A. The meaning of Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings that "if the debtor is deemed appropriate to resist the existence or scope of the obligation."

B. The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that there are considerable grounds for a defense as to the existence or scope of the Defendant’s obligation in light of the progress of the lawsuit in the case where the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s claim at the court of first instance, and reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court after the dismissal at the court of second instance, and only damages for delay in accordance with the interest rate

A. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to cases where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the adjudication of a fact-finding court declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered. Thus, the application of Article 3(1) of the same Act providing special cases concerning statutory interest rates which serve as the basis for calculating the amount of damages caused by the obligor’s nonperformance of the obligation may be excluded. Thus, Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that “if it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to resist the existence or absence of the obligation, or the scope of the obligation” refers to cases where the obligor’s assertion as to the existence or scope of the obligation is recognized to have considerable grounds. Thus, whether the obligation to resist is reasonable or not is related to the fact-finding and evaluation of the court concerning the case

B. The case affirming the judgment of the court of first instance on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was dismissed and remanded by the Supreme Court after the dismissal of the appeal at the court of second instance, and where the court below accepted the plaintiff's claim, the dispute on the existence and scope of the defendant's obligation to perform is deemed to have considerable grounds in light of the progress of the lawsuit, and only damages for delay in accordance with the

Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Promotion of Legal Proceedings

A. Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Meu1876 Decided May 26, 1987 (Gong1987, 1058) (Gong1991, 845) 90Da9285 Decided January 25, 1991 (Gong1991, 845) (Gong192, 2233)

[Judgment of the court below]

Law Firm Il Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na47040 delivered on May 1, 1992

The part of the judgment of the court below on delay damages shall be reversed, and the part against the plaintiff falling under the next order of payment shall be revoked.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 40,000,000 won with five percent per annum from November 15, 1989 to May 1, 1992, and twenty-five percent per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, when Non-party 1, an insurance solicitor of the defendant company, who was the insurance solicitor of the defendant company, died of the plaintiff at the time of entering into the life insurance contract of this case with the plaintiff, the court below, based on its adopted evidence, shall receive 50,000,000 won which is 10,000 won of the insurance amount if the above insurance was caused by an unforeseen accident. In particular, since the plaintiff's husband is a safe net fishing vessel crew, there is a concern that the marine accident would occur on the sea, and there is a concern that people who live on the seaside may die as a drinking food poisoning, such as fish and shellfish, and even if they die as a happy, the court below's decision was just in light of the facts that all general insurance money can not be paid KRW 50,00,000,000, which is 500,0000, which is 10,000 won or more, and there is no error in the rules of evidence finding that the plaintiff can not be paid the insurance premium.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

As to second ground for appeal

The court below held that the defendant is liable to pay damages for delay at the rate of 25 percent per annum under Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the day following the delivery of a copy of the complaint to the date of full payment with respect to the insurance money that the defendant is liable to pay

Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to cases where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until a fact-finding judgment declaring the existence of the obligation is rendered, and that the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to cases where the application of the provisions of Article 3(1) of the above Act stipulating special cases concerning statutory interest rates which serve as the basis for calculating the amount of damages due to the nonperformance of the obligation can be excluded. Thus, it is interpreted that the obligor under the above provision of the above Act is reasonable to resist the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, it is interpreted that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor’s assertion as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, it is related to the fact-finding and evaluation of the party members (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Meu1876, May 26, 198; Supreme Court Decision 90Da9285, Jan. 25, 1991).

However, according to the records, the plaintiff at the court of first instance alleged that the deceased non-party 2, the insured of the life insurance contract of this case, died due to sbio sbio spa, and that the defendant is obligated to pay 500% of the principal contract insurance money since this constitutes an accident of sbio sbio sbio. Accordingly, the defendant submitted insurance terms and conditions as evidence to the effect that addiction accidents such as the death of the deceased were excluded from sbrut accident according to the insurance clauses, and received the judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim at the court of first instance, and the appellate court lost the plaintiff even after the plaintiff filed an appeal. As a result of the plaintiff's appeal, the judgment of the appellate court was reversed and remanded, and the court below explained that the insurance solicitor of the defendant company did not pay 500% of the principal contract insurance money even if he died with sbio sbio sbio sbrut, and that the judgment of the court below was justified as to the existence or absence of insurance clause of this case.

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below on damages for delay is reversed, and this part is sufficient to directly judge by the party members, and therefore, it is decided to self-market in accordance with Article 40

As duly determined by the court below, the defendant is obligated to pay 40,000 won to the plaintiff. However, since a dispute is deemed to have considerable grounds in the fact-finding court as to the existence or scope of the obligation to pay damages for delay, it shall be obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from November 15, 1989 to May 1, 1992, which is clear from the day following the day on which the copy of the complaint of this case sought by the plaintiff was served to the defendant, and at the rate of 25% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the day of full payment. The plaintiff's damages for delay shall be accepted within the extent of this limit with merit. The plaintiff's damages for delay shall be revoked from the part of the judgment of the court of first instance

For the same reasons, the defendant's appeal is partially with merit, and it is so reversed as above. The remaining grounds of appeal are without merit. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)