(a) Whether the apartment district is designated and publicly announced as an apartment district and the construction is restricted, and it is difficult to dispose of it due to the damage of high seas due to the low carbon storage in the vicinity of the area, and whether it falls under the “a site for which a de facto construction is impossible” as prescribed

B. Whether or not the causes cited as “a site where de facto construction is impossible” under Article 9-2(1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site are the examples.

A. It is difficult to view that construction is restricted as an apartment district and it is difficult to dispose of the high seas due to the lack of carbon in the vicinity of the apartment district as stipulated in Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act on Ownership of Housing Site solely on the ground that it is difficult to dispose of the high seas.

B. Article 9-2 (1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Housing Site Ownership (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of Jun. 12, 1993) provides that "the housing site excluded from the housing site subject to the imposition of charges under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act shall be a housing site which falls under any of the following subparagraphs and confirmed by the head of the competent Si/Gun that no building permit cannot be granted by the head of the competent Si/Gun," and provides that "the housing site shall be a site that is confirmed by the head of the competent Si/Gun," under subparagraphs 1 through 6 of Article 1 of the Urban Planning Act, the Protection of Military Installations Act, the Housing Site Development Promotion Act, etc., or the private housing site owned directly by the State or local government for public use

Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 9-2 (1) of the Enforcement Rule of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of Jun. 12, 1993)

Supreme Court Decision 93Nu20252 delivered on May 13, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1721, 3Nu19405 delivered on May 24, 1994, 184Ha and 1844

[Judgment of the court below]

Head of Busan Metropolitan City and Jung-gu

Busan High Court Decision 93Gu1046 delivered on September 10, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 are also examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, based on macroficial evidence, that the land owned by the plaintiff was located in the Dongdong-gu Busan Metropolitan City ( Address omitted) and 1623.6 square meters in Busan Metropolitan City, which is the land owned by the plaintiff, and there was a large-scale low carbon in its neighboring area, and that the non-party Korea National Housing Corporation and Korea Land Development Corporation refused to request the purchase of the plaintiff's land due to pollution, business conditions, etc., on the land in this case, the plaintiff cannot independently construct the housing on the land in this case, and there is difficulty in disposing of the above low carbon due to damage to the high seas. The court below determined that the above land in this case does not fall under any item of the housing site excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges under Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Ownership of the Housing Site, and even if the above provision of the Enforcement Rule is exemplary, in light of the legislative purpose of the above Act, it is difficult to view the above land as being subject to the construction charges in this case as the last part of Article 20 (1).

Article 20 (1) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites provides that "the site for which the construction of a house is prohibited or de facto impossible under the Building Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Urban Planning Act," and Article 9-2 (1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of Jun. 12, 1993) provides that "the site excluded from the site subject to the imposition of charges under the provisions of the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act shall be a site that falls under any of the following subparagraphs and is confirmed by the head of the competent Si/Gun as being unable to grant a construction permit," and Article 20 (1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that "the site shall be a site for which the head of the competent Si/Gun is confirmed as being unable to grant a construction permit under the provisions of Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Urban Planning Act, the Protection of Military Installations Act, and the Construction of a steep slope, etc.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below which seems to be limited to the reasons cited in Article 9-2 (1) of the above Enforcement Rule is erroneous, or examining in accordance with the provisions of related Acts and subordinate statutes and the records, it is reasonable that the court below determined that the land of this case cannot be deemed as a site where construction cannot be actually impossible under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the above Act. Therefore, the above erroneous judgment of the court below does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, and the judgment of the party members who are in dispute of the lawsuit cannot be a proper precedent for the use of this case

The ground of appeal No. 3 is examined.

Article 3 (1) of the Addenda to the above Act provides that "the charges with respect to housing sites falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 19 at the time this Act enters into force shall not be imposed within two years from the enforcement date of this Act. If charges are imposed after the lapse of two years, the date on which the two years have passed shall be deemed the date falling under any of subparagraphs of Article 19." The above provision does not impose charges retroactively prior to the enforcement date of the Act, and it cannot be deemed that the provision is invalid as it violates the rule of law or excessive prohibition under the Constitution, the principle of retroactive legislation restriction, and the principle of property right guarantee under the Constitution. The decision of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no violation of the law

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)