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(영문) 대법원 1995. 2. 17. 선고 94다56234 판결
[손해배상(자)][공1995.4.1.(989),1420]
Main Issues

(a) Where the purport of the claim is expanded or the claim is combined, the case of applying the statutory interest rate under Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings

(b) The meaning of Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings "where it is deemed appropriate for the debtor to resist the existence or extent of the obligation"

Summary of Judgment

A. The statutory interest rate under Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings can be applied from the day following the day on which a written complaint demanding the performance of a pecuniary obligation or a document corresponding thereto is served on the obligor. Thus, if the obligee expands the claim, the extended claim amount can be applied to the interest rate under the above Article 3(1) from the day following the day on which the written statement expanding the claim is served on the obligor. In a lawsuit in which a claim is combined, the above legal principle

B. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings provides that "if it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute the existence or scope of the obligation, the existence or scope of the obligation" refers to the time when there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation. Thus, the issue of whether it is reasonable to dispute as above is the recognition and evaluation of the facts of the court as to the case

[Reference Provisions]

Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Promotion of Legal Proceedings

Reference Cases

A.B. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1876 delivered on May 26, 1987 (Gong1987, 1058). Supreme Court Decision 83Meu875, 876, 877 delivered on February 14, 1984 (Gong1984, 502) (Gong1984, 1994Ha, 3267)

Plaintiff-Appellee

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellant

Attorney Kim J-jin et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu District Court Decision 94Na3719 delivered on October 21, 1994

Text

The part of the judgment of the court below on damages for delay shall be reversed, as follows.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 236,827,22 won with 5% per annum from November 25, 1987 to February 16, 1994; 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment; 80,38 won with 5% per annum from November 25, 1987 to October 21, 1994; and 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

The total cost of a lawsuit shall be ten-minutes and one of them shall be borne by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant.

Reasons

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

According to the records, it is recognized that the first instance court entrusted a physical examination including a psychiatrist and an appraisal, and examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is justified in finding that there exists a mental disorder as stated in the judgment of the court below, and the above disability is caused by the accident in this case, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or by misunderstanding the legal principles on the lack of reason and compensation for damages. All arguments are without merit.

2. As to the third ground for appeal

A. The statutory interest rate under Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings may apply from the day following the day on which a complaint seeking the performance of a monetary obligation or a document corresponding thereto is served on the obligor. Thus, if an obligee expands the purport of a claim, the interest rate under the above provision may apply to the extended amount of claim from the day following the day on which the written statement expanding the purport of the claim is served on the obligor. Meanwhile, in a lawsuit where a claim is joined, the above legal principle applies to each subject matter of lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1876, May 26, 1987). In a lawsuit where a claim is joined, the damage which is a subject matter of lawsuit due to a tort is divided into three parts of passive property damage, positive property damage, and mental damage (see Supreme Court Decision 76Da1313, Oct. 12, 1976).

However, according to the records, the plaintiff filed a claim for the amount of KRW 67,826,632 with the passive income in the court of first instance, and extended the amount of damages from the lost income to KRW 78,787,276 as a result of the amendment of the claim to the appellate court. While 78,627,010 out of the expanded claim amount is accepted, the court below can find that the statutory interest rate of 25% per annum under Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings is applied to the total amount of the quoted amount from the day after the date when the court of first instance rendered the judgment. As such, the statutory interest rate of the above special Act cannot be applied to the portion of the lost income exceeding the amount claimed in the court of first instance from the day after the date when the court of first instance rendered the judgment was rendered, the part of the judgment of the court below as to the above delayed damages cannot be said to be erroneous in misapprehending the legal principles on Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning

B. Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Establishment or Scope of an Obligation "when it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute on the existence or scope of an obligation" refers to the time when there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of the obligation, and therefore, the issue of whether a dispute is unreasonable or not is related to the recognition and evaluation of the facts of the court as to the pertinent case. In light of the records, as to the damages claimed by the Plaintiff from the first instance court, it is not reasonable for the Defendant to dispute on the scope of the compensation as to the damages claimed from the first instance court from the day following the date when the first instance judgment was rendered, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning Article 3 (1) of the Act.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding damages for delay is reversed, and this part is sufficient to directly judge by the party members, and therefore, it is decided to affix its own seal in accordance with Article

As duly determined by the court below, the defendant is obligated to pay 237,627,610 won to the plaintiff. With respect to the claim of 236,827,222 won which the plaintiff raised at the court of first instance among the above money, it is reasonable for the defendant to dispute about the existence or scope of the obligation to pay damages until the court of first instance renders a judgment. Thus, damages for delay shall be paid at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from November 25, 1993 to February 16, 1994, which is the date of the accident of this case, and damages for delay at the rate of 800,38 won per annum from the next day to the date of full payment, and damages for delay shall be paid at the rate of 25% per annum under the Civil Act from the date of the judgment below to the date of the determination of the court below. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the defendant's damages for delay shall be paid at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the accident of this case.

4. Therefore, the Defendant’s portion of the damages for delay in the final appeal is with merit, and thus, the remaining final appeal is dismissed as without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대구지방법원 1994.10.21.선고 94나3719
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