(a) requirements for applying supplementary valuation methods of inherited property and burden of proof;

B. Whether Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Inheritance Tax Act is unconstitutional

C. Whether Article 5 (2) 1 (a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act is unconstitutional

D. Purport of Article 7-2 of the former Inheritance Tax Act

A. The assessment of inherited property by the method stipulated in Article 5(2) through (5) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act is a supplementary assessment method that can only be selected when it is difficult to calculate the market price at the time of the commencement of the inheritance, and there was no choice but to choose a supplementary assessment method because it is difficult to compute the market price.

B. Article 2(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 1990, May 1, 1990) provides that a special provision to give preferential treatment to taxpayers who cooperate in national tax collection procedures and induce a conscientious report shall not be deemed null and void as it violates the Constitution’s right of equality, no.

C. Article 5 (2) 1 (a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act provides that the value of land, which is inherited property, shall be assessed on the basis of the publicly assessed individual land price under the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands, etc. Act, which shall not be deemed null

D. The provision of Article 7-2 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4283, Dec. 31, 1990) stipulates that where the disposal value of the inherited property disposed of by an ancestor is at least 50,000,000 won within one year prior to the commencement date of the inheritance, if the tax authority has proved that the disposal value of the inherited property is more than 50,000 won, the tax authority may include the amount in the taxable value of inherited property even if the taxpayer fails to prove the use of the disposal value, unless the taxpayer proves that the disposal value

(a)Article 26 of the Administrative Litigation Act : (a) Article 5(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act; (b) Article 11, Article 23, and Article 38 of the Constitution; Article 5(2)1(a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act; Article 5(2) of the Constitution; Article 59 of the Constitution; Article 7-2 of the former Inheritance Tax Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 92Nu787 delivered on February 26, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 1108) 92Nu16218 delivered on June 11, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2054). Supreme Court Decision 93Nu9286 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong1995Sang, 131 delivered on November 25, 1994). Supreme Court Decision 89Nu1490 delivered on December 12, 1989 (Gong190, 282) 92Nu413 delivered on September 25, 1992 (Gong192, 3037)

Plaintiff 1 and 3 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant Kim Ba-young

Head of Seogsan Tax Office

Busan High Court Decision 92Gu5201 delivered on November 23, 1994

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

The court below recognized the fact that the appraisal of inherited property by the method under Article 5 (2) through (5) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act is a supplementary assessment method that can only be selected only when it is difficult to calculate the market price at the time of the commencement of the inheritance, and that there was no choice of supplementary assessment method because it is difficult to calculate the market price, and the burden of proof on the fact that each land in the judgment of the court below is held by the Supreme Court based on macro-Evidence that there was a tax authority, is currently owned by the heir without being sold after the plaintiffs acquired by the heir, and there is no scambling of sale or expropriation of land, and there is no scambling of transaction value before and after the commencement of the inheritance or appraisal value by the appraisal agency with public trust, and there is no data about the sale or sale of neighboring land which is not different from each of the above land. The above reason constitutes "when it is difficult to calculate the market price" under Article 5 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act, and thus, the taxation by the above supplementary assessment method is legitimate.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

On the second ground for appeal

Article 2 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 1293 of May 1, 1990) provides that an inheritance commenced before December 31, 1990, and the reported period of the report shall evaluate the value of inherited property by the amount of the standard market price of taxation under the Local Tax Act, i.e., the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act. The supplementary provision of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act is a special provision for giving preferential treatment to taxpayers who cooperate in the national tax collection procedures and inducing them to report in good faith, and it cannot be deemed null and void because it violates the principle of equal rights, the principle of no taxation without law, and the principle of property right security (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu9286, Sep. 14, 1993; 94Nu9047, Nov. 25, 1994). It can not be accepted to interpret the value of inherited property as in this case.

On the third ground for appeal

Article 5 (2) 1 (a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act provides that the value of land, which is inherited property, shall be assessed on the basis of the publicly assessed individual land price under the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands, etc. Act. This cannot be deemed null and void as it goes against the principle of no taxation without law

On the fourth ground

Article 7-2 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4283 of Dec. 31, 1990) provides that where the disposal value of the inherited property disposed of by an ancestor is more than 50,000,000 won within one year prior to the commencement date of the inheritance, the actual burden of proof shall be converted, and where the tax authority proves that the disposal value of the inherited property is objectively unclear, unless the taxpayer proves the use of the disposal value, the amount may be included in the taxable value of inherited property even if the taxpayer does not prove that the disposal value of the inherited property was inherited in cash (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 89Nu1490, Dec. 12, 1989; 92Nu413, Sept. 25, 1992).

On the contrary, the argument that if the disposal value of inherited property is 50,000,000 won or more and its use is objectively unclear, if the taxpayer’s failure to prove its use is less than 50,000,000 won, the above provision of the Inheritance Tax Act concerning the conversion of burden of proof does not apply to the value of the inherited property. The argument that the tax authority may include it in the taxable value of inherited property only when it proves that the equivalent value of the inherited property is inherited to the inheritor in cash.

On the fifth ground

The court below is clear in determining the illegality of the disposition in this case, which the defendant rendered on February 16, 1993, on the premise that the disposition in this case was imposed and notified on the plaintiff 1. Thus, there is no illegality in the omission of judgment, such as the theory of lawsuit.

There is no reason for this issue.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Im-soo (Presiding Justice)