[1] The case holding that an agreement reached at the end of a dispute surrounding the revised rules on retirement allowance payment between labor and management is a compromise agreement

[2] The meaning of "matters other than dispute which can be cancelled on the ground of mistake in a reconciliation contract under the Civil Act"

[3] The meaning of "serious negligence" as stipulated in the proviso of Article 109 (1) of the Civil Code

[1] If there is a dispute between labor and management with respect to the amendment of the retirement allowance payment provision to reduce the retirement allowance rate, and if the employee who already retired from the same dispute agrees to follow the final judgment of the lawsuit pending in the court, such agreement constitutes a settlement contract since the new legal relationship is determined and all of the disputes are concluded.

[2] In a compromise contract under the Civil Act, a party may cancel it only when there is an error in matters other than a dispute which is the object of qualification of the parties to the compromise or settlement (Article 733 of the Civil Act). The term "matters other than a dispute which is the object of reconciliation" refers to matters which are not the object of the dispute but the premise or basis of the dispute, which are the object of the dispute, and which are agreed by both parties to the dispute and are not the object of mutual concession

[3] "Serious negligence" as stipulated in the proviso of Article 109 (1) of the Civil Code refers to a gross lack of attention that is normally required in light of the name of the voter, the type and purpose of the act, etc.

[1] Article 731 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 733 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 109 (1) of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 80Da1616 delivered on December 9, 198 (Gong1981, 13509), Supreme Court Decision 90Da16825 delivered on June 14, 1991 (Gong1991, 1917) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da47208 delivered on July 14, 1992 (Gong192, 2390), Supreme Court Decision 94Da11217 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2841) (Gong194, 195Ha, 195Ha, 3724) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 94Da42839 delivered on October 12, 1995 (Gong195, 3724) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 92Da372938 delivered on September 23, 1992

Korea National Tourism Organization (Attorney Park Ho-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and 22 others (Attorney Han-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 93Na5750 delivered on March 31, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below revised the rules for retirement allowance payment to the plaintiff as of January 1, 1981 (hereinafter the previous provisions, the revised provisions, and the subsequent provisions) as stated in its reasoning, and the new provisions, on the ground that the non-party 1 and the non-party 272 among the employees were null and void because they did not obtain consent from the collective decision-making method of the workers group, filed a lawsuit seeking payment of the difference of retirement allowance under the new and old provisions, and the non-party 2 and the non-party 272, who were the plaintiff's employees, did not bring a lawsuit as null and void. The court below held that the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 and the non-party 3 and the non-party 22 who did not bring a lawsuit (the defendants of the court of first instance are included; the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 and the non-party 18, who did not reach an agreement in accordance with the above legal principles as to the above plaintiff's employees's share of the lawsuit.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

On the second ground for appeal

The parties to a settlement contract under the Civil Act may cancel the settlement contract only when there is an error in matters other than the dispute which is the object of the qualification of the parties to the settlement or the settlement (Article 733 of the Civil Act). The term "matters other than those which are the object of the settlement" is not the object of the dispute, but the premise or basis of the dispute, which is scheduled by both parties, and which are not the subject of mutual concession and are understood as facts without any dispute (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da47208, Jul. 14, 1992; 92Da18719, 18726, Oct. 27, 1992; 94Da1217, Sept. 30, 1994). The new provision in the settlement contract in this case is justified in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the cancellation of the settlement contract itself, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legal relations that are the object of the dispute itself.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

On the third ground for appeal

The court below did not regard the agreement in this case as a settlement contract, or even if the settlement contract in this case can be cancelled on the ground of an error, it is only an additional decision that it cannot be cancelled on the part of the plaintiff because it was gross negligence as stated in its reasoning. Thus, the "serious negligence" under the proviso of Article 109 (1) of the Civil Act does not mean that the plaintiff's act does not constitute an independent ground of appeal, and the "serious negligence" refers to the plaintiff's act of lack of common required principle in light of his occupation, kind of act, purpose, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da25830, 25847, Nov. 24, 192; 92Da3881, Jun. 29, 1993; 92Da3881, Jun. 29, 1993.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

On the fourth ground

The court below held that among the defendants of this case, the deceased non-party 5 was the representative of the plaintiff trade union at the time of 1981, and the defendant 2 participated in the labor-management consultation with the chief of the general affairs of the plaintiff corporation on 1983, and the plaintiff trade union held the original of the collective agreement on 1981, including the new contents of the agreement at the time of the agreement of this case, and the defendant 2 et al. did not violate the new rules of law merely because the plaintiff 2 et al. filed a lawsuit in the decision of this case. The court below's measures are just and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

On the fifth ground

According to the evidence No. 8 of the judgment below, it is recognized that the agreement of this case was made by mistake between the plaintiff and the plaintiff trade union on May 18, 1992, and that the agreement of this case was cancelled, but the defendants of this case retired from all before the date of cancellation of the agreement, and since all of the above defendants of this case retired from the trade union at the time of cancellation of the agreement, the validity of cancellation of agreement with the plaintiff and the above trade union cannot be viewed to naturally affect the defendants of this case. Such measures of the court below are justified, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on delegation of authority in relation to the conclusion of the contract and termination of contract

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)