B. Whether the presumption of possession with autonomy is reversed where the possessor’s source of possessor’s right is not acknowledged (negative)

C. In a case where a person who acquired a real right due to the completion of the acquisition by prescription before the enforcement date of the Civil Act loses his/her real right because he/she fails to register within the period prescribed in Article 10 of the Addenda to the Civil Act, whether the right to claim ownership transfer registration due to the completion

(d) Whether the claim for transfer registration of ownership due to the completion of prescription takes place by extinctive prescription;

E. Requirements for the establishment of a customary marriage before the enforcement of the Joseon Family Ordinance (No. 154 of December 8, 1922), and whether the probative value of the entry in the family register as to the marital status at the time of the enforcement of the Joseon Family Ordinance

F. Whether, in a case where the head of a family, who is a married couple under the former custom, died of his/her mother and her mother, and the mother died of his/her mother without being selected by the ex post facto mother, the head of the family and the inheritance of the property

(g) In the above paragraph (f), where the wife’s wife does not remain in that Party, the relationship of attribution of the miscarriage;

B. Even in cases where the possessor asserts the right of possession, such as the purchase and sale or donation, but it is not recognized, the presumption of possession with autonomy cannot be deemed to be reversed or the possession with the nature of the possessor’s possession solely on the ground that the possessor is not proven, unless the possessor bears the burden of proving the right of possession.

C. Even if a person who acquired a real right due to the completion of acquisition by prescription prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act loses the effect of acquisition of the real right by failing to make a registration within the period prescribed in Article 10 of the Addenda of the Civil Act, it does not lose the right to file a claim for registration of transfer of ownership due to the completion

(d) The claim for ownership transfer registration based on completion of the prescriptive acquisition for land shall not be extinguished by prescription as long as possession of the land continues.

E. According to our custom before July 1, 1923, in which the Joseon Family Order (No. 154 of the General Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 192, Dec. 8, 1922) was enforced, the marriage is established when the intention of the parties or the alternative couple was reached, and the report of marriage was not a requirement for establishing the marriage. Thus, it is difficult to view that the entry in the family register as to whether the marriage was married prior to the enforcement of the Joseon Family Order has absolute probative value.

F. According to the custom prior to the enforcement of the Civil Act, in a case where the head of a family died without a male to inherit as a married person, the head of the family would be entitled to a lump sum inheritance and property inheritance until the father of the deceased family was selected by the ex post facto mother of the deceased family. However, even if the father of the deceased family was not selected by the ex post facto mother of the deceased family, there is no room for the head of the deceased family to apply to a case where the deceased father of the deceased family died without an unmarried mother of the deceased family.

G. In the above paragraph (f) above, if the wife of the deceased at that time did not remain in his or her own family, his or her heritage shall be deemed to have been equally succeeded to and reverted to all his or her family members. On the other hand, the property belonging to his or her family members shall not be deemed to have been reverted to the birth of the deceased family head of the deceased family, but shall be equally succeeded to his or her children, not to have been reverted to the birth of the deceased family head of the deceased family.

2. The defendants' remaining appeals are dismissed.

3. The costs of appeal as to the dismissed portion are assessed against the Defendants.

A. Before the division, Gwangju Northern-gu ( Address 1 omitted) forest 994 square meters (hereinafter referred to as “instant forest”) was divided into 561 square meters of forests and 561 square meters of forests and 433 square meters of forests and 433 square meters of forests ( Address 2 omitted) on December 5, 1960. Since October 15, 1979, the instant land was divided into 12 square meters of land attached to the annexed list.

B. From 1935 to 20 years, the Plaintiff clan continuously occupied the forest land of this case and acquired prescription by continuously occupying it.

C. The forest of this case was originally owned by Nonparty 1 and succeeded to the ownership of the forest of this case by the deceased Nonparty 2, his father’s father’s wife, but around 1957, Nonparty 3 succeeded to his status.

D. Although Nonparty 4 did not purchase the forest of this case, he pretended to purchase it on April 1, 1978, and filed a lawsuit against Nonparty 1, who had already died, claiming the implementation of the procedure for ownership transfer registration of the forest of this case, including ( Address 2 omitted) and ( Address 3 omitted), and the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of Nonparty 5 on August 22, 1979 on the basis of the judgment after the copy of the complaint was delivered to the false address, and the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of Nonparty 4 on August 29, 1979 on the basis of the registration. The registration was completed in the name of Defendant 20 on September 28, 1979, and the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of the other Defendants. Thus, each registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Defendants was null and void on the basis of the above registration of ownership transfer in the name of Nonparty 4 or the registration completed in sequence.

E. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim for the registration of cancellation of the ownership transfer registration in the name of the Defendants that caused the Defendants to the above Nonparty 3 on behalf of Nonparty 3, who succeeded to the status of the deceased Nonparty 2, the owner at the time of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition for the instant land, on behalf of the above Nonparty 3, is reasonable. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim for this case is acceptable.

2. Determination on the first ground of appeal by the Defendants’ legal representatives

The lower court, on April 5, 1915, found that the forest land of this case was in the name of the deceased non-party 1 at the time of the land situation, and the graves of the plaintiff clan 6 and non-party 7 were installed on the above forest land. The plaintiff clan 10th of October each year, and the plaintiff clan 8th of October, the deceased clan 1935 appointed the deceased non-party 8 as the cemetery and managed the above cemetery. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the above woodland 400 square meters [the court below's 1st of 23th of 1957], which was part of the above forest land to cultivate and cultivate the above woodland 5th of 40 square meters [the court below's 9th of 200 square meters of 1st of 20th of 1957, which had been found to have been in possession of the above cemetery, and it did not err in the misapprehensioning of legal principles as to the above woodland 198th of July 196.

3. Determination on the second ground of appeal by the defendants' attorney

The intention of possession, which is the requirement for possession with respect to the acquisition by prescription, shall be determined by the nature of the source of possessory right which objectively causes the acquisition by possession, and the possessor is presumed to possess as his own intention under Article 197(1) of the Civil Act only if the nature of the source of possessory right is not clear (see Supreme Court Decision 85Meu1644, Nov. 10, 1987); however, the person who installs or owns a grave on another’s land does not presume the intention of possession by nature of the source of possessory right (see Supreme Court Decision 66Da465, Jun. 21, 1966); and the possession for the management of another’s goods is deemed to be the owner’s possession by nature of the source of possessory right (see Supreme Court Decision 88Meu1619, Oct. 24, 198; Supreme Court Decision 80Da1969, Oct. 27, 1980).

However, in a case where the possessor asserts the right of possession, such as sale and gift, but it is not recognized, the presumption of possession cannot be reversed or it cannot be viewed as possession with the nature of the possessor's source solely on the ground that the possessor does not prove his/her source of possession, unless the possessor bears the burden of proof as to the right of possession. The Supreme Court en banc Decision 82Da708,709, 82Meu1792,1793 Decided July 12, 1983 was established and decided by the party members (Supreme Court Decision 90Da5733 Decided December 26, 199; Supreme Court Decision 89Meu12176 Decided June 28, 191; Supreme Court Decision 90Da1838 Decided July 9, 191, etc.).

The court below did not recognize only the fact that the plaintiff clan appointed the cemetery and allowed the ancestor to defend and manage the graves of the ancestor members installed on the above woodland, but also recognized the fact that the plaintiff clan possessed and managed all of the above woodland while cultivating and cultivating part of the above woodland. In comparison with the records and records of the evidence employed by the court below, the above fact finding by the court below is just and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles as to the source of possession right or the intention of possession right in real estate acquisition, as in the theory of lawsuit, and as long as the court below did not make a separate judgment as to the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff clan possessed the above woodland with the intention of possession by the plaintiff clan, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the judgment as to the theory of lawsuit, and therefore there is no reason to support the argument that the plaintiff clan possessed the above woodland

4. Determination as to the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 3 by attorney Kim Yong-deok, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

In sum, the theory of lawsuit, even though the plaintiff acquired ownership of the forest of this case due to the completion of the prescription prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act, has not been registered within six years from the enforcement date of the Civil Act and has lost its validity pursuant to Article 10 of the Addenda of the Civil Act. The defendants did not make such assertion at fact-finding court, and even if a person who acquired a real right due to the completion of prescription prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act loses its validity by failing to make a registration within the period as stipulated in Article 10 of the Addenda of the Civil Act, the claim for ownership transfer registration due to the completion of prescription does not lose its validity, and as such, the right to claim for ownership transfer registration due to the completion of prescription for the land does not cease to have expired as long as the possession of the land continues (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 76Da148, Nov. 6, 1976).

5. Judgment on the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 3 by the Defendants, Attorney Yoon-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

A. On April 5, 1915, the lower court determined that: (a) Nonparty 1 was the land situation in the name of the deceased Nonparty 1; (b) Nonparty 1 was the wife of his family; (c) Nonparty 12 (her father’s name 2 omitted); (d) Nonparty 3 (her father’s name 3 omitted); and (e) died on September 1, 1920; (d) Nonparty 12 died on May 25, 1925; (e) Nonparty 11 died on the deceased on the part of the deceased Nonparty 12; and (e) Nonparty 11 died on November 2, 1926; and (e) Nonparty 2 died on the deceased on the part of his family; and (e) Nonparty 3 was inherited on the deceased on the part of his family; and (e) Nonparty 11 died on the deceased on the part of his family; and (e) Nonparty 3 was married on the part of his family head, who was the deceased on the part of his mother and 2.

B. First, as recognized by the court below, we examine whether the above non-party 12 died in an unmarried manner.

Examining the evidence cited by the court below in comparison with the records, it can be seen that there is only evidence Nos. 2-1, 2, 3 (each of the removed copies) and Evidence Nos. 10-1, 2 (each of the removed copies) with the evidence No. 10-1, and 2 (each of the removed judgments) consistent with the evidence presented by the above non-party No. 12. According to our custom before July 1, 1923, where the Joseon Order (No. 154 of the General Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs of December 8, 1922) was enforced, the marriage is established when the parties' intentions or the intention of the married couple on behalf of them were agreed with the parties, and it was not a requirement for establishing a marriage report (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 76Meu34, Oct. 7, 197; 86Meu129, Oct. 13, 1987).

On the other hand, according to the evidence No. 15-1 and No. 15-2 of the above non-party 12 without dispute over the establishment of the court below, the above non-party 12 was registered as the wife of the above non-party 12 and the non-party 17, who is the children of the above non-party 12, was registered as the non-party 16, and the non-party 18, who is the non-party 16, was registered as the non-party 16, and the non-party 18, who is the witness of the court below before remand, testified that the non-party 12 was married before the death of the above non-party 12 and the non-party 12, who was the non-party 19, before the above non-party 19 was remanded to the court below's judgment that it was consistent with the plaintiff's argument that the non-party 19 was the non-party 19, who was the non-party 19, before the date for pleading.

Nevertheless, the court below rejected each of the above witnesses' testimony without any reasonable reasons without rejecting Gap evidence Nos. 15-1 and 2, and confirmed that the above non-party Nos. 2-1, 2, 3, and 10-1 and 2 died with the non-party Nos. 12. Thus, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of marriage under the former custom or in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence.

C. Meanwhile, according to the custom before the enforcement of the Civil Act, if the above non-party 12, who was the deceased non-party 12 as the deceased non-party 2, died without inheritance, the above non-party 11, who was the mother of the above non-party 2, would be entitled to temporary inheritance and inheritance of the family until the deceased non-party 12 was selected after the death of the above non-party 12, but even if the above non-party 11 was not selected after the death of the above non-party 12, the above non-party 3 and the non-party 2, who was the above non-party 12, were not likely to succeed to the family and inheritance of the property (see Supreme Court Decision 87Meu13, Sept. 26, 198). If the above non-party 12, who was the non-party 12, did not belong to the above non-party 97Da17979, May 17, 197, it appears that the above non-party 197.

Therefore, the registration of ownership transfer made in the name of Defendant 20 on September 28, 1979 with respect to 561 square meters and 433 square meters in Gwangju Northern-gu ( Address 2 omitted) forest, which was divided into the forest of this case, was made based on the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Defendant 20 on September 28, 1979, but it is valid as it conforms to the substantive legal relationship within the scope of 1/2 shares owned by Defendant 20, and each registration of ownership transfer in the name of other Defendants on the land of this case, which was made based on the registration of ownership transfer, is valid within the scope of 1/2 shares unless there are other special circumstances. However, the court below determined that the above land of this case was the sole ownership transfer under the name of the above non-party 3, and thus, it is clear that the above registration of ownership transfer was entirely null and void. The court below erred in the misapprehension of the judgment of this case on the premise that the above non-party 3 was the sole ownership of this case.

6. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendants as to one half of the shares against the land of this case is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination as to this part. The remaining appeal by the defendants (as to one half of the shares against the land of this case) is dismissed, and the costs of appeal as to the dismissed part are assessed against the defendants, who are the losing part. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)