit, the non-indicted 1 and the non-indicted 7, etc. on February 15, 1993 were found as 1, 05:30, and the non-indicted 1 and the defendant 4 shared with each other so that the non-indicted 1 and the non-indicted 4 could not communicate the police. The defendant 2, who followed the judgment of the court of first instance, did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the crime of homicide and the non-indicted 3's homicide, the victim's body and the non-indicted 1 and 3, and the victim's body were found to be inconsistent with the above evidence.

2. The Defendants’ grounds of appeal No. 2 and the defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 3

A. The criminal intent of the crime of murder is not sufficient for the victim to have known and confirmed the fact that the victim might die due to his/her own act, and it is not necessary for the victim to die or to have do so, and dolusent intent, not for conclusive intention (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Do1091, Jul. 21, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 88Do692, Jun. 14, 198). If the facts of the first instance judgment maintained by the court below were duly established, the defendants 1, 3, 5, and 6, etc., who were directly engaged in the harmful act against the victim's head or chest, were not aware of the victim's body and the victim's body, and thus, the defendants were not aware of the fact that he/she could not have been aware of the victim's death with the victim's 1, 4, and 17, as stated in the court below's reasoning, and there were no errors in the misapprehension of the victim's body and 16, as well.

B. However, Defendant 2 consistently with the prosecutor's office, although he did not find Nonindicted 7, etc. with other Defendants, Defendant 2 took the place of the crime in this case. However, Defendant 1 et al., upon the contact that she was frighten 1, and found Defendant 1 to be fright 1, etc., Defendant 1 et al. entered the place of the crime in this case. Thus, even according to the facts charged in the indictment itself as stated in the indictment, Defendant 2 stated that he was aware that he was frighten, etc., even though he was frighten and frightened, he did not have to take part in the crime in the crime in the crime of this case. In addition, Defendant 1 et al., the evidence or evidence adopted by the judgment of the court of first instance, which the court below maintained, could not be seen as having been aware of the above facts of the Defendant's direct participation in the crime in the crime in this case or attempted murder. Thus, Defendant 1 cannot be viewed as having been aware of the above facts.

Nevertheless, without any evidence, the court below convicted the above defendant of the charge of murder and attempted murder on the premise that the above defendant had the intention to commit the crime of murder. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence in finding the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, and it is clear that such illegality has affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, there is a reason to point this out.

3. Judgment on the ground of appeal No. 4 by defense counsel

Article 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act strictly limits the admissibility of a suspect interrogation protocol prepared by an investigative agency other than a public prosecutor, which is prepared by the person who made the statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial, and also can be admitted as evidence only when the defendant who made the suspect at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial, or his defense counsel admitted the contents thereof. This provision shall apply not only to the case where the interrogation protocol prepared by an investigative agency other than the public prosecutor is used as evidence of guilt but also to the case where the interrogation protocol prepared by the investigative agency other than the public prosecutor is used as evidence of guilt as evidence of guilt against other accused or suspect who made the investigation agency other than the public prosecutor (see Supreme Court Decision 86Do1783, Nov. 11, 1986; 92Do442, Apr. 14, 1992, etc.

The court below held that according to the evidence adopted by the court of first instance and the statement of the interrogation protocol on the defendant 3 prepared by the assistant judicial police officer, the defendant 6/2 of this case's charges can be acknowledged. According to the records, the above interrogation protocol was clear that the above defendants or defense counsel did not recognize its contents at a preparatory hearing or on the trial date. Thus, the court below's judgment that held the above interrogation protocol on the defendant 3 prepared by investigation agency other than the prosecutor as evidence of guilt against the above defendants as evidence of guilt is erroneous in the misapprehension of law as evidence of guilt.

However, even if each of the facts charged against Defendant 6 excludes the above interrogation protocol, it can be sufficiently recognized based on the evidence adopted by the court of first instance that the court below maintained as stated in paragraph 1 (1). Thus, it cannot be deemed that the above error of law committed by the court below affected the part which found the above defendant guilty among the judgment below, and there is no reason to discuss this issue.

However, it is clear that the above error of the judgment below committed by the court below affected the part which found Defendant 2 guilty, which affected the conclusion of the judgment of the court below, and there is a reason to point this out.

4. Determination as to the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 3 and No. 2 of the grounds of appeal by the defense counsel except Defendant 2

It is identical to the theory of the lawsuit that the above Defendants may be punished for murder only when there is a causal relationship between the harmful act by the above Defendants and the death of the victim 1. However, since the commission of murder does not fall under the only cause or a direct cause which causes the death of the victim (see Supreme Court Decision 82Do2525, Dec. 28, 1982). Thus, even if there exists a different fact between the commission of murder and the death of the victim, and the fact directly causes the death, if such fact is ordinarily foreseeable, it shall be deemed that there exists a causal relationship between the act of murder and the death of the victim.

According to relevant evidence, such as the testimony of the witness Lee Young-young and Lee Yang-young, and the written diagnosis of death on the victim 1 prepared by the Lee Jong-ok of the court of first instance, the victim 1 suffered from the crime of this case on February 15, 1993, and received treatment again due to the occurrence of acute salmatosis, and death on March 17, 1993, the occurrence of pulmonary salmatism, salmatism, salmatism, and salmaty blood salmatism, and the occurrence of the above salmatism or disease is more bad, and the death rate is 30% to 60%, and in particular, the death rate is the highest in the case of the above salmatal salmaty that occurred after the operation or on credit, and even if the above salunity salmatism was reduced, it is more likely that the above salmatization and salmatium were directly caused by the above me.

The judgment of the court below that made the same conclusion is just, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles on causation without making a proper deliberation as in the judgment of the court below, and there is no reason to discuss.

5. Determination as to Defendant 1, 3, 5, and 6’s grounds of appeal No. 4 and grounds of appeal No. 5 by defense counsel

The court below held that the crime of this case was committed under a close examination in advance for retaliation, and the contents of the crime of this case were cruel as a victim's without discrimination ovum by carrying a deadly weapon, such as blades, improvement, hacks, pipes, and stens, etc., at night. The result is very heavy for the victim to death and serious. The victims are those who are not at all related to the spefic violence that originally aimed at the above defendants, and eventually, the crime of this case is the case where a deceased person was killed with a deadly weapon while carrying a deadly weapon. After the crime of this case, some accomplices attempted to conceal the crime of this case, and there were no other circumstances such as character, character, intelligence, criminal power, family relationship relationship, home environment, and circumstances after the crime, and there were no reasonable grounds to recognize that the above defendants' age and 15 years of imprisonment had been too unfair, considering the above circumstances and the records.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding Defendant 2 is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. All other Defendants’ appeals are dismissed, and part of the detention days after the appeal is included in the original sentence of the court of first instance against Defendant 3 and 4. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-광주고등법원 1993.12.10.선고 93노670
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