In a case where a part of the defendant's appeal was accepted in the appellate court and the part of the cited amount in the first instance was revoked, but the plaintiff's appeal was accepted in the appellate court and the appellate court reversed and remanded the judgment in the appellate court, and the appellate court maintained the cited amount in the first instance as it is, the period during which the defendant deems it reasonable to dispute about the existence or scope of the quoted amount

In a case where the appellate court accepted the defendant's appeal partially and revoked part of the cited amount of the first instance court, but the appellate court reversed and remanded the judgment of the appellate court and maintained the cited amount of the first instance court after reversed and remanded, it is reasonable to deem that, if the defendant's argument was accepted by the appellate court prior to the remanding of the case, there was a reasonable ground for the defendant's defense as to the existence or scope of the obligation until

Article 3(1) and (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

Supreme Court Decision 94Da2942 delivered on November 11, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3267) Supreme Court Decision 95Da51960 delivered on February 23, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1075) Supreme Court Decision 97Da6988 delivered on May 9, 197 (Gong1997Sang, 1732) 96Da17202 delivered on July 14, 1998 (Gong198Ha, 2103)

[Judgment of the court below]

Dongbu Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Jeon Byung-chul, Counsel for defendant-appellee)

Supreme Court Decision 97Da57900 Delivered on March 27, 1998

Suwon District Court Decision 98Na3839 delivered on November 11, 1998

Of the part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against which payment is ordered in excess of the amount equivalent to five percent per annum from April 10, 1993 to March 27, 1998, and twenty-five percent per annum from March 28, 1998 as to the part against the defendant in the judgment of first instance, shall be reversed. The part against the defendant in the judgment of first instance ordering payment in excess of the amount equivalent to five percent per annum from March 10, 1993 to March 27, 1998, and the part against which payment is made in full, shall be dismissed. The remaining appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal against the dismissed appeal

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the nurse's occupation constitutes a Korean Standard Occupational Classification 32 as a life-science and health-related expert under the Korean Standard Occupational Classification, and calculated the plaintiff's lost interests based on the premise that the nurse's occupation constitutes a life-science and health-related expert under the Central Classification 22, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the calculation of lost interests. The ground of appeal as to this point

2. On the second ground for appeal

The lower court determined that the Defendant is obligated to determine the amount of the property damage that the Defendant is liable to pay to the Plaintiff at KRW 148,80,634, and to pay damages for delay in addition to the rate of 25 percent per annum as stipulated in Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter “Special Cases”) from December 27, 1995 to the date of full payment, with respect to KRW 135,075,224 cited in the first instance judgment.

However, Article 3(2) of the Special Act provides that the provision of paragraph (1) shall not apply to a case where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until a fact-finding judgment declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered. Here, when it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation, the term "if it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation," refers to the case where the obligor's assertion in a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation is deemed to have considerable grounds (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Meu1876, May 26, 1987; Supreme Court Decisions 91Da2108, Nov. 22, 1991; 92Da23827, Oct. 13, 1992).

In light of the record, the process of the instant lawsuit is examined as follows.

As to the plaintiff's claim, the first instance court ordered to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum from April 10, 1993 to December 26, 195, which is 135,075,224 won as property damages, and damages for delay from April 10, 1993 to the date of the first instance judgment, which is 15% per annum from the date of the first instance judgment, and at the rate of 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment. The defendant's appeal is dismissed, and the court below accepted part of the plaintiff's appeal before remand as a result of the plaintiff's incidental appeal and accepted part of the defendant's appeal, which is 11,098,43 won as to property damages from the first instance judgment and 194% as to the damages for delay from April 10, 1993 to the date of the second instance judgment, and the part of the judgment below which ruled that the defendant's damages for delay should be paid to the plaintiff is reversed.

However, if the defendant's argument was accepted by the court below prior to remanding, it is reasonable to view that there was a reasonable ground for the defendant to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment is reversed. Nevertheless, it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles of Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Payment of Damages at the rate of 25 percent per annum from the day after the court of first instance sentenced to the amount of KRW 135,075,224, which the court below accepted in the court of first instance, to order the payment of damages for delay at the rate of 135,000 per annum from the day after the court of first instance sentenced

As to this part, it is sufficient for the court to render a judgment by directly correcting it, it shall make a self-market in accordance with Article 407 of the Civil Procedure Act.

As legally determined by the court below, the defendant shall pay 148,80,634 won as property damages to the plaintiff: Provided, That as to damages for delay, the amount of 135,075,224 won cited in the court of first instance among the above legal principles shall be 5% per annum under the Civil Act from April 10, 1993 to March 27, 1998, which is the date of the judgment of remand of this court, and 25% per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement from March 28, 1998 to the date of full payment; and as to the amount of 13,725,410 won additionally cited in the court below after remand from April 10, 1993 to the date of the judgment of remand of this court, only the amount shall be 13,725,410 won per annum as prescribed by the Civil Act from November 11, 1998 to the date of the judgment of the court below.

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim shall be accepted only to this extent. Among the judgment of the court of first instance, the damages for delay ordering payment in excess of this scope shall be revoked unfairly and the plaintiff's claim as to the cancellation portion shall be dismissed. The defendant's remaining appeal shall be dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant. It is so decided

Justices Lee In-hee (Presiding Justice)