(a) The meaning of "where it is deemed reasonable for the debtor to resist the existence or scope of the obligation" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings;

B. The case reversing the judgment below which did not apply the interest rate under Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day of service of a complaint to the day of a final judgment in the appellate trial on the ground that the part of the judgment of the court of first instance which accepted the plaintiff's claim

A. The term "if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute about the existence or scope of the obligation" under Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings refers to the time when the obligor's assertion in dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation is deemed to have considerable grounds for the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, whether the obligor's defense is reasonable or not is related to the fact-finding and evaluation of the case in question.

B. Although the part of the judgment of the court of first instance which fully accepted the Plaintiff’s claim was revoked in the appellate court, if it is extremely small and has rejected the Defendant’s defense from the same point of view as the court of first instance as to the construction price, which served as the basis for calculating the agreed damages, among the construction price and agreed damages accepted by the court of first instance, the revoked part is merely an ex officio determination of the period, and it is extremely small and medium amount, not applying the interest rate under Article 3 of the Special Act on the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Meu1876 Decided February 14, 1984 (Gong1987, 1990, 1564) decided May 26, 1987 (Gong1987, 1058)

[Defendant-Appellant] Kim Jong-chul et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant

Attorney Jeon-soo, Counsel for the National Institute of Cultural Heritage

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na6783 delivered on August 24, 1990

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff as to damages for delay is reversed.

The case is remanded to the Seoul High Court on this part.

The plaintiff's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the records, with respect to the plaintiff's claim for damages for delay of KRW 2,618,400 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 2,618,40 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 260 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 48,460 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 26,460 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 28,460 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 46,460 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 28,460 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 96,47 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 26,46,466,40 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 96,46,46,460 for the amount of damages for delay of the contract, the amount of damages for delay of KRW 28,960 for the amount of damages for delay of KRW 96,486.3

2. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed reasonable to dispute about the existence or scope of an obligation until the obligor is adjudicated as a fact-finding court that declares the existence of the obligation, the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to a reasonable extent." Article 3(1) of the same Act provides that the application of the provisions of Article 3(1) concerning statutory interest rate which serves as the basis for calculating the amount of damages caused by nonperformance of the obligation may be excluded." Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that "if it is deemed reasonable to dispute about the existence or scope of the obligation," it is interpreted that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's assertion as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, it is interpreted that whether the obligor is reasonable to dispute as above is related to the fact-finding and evaluation thereof by the court (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 83Da87576, Feb. 14, 1984; 2087Du68686.

3. However, according to the records, the defendant asserted that the contract for construction work between the plaintiff and the defendant violates mandatory provisions or is null and void, and the claim for construction work price in this case cannot be permitted under the principle of trust and good faith through the court of first instance and the court below, but all such arguments were rejected, and the part which the court below cancelled the judgment of the court of first instance and dismissed the plaintiff's claim according to the defendant's appeal is merely 121,854 won (25,40,194-25,340 won), which is merely 121,854 won (25,194, 284, 340 won), which is nothing more than 2,643,758,340 won for which the plaintiff's claim was accepted, and it is hard to see that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the plaintiff's claim for damages for delay in the calculation of the contract price as to the plaintiff's damages for delay within the scope of 10th of the court below's decision.

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Jae-sung (Presiding Justice)