A. Admissibility of evidence of co-defendant's confession

B. Whether Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act also applies to the interrogation protocol on the other accused of accomplice relation

A. Co-defendant's confession is admissible independently because it is not different from the case where the defendant's cross-examination is guaranteed.

B. Provisions which strictly limit the admissibility of interrogation records prepared by investigation agencies other than prosecutor under Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act should be applied not only to cases where interrogation records prepared by investigation agencies other than prosecutor of the defendant are used as evidence of guilt, but also to cases where investigation agencies other than prosecutor of the defendant or the suspect who are co-offenders with the defendant adopt interrogation records prepared by investigation agencies other

Articles 310 and 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 68Do231 Decided April 16, 1968, 85Do691 Decided June 25, 1985, Supreme Court Decision 87Do973 Decided July 7, 1987, Supreme Court Decision 79Do287 Decided April 10, 197, Supreme Court Decision 86Do1783 Decided November 11, 1986

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Seo Tae-ro

Daegu High Court Decision 86No1723 delivered on April 16, 1987

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Co-defendant's confession is admissible independently because it does not differ from the case where the defendant's right to cross-examination is guaranteed, and the defendant's right to cross-examination is examined as a witness (see Supreme Court Decision 87Do973, Jul. 7, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 85Do691, Jun. 25, 1985, etc.). It is not permissible to criticize the judgment of the court below as an opposing opinion.

2. Provisions which strictly limit the admissibility of a suspect interrogation protocol prepared by investigation agency other than the prosecutor under Article 312 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act shall be applied not only to cases where the interrogation protocol prepared by investigation agency other than the prosecutor against the defendant is used as evidence of guilt, but also to cases where the investigation agency other than the prosecutor against the defendant or the suspect in relation to the defendant was adopted as evidence of guilt against the defendant (see Supreme Court Decision 86Do1783, Nov. 11, 1986).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, in recognizing the criminal facts of the judgment of the court below against the defendant, each protocol of interrogation of a suspect against the co-defendant 1, 2, and 3 prepared by the court below as evidence, which is obviously the document that the defendant or his defense counsel did not agree to use as evidence, and since the protocol of interrogation of a suspect is about the defendant and co-offenders, the court below's adoption as evidence for conviction is unlawful as pointed out in the arguments. However, according to the records, in addition to the above protocol of interrogation of a suspect, it is sufficient to recognize the defendant's habitualness and criminal facts as to the court of first instance, including each protocol of interrogation of a suspect as to the co-defendant 1, 2, and 2 prepared by the public prosecutor, the evidence of the court below, including the above protocol of interrogation of a suspect as co-defendant 1, and 2, etc. prepared by the public prosecutor, it is sufficient to acknowledge the defendant's habitualness and criminal facts as to

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)