(a) In cases where a building on the land, the category of which is a building on the land, becomes a house on the public register and is used for the purpose of illegal alteration, whether such land falls under a housing site under the Act on the Ownership

B. Whether a clan is a juristic person that carries on religious affairs, religion, or other public business under Article 12 subparagraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Site

C. Whether "it is impossible to construct a de facto building" can be viewed as "a site where it is impossible to construct a de facto building solely on the ground that a clan was established."

(a) Where a building on land, the category of which is a building on the register or management ledger is both a house and is used for another purpose without any lawful permission or reporting on the change of use as prescribed by the Building Act, such land is a site of a house, and thus constitutes a housing site subject to the Act on Ownership of the Housing Site regardless of the subsequent unlawful change of use.

B. A clan, an unincorporated association, which is a non-corporate body, is composed of descendants of the joint ancestor for the purpose of maintaining and preserving the worship, preserving and managing the clan properties, etc., shall not be deemed a juristic person operating religious services, religion, or other public services as stipulated in Article 12 subparagraph 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Site Ownership (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 193). Thus, the land owned by a clan and used directly for the protection, etc. of the graves of the joint ancestor at the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site shall not be excluded from the imposition of charges.

C. In light of the fact that Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site provides that construction is prohibited under the same law as the case where construction is actually impossible, and that Article 9-2 (1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of Jun. 12, 1993) lists a site where construction is virtually impossible, "site where de facto construction is impossible", which is stipulated as a site excluded from the subject of imposition of charges under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the same Act, refers to a site where it is impossible to construct a house due to physical reasons inherent in the relevant land itself, and it cannot be determined by the objective criteria for determining who is impossible to construct a house, such as the situation of the owner of the housing site. Thus, just because a clan is installed on a part of the land, it cannot be deemed that the land is de facto impossible to construct a house under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the same Act.

(a) Subparagraph 1 (a) of Article 2 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Articles 20(1)8, 10, and 12(1)4 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Articles 2(1), 12 subparag. 2, and 26(1)5 (c) of the Addenda; Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 20(1)3 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527, Jun. 12, 1993); Article 9-2(1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Ownership of

A. Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1968 delivered on May 10, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1353), Supreme Court Decision 94Nu7487 delivered on February 22, 1991 (Gong1991, 1106), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2071 delivered on April 26, 1994 (Gong194Sang, 1514) (Gong1514 delivered on May 13, 1994)

Jin-Sari-Sari-Sari-Sari-Sari-Sari

Head of Dong-gu Daejeon Metropolitan City

Daejeon High Court Decision 93Gu1228 delivered on February 4, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal.

1. In light of records and relevant evidence, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below that each of the lands listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter referred to as the "land of this case") at the time of the plaintiff clan's trial constituted a housing site under the Act on the Ownership of the Housing Site which is subject to the excessive ownership charge (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the housing site of this case or a mistake of facts in violation of the rules of evidence or in violation of the rules of evidence. There is no reason to

2. In comparison with the judgment below's records, the court below did not determine the plaintiff's assertion that the above land is not a housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Act, which is the site since the building constructed on the three land of this case was registered as a house on the building management ledger, but is actually used as a re-place for the management of the plaintiff's clan's graves before the base date of the charges of this case. Further, the court below rejected the witness 1's testimony to the effect that the above building is actually being used as a re-place as a house on the building management ledger for the reasons that the above building was

However, even if the plaintiff's assertion regarding a building constructed on the three land of this case is recognized, if a building on the land of which land category is a building on the registry or the management ledger is used for another purpose without any lawful permission or report for the alteration of use under the Building Act, since it is a site of a house, it constitutes a housing site subject to the law regardless of the subsequent illegal alteration of use (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu16888, Mar. 25, 1994; 94Nu1968, May 10, 194). Thus, it is obvious that the plaintiff's above assertion is dismissed for lack of justifiable grounds.

Therefore, this error by the court below is not affected by the conclusion of the judgment, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the judgment. The argument is without merit.

3. Although all charges are imposed on a housing site owned by a corporation (including an unincorporated association, foundation, or other organization; hereinafter the same shall apply), since a housing site falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 20(1) of the Act is excluded from the subject of imposition of charges, considering the contents of Article 20(1)8, Article 10, Article 12(1)4 of the Act, Article 2(1) of the Addenda of the Act, Article 12 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1382 of May 10, 1993; hereinafter the same shall apply) and Article 26(1)5 of the Act, it constitutes a housing site acquired in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Act, which is subject to imposition of charges on the housing site shall be excluded from the subject of imposition of charges on the housing site (see the judgment of the head of Si/Gun and the subject of imposition of charges on the housing site acquired in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Act.

However, according to the records, the plaintiff clan is a non-corporate body that is composed of the members of the family clan of the family clan which is composed of the members of the family clan of the deceased clan as a joint ancestor and is for the maintenance and preservation of the clan's worships, for the purpose of the preservation and management of the clans, for the clans, and for the preservation and management of the clan's properties, and it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff clan is a juristic person that is engaged in religious services, religion, or other public services provided for in subparagraph 2 of Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu7487 delivered on February 22, 191, 191). It shall not be deemed that the land of this case is the land owned by the plaintiff clan

Nevertheless, the court below rejected the above assertion on the plaintiff's assertion that the land of this case constitutes a site excluded from the subject of the charge because it is a land used directly for the business of the plaintiff's own business, such as the protection of graves, etc., which is the unique business of the plaintiff's clan, without deciding whether the plaintiff's clan constitutes a juristic person engaged in religious or other public business as provided in subparagraph 2 of Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree, and the plaintiff did not submit a use plan as provided in Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the Act, and it did not use and develop the land of this case with the approval of the business plan for housing construction or building site creation as provided in Article 13 of the Act. In light of the above legal principles, the above decision of the court below is erroneous, but the conclusion that the land of this case is not excluded from the subject of the charge,

4. Article 20(1) of the Act provides that one of the sites subject to imposition of charges is prohibited or de facto impossible to construct a house pursuant to the Building Act, the Urban Planning Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and Article 9-2(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of Jun. 12, 1993; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that “the site excluded from the site subject to imposition of charges pursuant to the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act shall be a site that falls under any of the following subparagraphs and confirmed by the head of the competent Si/Gun as unable to grant a building permit pursuant to the Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Urban Planning Act, the Protection of Military Installations Act, the Protection of Military Installations Act, and the Housing Site Development Promotion Act, which are not possible to construct a house directly by the State or local government for public use, and the examples of each subparagraph of Article 9-2(1) of the Enforcement Rule shall be deemed to be the party member(s).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that part of the land of this case 2 is three graves of the plaintiff clans, and that part of the land is used as land for the protection of graves, and thus, it should be excluded from the imposition of the charge because the above land falls under the ground of each subparagraph of Article 9-2 (1) of the Enforcement Rule, and it cannot be deemed that the above ground does not fall under the ground of Article 9-2 (1) 3 of the Enforcement Rule, and it cannot be deemed that the construction is impossible in fact, which is the requirement for application of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act. In light of the above legal principles, the above judgment that the court below deemed that

However, in light of the fact that construction is prohibited under Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act as well as the fact that a site which is virtually impossible to construct is listed in Article 9-2 (1) of the Enforcement Rule, which is stipulated as a site excluded from the subject of imposition of charges under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act, the term "site where de facto construction is impossible" refers to a site where it is impossible to construct a house due to physical reasons inherent in the land itself, and it shall not be determined based on the objective criteria for whether it is impossible to construct the house even if the site is owned by anyone, and it shall not be determined based on the subjective circumstances of the owner, such as the personal situation of the housing site owner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu2071, Apr. 26, 1994; 93Nu20252, May 13, 1994). Review by the record, the latter part of Article 20 (1) 30) of the above land cannot be viewed as a building site.

Therefore, the court below's conclusion that the land of this case cannot be viewed as a site where construction of the land of this case cannot be actually impossible under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act is justified, and such error of error by the court below is not affected by the conclusion of the judgment. The argument is without merit.

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)