[1] Whether the principle of liability for negligence or the theory of comparative negligence applies to the liability for the payment of mutual aid benefits under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents at School (negative in principle), and whether the legal principle that limits the scope of liability for damages applies to the above mutual aid benefits in a civil damages case (negative in principle)

[2] Whether delegation by the Presidential Decree of Articles 36 through 40 of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents to the matters necessary for the standards for the payment of mutual aid benefits by type of benefit under Article 43 of the same Act can be deemed as delegation to the effect that the payment of mutual aid benefits may be restricted for any reason other than the grounds for restriction on payment under Article 43 of the same Act (negative), and the validity of Article 19-2(1), (2), and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents, which provides for the reasons for restriction on payment by offsetting

[1] The purpose of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) is to prevent school safety accidents and to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of the school safety accident compensation mutual-aid project in order to promptly and appropriately compensate for damages caused by school safety accidents. The Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) imposes an obligation to prevent school safety accidents on the Superintendent of an Office of Education, the principal of the school, etc. In the event of school safety accidents, the Superintendent of an Office of Education, the principal of the school, etc. shall provide mutual-aid benefits to the beneficiaries, such as students, teachers, and staff, etc. who suffered damages without asking whether they are responsible for the occurrence of such accidents, thereby protecting the lives and bodies of the victims from the school safety accidents and establishing a practical school safety net by compensating the damages promptly and appropriately. The mutual-aid system under the School Safety Act differs from the legislative intent of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents at School to ensure that the Mutual-Aid Association, established and operated in the form of a non-profit incorporated association under the Civil Act by each Office of Education.

[2] [Majority Opinion] In full view of the legislative form and content of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) and the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act”), the legislative purport and basic ideology of the School Safety Act, and the nature of the corresponding deductions, etc., delegated matters necessary to be prescribed by the Presidential Decree by Article 36 or 40 of the School Safety Act concerning the payment standards, etc. for the amount of deduction benefits by types of benefits, to ensure that it is difficult legislative and technically to determine the amount of deduction benefits by taking into account the fact that it is not easy to determine daily methods of calculating the amount of deduction benefits or payment methods, and that it is intended to ensure the flexible operation of the mutual aid benefits system by ensuring appropriate response to socioeconomic changes, etc., the delegation is merely limited to the detailed standards for the payment of deduction benefits and the method of calculating the amount of benefits. Moreover, it does not purport to limit the amount of deduction benefits for reasons other than those stipulated in Article 43 of the School Safety Act.

According to Article 19-2(1), (2), and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Enforcement Decree”), the beneficiaries of the mutual aid benefits due to a school safety accident may be excluded from the time of determining the amount of each mutual aid benefit to be paid. The beneficiaries’ negligence processed in a school safety accident may be restricted from the amount of each mutual aid benefit, i.e., disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family benefits, except for the medical care benefits and funeral expenses, among the five kinds of mutual aid benefits. However, in light of the legislative intent and character of the School Safety Act, the purport of delegation of the said Act, and the purport of delegation of the said Act, and the purport of the delegation of Articles 36 through 40 of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act, the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act stipulating the restriction on payment of the mutual aid benefits by negligence are limited to Article 43 of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act, and thus, the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act prescribing the scope of delegation of the Act.

[Concurring Opinion by Justice Kwon Soon-il] A school safety mutual aid system is a social insurance system that copes with social risks that arise to students, school staff, etc. by an insurance method, and therefore, the entitlement to mutual aid benefits under the above system is one of the so-called “right to social security benefits” and it is reasonable to regard the entitlement to mutual aid benefits as a right under public law that is specifically formed by the law of school safety law. Therefore, the entitlement to mutual aid benefits held by the beneficiaries and their bereaved family members differs from the rights under private law, such as the right to claim damages under the State Compensation Act or the right to claim damages due to nonperformance or tort under the Civil Act. Although the decision on the payment of benefits by the school safety mutual aid association cannot be deemed an administrative disposition that is subject to appeal litigation, insofar as the entitlement to mutual aid benefits is a right under public law, the legal nature of litigation is not

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Jo Hee-de] Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides that “The expenses necessary for the treatment of king in a case where the so-called “sking”, such as a disease, injury, or physical disability, which had already existed to a person under mutual aid, has deteriorated due to a school safety accident” is related to symptoms that had already existed before the school safety accident occurred, and thus, it does not include damage suffered by the beneficiary due to a school safety

Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides for the legal principle that mutual aid benefits may be paid, except for the portion not recognized as damage caused by school safety accidents. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the basis or delegation of the parent law should be separately made.

In addition, matters necessary for the “standards, etc. for the payment of medical care benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses” shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree. Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2) of the School Safety Act provide that matters necessary for the “standards for the determination of the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, and the method for payment thereof,” and Article 37(2) of the School Safety Act providing that “the standards for determination of the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, the method for payment thereof, etc.” can be deemed as the basis or the delegation provision of the mother’s law concerning the restriction on

Therefore, Article 19-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act is an invalid provision beyond the limit of delegated legislation by specifying the necessary contents concerning the limitation of deduction benefits as stipulated in Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik and Justice Kim Jae-hyung] In the event a beneficiary of mutual aid benefits has been raised, whether the medical expenses can be deducted from the amount paid for the mutual aid benefits (Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act), and whether the beneficiary’s negligence should be taken into account in calculating disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family’s benefits (Article 19-2(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act), among the mutual aid benefits (Article 19-2(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act), can be included in “necessary matters concerning the payment criteria, etc.” and “necessary matters

In civil damages, “the scope of damages or the calculation of damages” and “the restriction on compensation for damages” are strictly divided, and as such, comparative negligence and comparative negligence are related to the limitation of compensation for damages, it cannot be deemed that the scope of compensation for damages or the calculation and calculation of damages are irrelevant to the calculation of the amount of compensation for losses. Likewise, it is not reasonable to view that the “the calculation and calculation of the amount of mutual-aid benefits” and “the restriction on payment” under the School Safety Act are strictly divided and the “the calculation and calculation of the amount of compensation for losses” and “the restriction on payment” are not the area of calculation and calculation of the amount of payment, but only the area of restriction on payment, rather than the area of calculation and calculation of the amount of payment. Therefore, it is not reasonable to consider that the “the calculation and method of payment, etc. of the amount of disability benefits” under Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2) of the School Safety Act and Article 37(2) of the School Safety Act is a parent law which delegates matters concerning the amount of payment and scope of payment.

The provisions of the Enforcement Decree, which stipulate that the beneficiary’s testimony may be taken into account and offsetting negligence, shall not be deemed to have exceeded the limit of the delegated legislation, as they embody the necessary contents in determining the amount and scope of the deduction benefits as stipulated in Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act.

[1] Articles 1, 2 subparag. 4 and 6, 5, 11(1), 34, and 43 of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents; Articles 396, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 75 of the Constitution; Articles 36(5), 37(2), 38(2), 39(2), 40(2), and 43 of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents; Article 19-2(1), (2), and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961 Decided December 13, 2012

Plaintiff 1 and three others (Law Firm Shinsung, Attorneys Ansan-gu et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan Metropolitan Government School Safety Mutual Aid Association (Law Firm Jeong, Attorneys Lee Jung-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan High Court Decision 2015Na50842 decided January 28, 2016

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. The term “school safety accident” under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents at School (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) means an accident that happens during educational activities, which directly causes the duties belonging to the management and supervision of the principal, such as all accidents that harm the life or body of students, school employees, or participants in educational activities, and school meal services, and which are caused by the students, school employees, or participants in educational activities, as prescribed by the Presidential Decree (Article 2 subparag. 6). The term “educational activities” refers to on-site experience activities, such as class, special activity, discretionary activity, extracurricular activities, training activities, veterinary travel, etc. conducted in accordance with the school’s curriculum, but there is no separate provision to restrict the occurrence of the accident (Article 2 subparag. 4). Accordingly, if an accident occurred during educational activities, which causes damage to the life or body of students, school employees, or participants in educational activities, it constitutes the school safety accident as prescribed by the School Safety Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Da116111, Dec. 116, 16.

In addition, Articles 39 and 40 of the School Safety Act provide that the bereaved family's benefits and funeral expenses shall be paid to "where a person who died due to a school safety accident". Thus, in order to receive the deduction benefits, there exists a causal relationship between the school safety accident and the death. However, if the principal cause of death overlaps with the principal cause of death even though it does not have a direct relationship with the school safety accident, and at least if the school safety accident overlaps with the principal cause of death and causes death, the causal relationship should be deemed to exist between the two. Moreover, the causal relationship does not necessarily have to be proved clearly in medical and natural science, and if it can be inferred that there is a proximate causal relationship between the school safety accident and the death in light of all the circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da11961, supra).

B. Based on the evidence of its employment, the lower court determined that the Nonparty’s death in the above emergency room around 17:18 at around 14:00, when the Nonparty was taking part in self-learning (hereinafter “accident”), found the Nonparty who was used in the toilet at around 16:50, when the self-learning was completed, and that the Nonparty’s arrival at the 119 emergency squad at around 17:02, when receiving the reported phone and sent the Nonparty to the emergency room at ○ University Hospital at around 17:18, on the part of the emergency vehicle, fell under the accident under the School Safety Act in which the instant accident was occurred during the course of educational activities.

Furthermore, the lower court determined that, in light of the following: (a) at the time of the instant accident, the Nonparty, as a student of the second-year high school, appears to have suffered considerable stress through class and examination, etc.; (b) the Nonparty, from September 11, 2008 to △△ University Hospital, received cerebral typhism in the hospital; (c) however, (d) the process of treatment was good; and (e) there was no recurrence of cerebral typhism, such as that there was no recurrence of hys after the occurrence of salphical training on June 28, 201; (b) the person directly on the written examination of the body of the body of the Nonparty was the “resumed by hys”; and (c) the cause thereof was the “resumed by liver,” the lower court determined that the above excessive stress, etc. affected the Nonparty’s cerebral disease or caused the instant accident by being overlapped with the said disease, and that there was a proximate causal link between the Nonparty’s death and the instant accident.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. The purpose of the School Safety Act is to prevent school safety accidents and to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of the school safety accident compensation mutual-aid project in order to promptly and appropriately compensate for damages caused by school safety accidents is to protect the lives and bodies of students, school employees, etc. from school safety accidents by providing the mutual-aid benefits to the beneficiaries of the students, school employees, etc. in the event of school safety accidents without asking the superintendent of education, school principals, etc. as to whether they are responsible for the occurrence of such accidents, and to establish a substantial network of school safety by compensating for such damages promptly and appropriately. The mutual-aid system under the above School Safety Act is to be established in the previous City/Do Offices of Education in order to ensure that the Mutual-Aid Association, a non-profit association established and operated in the form of a non-profit incorporated association under the Civil Act of each City/Do Office of Education, is dissolved by the implementation of the School Safety Act, to ensure that the rights and obligations can be received by comprehensive succession under the School Safety Act, and to ensure that the basic structure of mutual-aid benefits system is not applied in accordance with the principle of comparative law.

Meanwhile, according to Article 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the Presidential Decree provides for the matters delegated by the Act and matters necessary for the enforcement of the Act. Thus, it is only possible to provide for the matters delegated by the parent corporation Act or detailed matters necessary for the real enforcement of the Act within the scope prescribed by the Act. It cannot modify or supplement the contents of rights and obligations of individuals provided by the Act without delegation of the Act, or further provide for the grounds for restriction on rights without any Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Da37342, Jan. 24, 1995, etc.). Since the delegation of the Act on Matters prescribed by Presidential Decree must specify the scope specifically, the delegation of the Act must be defined in advance from the content and purport of the delegation provision so that the elements such as the purpose, content and scope of the delegation, and the goals, criteria, etc. to be complied with by the administrative legislation based on the delegation. Whether such delegation exists should be determined by considering not only the form and content of the delegation provision, but also the overall system, purpose, purpose, etc. (see, etc.).

B. The School Safety Act divides the mutual aid benefits paid by the School Safety Mutual Aid Association into medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34) and determines the amount of mutual aid benefits pursuant to the provisions of Articles 36 through 40 for each type of mutual aid benefits (Article 35), and stipulates the standards for the payment of each mutual aid benefits (Articles 36 through 40), provides for the payment of medical care benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, funeral expenses, and funeral expenses (Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2)); and with respect to disability benefits, Article 37(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides that “The criteria for determining the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, and the method for payment thereof shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree” (Article 37(2)); and Article 36(1) through (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides for the detailed matters concerning the payment criteria for each item (hereinafter referred to “the Enforcement Decree”).

On the other hand, Article 43 of the School Safety Act provides for the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits in a lump sum, and it is evident that the state of injury, etc. has deteriorated or interfered with the medical care institution's medical treatment because the beneficiary's failure to comply with the instructions of the medical care institution without any justifiable reason when the beneficiary has received damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and the beneficiary's failure to pay mutual aid fees due to the reasons attributable to the beneficiary, and there are no other provisions for restricting

In full view of the legislative intent and basic ideology of the School Safety Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof, and the nature of mutual aid benefits pursuant thereto, the delegation to be prescribed by the Presidential Decree as to the matters necessary for the payment standards, etc. of mutual aid benefits by type of each benefit under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act is to ensure the flexible operation of the mutual aid benefits system by taking account of the fact that it is not easy legislative and technical means to stipulate daily methods, such as the calculation method, payment method, etc. of mutual aid benefits under the Act, and by allowing appropriate response to changes in socioeconomic environment, etc. Accordingly, the delegation is merely limited to the provision of the detailed criteria and calculation method for mutual aid benefits to be provided under the Enforcement Decree, and further, it does not purport to delegate the delegation of the provision of mutual aid benefits for reasons other than restriction on payment under Article 43 of the School Safety Act.

C. However, Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides, “The Mutual-Aid Association may, when it determines the amount of mutual aid benefits pursuant to Article 35 of the School Safety Act, pay mutual aid benefits except for the expenses incurred in treating the already existing disease, injury, or physical disability, etc. where the disease, injury, or physical disability, etc. which existed in the beneficiary has deteriorated due to the school safety accident.” Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides, “The Mutual-Aid Association may offset the amount of disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family benefits by negligence on the part of the beneficiary in calculating the disability benefits under Articles 37 through 39 of the School Safety Act,” and Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides, “The matters necessary for the subject of comparative negligence, standards, etc. under paragraph (2) shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education” (hereinafter collectively referred to as “instant Enforcement Decree provision”).

Ultimately, according to the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case, the costs incurred in treating the beneficiaries of the mutual aid benefits due to a disease, injury, or physical disability may be excluded when determining the amount of each mutual aid benefit. If the beneficiary’s negligence in the school safety accident excludes the amount of medical care benefits and funeral expenses from the five kinds of mutual aid benefits, i.e., disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family’s benefits, the amount of payment may be limited by offsetting negligence. However, in light of the legislative intent and nature of the instant school safety Act, the purport of delegation of the said Act, the purpose of delegation of the said Act, and the reasons for restricting payment of the mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, and the fact that the parent’s school safety Act only lists the reasons for restricting payment of the mutual aid benefits under Article 43, if the provisions of the instant Enforcement Decree, which provide for the reasons for restricting payment by negligence, are prescribed to be delegated by Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, this shall not exceed the scope of delegation, and thus, the provisions of this case shall be deemed null and void.

D. In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case was null and void, and rejected Defendant’s assertion of reduction of king and comparative negligence based thereon. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of the provision

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of Justice Kwon Soon-il on the method of deliberation of the procedure of this case and the validity of the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, and except for the dissenting opinion by Justice Jo Hee-de on whether the part of Article 19-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for the reason for restriction on payment by the king, is null and void under the Enforcement Decree of this case, the dissenting opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik and Justice Kim Jae-hyung as to the invalidity of the provision of this case, and there is

4. The separate opinion by Justice Kwon Soon-il as to the method of examining the litigation procedure of this case and whether the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of this case are invalid

A. First, we examine the legal nature of the lawsuit seeking payment of the deduction benefits under the School Safety Act against the Mutual-Aid Association.

(1) The purpose of the School Safety Act is to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of projects for school safety accident compensation mutual aid in order to prevent school safety accidents and to compensate students, school employees, and participants in educational activities for damages sustained by school safety accidents in a prompt and appropriate manner (Article 1). Under this Act, the Superintendent of an Office of Education shall establish a mutual aid association in the relevant City/Do to implement the school safety mutual aid project (Articles 11(1) and 15(1)), and shall have the authority to appoint executives of the mutual aid association, approve the fund operation plan, guide and supervise the state of property (Articles 20, 25, and 55). The principal of the school provided for in Article 2 subparag. 1 of this Act shall become an account holder of school safety mutual aid and shall not be allowed to withdraw from the school (Article 12 subparag. 2), the students, school employees, participants, etc. of the school who subscribed to the school safety mutual aid agreement shall not be entitled to the benefits of school safety mutual aid (Article 14(1)4).

(2) In full view of the circumstances examined below along with the purpose of the school safety mutual aid project, the project undertaker, and the details of and procedures for the payment of the deduction benefits as seen in the above provisions, since the school safety mutual aid system is a social insurance system that copes with the social risks of school safety accidents that occur to students, school staff, etc. by the insurance method, the entitlement to mutual aid benefits under the above system is justifiable to regard the entitlement to mutual aid benefits as a right under public law that is specifically formed by the law of school safety law. Therefore, the entitlement to mutual aid benefits held by the beneficiaries and their bereaved family members is different from the rights under private law (judicial) such as the right to claim damages under the State Compensation Act or the right to claim damages due to default or tort under the Civil Act. Although the determination of benefits by the school safety mutual aid association cannot be deemed an administrative disposition that is subject to appeal litigation (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du20874, Dec. 13, 2012), so long as the entitlement to mutual aid benefits is a right under public law, not a civil lawsuit, but a party under public law.

First, the superintendent of education is the person who implements the school safety mutual aid project (Article 11(1)), and the person who establishes the school safety mutual aid association and the school safety mutual aid federation shall be each superintendent of education and the Minister of Education (Articles 15(1) and 28). In addition, the executives and employees of the Mutual Aid Association and the Mutual Aid Association and the Mutual Aid Association and the members of the Review Committee and the Review Committee shall be deemed public officials in the application of bribery under the Criminal Act (Article 70). The principal of the school provided for in the School Safety Act shall be deemed public officials in the status of teachers and shall not be admitted to mutual aid in the status of a private person (private person). In addition, the Minister of Education or the Superintendent of an Office of Education shall also be able to take measures necessary for correcting the relevant violation, such as issuing a payment order of mutual aid fees to the mutual aid subscribers who

Second, financial resources for school safety mutual aid projects shall be borne by the finance of the State or local governments (Article 51(1) and (2) and Article 52(2)). A case where a mutual-aid policyholder pays the mutual-aid premium (Article 49(1)), the “school’s budget” being the financial resources is provided by the special accounts for educational expenses with funds received from the general accounts of the State or the special accounts for educational expenses of the State or local governments, subsidies and subsidies of the State or local governments.

Third, the beneficiary of the school safety mutual aid and his/her bereaved family members have no limitation on exercising the right to claim damages under the State Compensation Act or the right to claim damages under the Civil Act or the right to claim damages due to non-performance of obligations or tort against the State, local governments and other individuals responsible for the damages caused by the school safety accident: Provided, That in cases where the beneficiary has received the benefits for the damages caused by the school safety accident, the State, local governments, mutual aid holders or beneficiaries who are responsible for such compensation or compensation shall be exempted from the liability for the compensation or compensation under other Acts and subordinate statutes within the scope of the amount of such benefits, and the Mutual Aid Association may not pay the benefits within the scope of such compensation or compensation (Article 45(1) and (2)).

Finally, according to the Supreme Court precedents, the mutual aid system under the School Safety Act is not applicable to the relationship between the system for compensating for losses caused by tort and its purport or purpose, as it has the nature of directly compensating for the losses suffered by the beneficiaries due to a school safety accident at the level of social security, and it differs from that of compensating for losses caused by tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da11961, Dec. 13, 2012). This is not the principle of liability for negligence or the theory of offsetting negligence, unless otherwise specifically provided in the law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da11961, Dec. 13, 2012).

B. Next, we examine whether the enforcement decree of the instant case is null and void due to the lack of delegation of the parent corporate school safety law.

(1) As seen earlier, the beneficiaries’ or their bereaved family members’ entitlement to mutual aid benefits constitutes entitlement to social security benefits recognized by the School Safety Act. As such, it is allowed that the Mutual-Aid Association delegates specific contents and scope of mutual aid benefits to the beneficiaries by delegation to subordinate statutes, such as Presidential Decree, without setting the contents, scope, and method of mutual aid benefits, in full view of the financial burden ability of the State and local governments and the overall level of social security, standards for assessment of school safety accidents and related damage therefrom, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du1302, Nov. 13, 2008, etc.).

In addition, with respect to the provision that forms the contents of the right having the nature of social security benefits, the demand for the clarity and clarity of delegation is relatively mitigated (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2015Hun-Ba191, Feb. 25, 2016). However, even in such a case, the contents of subordinate statutes should be within the scope that can be predicted by the mother law itself from the delegated contents. Such predictability should not be determined with only one specific provision, but should be determined with an organic and systematic comprehensive consideration of all relevant provisions in light of the legislative intent of the law.

(2) The type of the mutual aid benefit under the School Safety Act includes medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family’s benefits, funeral expenses, etc. However, the School Safety Act provides for the following matters: “necessary matters concerning the criteria for determining the degree of disability and the method of calculating and paying disability benefits;” “necessary matters concerning the standards for paying nursing benefits;” “necessary matters concerning the standards for paying bereaved family’s benefits;” and “necessary matters concerning the standards for paying funeral expenses” (Articles 36(5), 37(2), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2)).

In addition, as grounds for restrictions on mutual aid benefits, the School Safety Act provides that the mutual aid benefits may not be paid in whole or in part in cases where the beneficiary or his/her guardian, etc. fails to comply with the instructions of the medical care institution without any justifiable reason, and thus the state of the beneficiary’s injury, disease or disability becomes worse or obstructs the medical care institution’s treatment because the beneficiary or his/her guardian, etc. do not comply with the instructions of the medical care institution” (Article 43(1)1, 2, and 30 of the Automobile Safety Act).

(3) In light of the above legal principles, in full view of the above provisions and the legal nature of mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, the pertinent provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case shall be deemed null and void as it deviates from the scope of delegation by the mother law.

First, Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, which are the grounds for delegation, delegate the "matters necessary for the payment standards, etc." to the Presidential Decree, and it is difficult to view that the delegation matters are limited to the "matters necessary for the payment standards". However, Article 43 of the School Safety Act on the "Restrictions on and Suspension of the Payment of Mutual Aid Benefits" does not delegate to the Presidential Decree the grounds for restricting and suspending the payment of mutual aid benefits except for the reasons prescribed in the pertinent provision. Thus, it is difficult to view that the Enforcement Decree of the instant case’s provision was not scheduled by the School Safety Act on the grounds for restricting the beneficiary’s contribution, negligence, etc. as the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits is not stipulated by the School Safety Act. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the delegation of the provisions of the instant

Second, considering that the school safety mutual aid system is a social insurance system to cope with social risks such as school safety accidents, and that the right to receive a mutual aid benefit under the above system is a social security right to receive a mutual aid benefit, limiting the right to receive a mutual aid benefit for reasons such as kings or negligence not explicitly prescribed by the Act is contrary to the purpose of the school safety mutual aid system to compensate for damages suffered by school safety accidents in a prompt and appropriate manner, and it is difficult to view that the right to receive a mutual aid benefit accords with the purpose of Article 13 of the Framework Act on Social Security that provides for limitation to the minimum extent necessary for

C. As seen earlier, the legal nature of a lawsuit against the Mutual-Aid Association seeking payment of deduction benefits under the School Safety Act is not a civil lawsuit, but a party lawsuit under public law as stipulated in Article 3 subparag. 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Thus, the instant lawsuit constitutes a case where a party lawsuit under the Administrative Litigation Act is filed as a civil lawsuit.

However, since the Busan District Court Panel Division, which is the first instance court of this case, has jurisdiction over the case of this case as a party suit under the Administrative Litigation Act, there is no problem of violation of jurisdiction in this case. Furthermore, although the court below should have deliberated the lawsuit of this case in accordance with the procedures of the administrative litigation, it cannot be found that the facts were confirmed without applying the provisions of ex officio investigation in the trial and affected the judgment. Thus, it is difficult to view the above procedural error as a ground for reversal of the judgment below.

On the other hand, the court below was just in its conclusion that the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case was null and void, and rejected the defendant's assertion of reduction of king and comparative negligence, and it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the validity of the provision of this case.

As above, I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that dismisses the appeal of this case, but there are different reasons, so I express my separate opinion.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Jo Hee-de as to whether Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for the grounds for restricting the payment by a king certificate, is null and void

A. The Majority Opinion argues that Article 19-2(2) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for the grounds for restricting payment by negligence among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of this case, is null and void, as well as Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for the grounds for restricting payment by kings, without statutory delegation.

B. However, the legal principle of the majority opinion that regards Article 19-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for the reason for restriction on payment by the king as invalid among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of this case, cannot be accepted for the following reasons.

(1) Article 1 of the School Safety Act provides that “The purpose of this Act is to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of a project for the safety accident compensation mutual aid to prevent school safety accidents and to compensate students, teachers, and participants in educational activities for damages caused by school safety accidents in a prompt and appropriate manner.” Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act provides that “The Mutual-Aid Association may pay mutual aid benefits except for the expenses necessary for the medical treatment, such as the disease, injury, or physical disability already existing to the beneficiary in determining the amount of mutual aid benefits pursuant to Article 35 of the Act.”

(2) “Damage” under Article 1 of the School Safety Act refers to the scope of damage in proximate causal relation with the school safety accident or the amount of damage calculated through comparative negligence among the damages suffered by the beneficiaries, such as students, teachers, and staff members, etc., or the amount of damage calculated through comparative negligence. Therefore, where the negligence of the beneficiaries, such as students, teachers, and staff, etc., compete with the occurrence of the damages caused by the school safety accident, the damage caused by the negligence of the beneficiaries may also be deemed to include the damage caused by the school safety accident.

However, “The expenses necessary for the treatment of the king” under Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree shall be deemed not to be included in the damages caused by the school safety accident since it is related to symptoms that had already existed prior to the occurrence of the school safety accident. In the case of the king, as in the case of comparative negligence, the part caused by the king shall be considered as the damages caused by the school safety accident, including the part caused by the king of the beneficiary, and the damages may be assessed by the method of reducing the damages in accordance with the limitation of liability doctrine. However, it is only for the convenience of calculating the damages, and it is not included in the concept of damages in proximate causal relation with the school safety accident by nature. The payment of expenses incurred by the beneficiary for the treatment of the king is unjust because it goes against the language and text of the School Safety Act to properly compensate for the damages caused by the school safety accident and its legislative intent is excessive.

Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree provides for the legal doctrine that benefits can be paid, except for the portion not recognized as damage caused by school safety accidents, so it is difficult to view that the basis or delegation of the parent law should be separately made.

In addition, matters necessary for the “standards, etc. for the payment of medical care benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses” shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree. Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2) of the School Safety Act provide that matters necessary for the “standards for the determination of the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, and the method for payment thereof,” and Article 37(2) of the School Safety Act providing that “the standards for determination of the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, the method for payment thereof, etc.” can be deemed as the basis or the delegation provision of the mother’s law concerning the restriction on

(3) Therefore, Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act stipulates the necessary details concerning the limitation of mutual aid benefits as stipulated in Articles 36 through 40 of the same Act, and it cannot be deemed that the same is invalid beyond the limit of delegated legislation.

C. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that even Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, which provides the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits under the Enforcement Decree of the instant case, even though there is no provision or delegation of the parent law regarding the restriction on the payment of mutual aid benefits, the provision that does not have any delegation of the law is invalid, and thus, rejected Defendant’s assertion on the reduction of the Defendant’s sperperition. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree, which

For the foregoing reasons, I oppose the Majority Opinion.

6. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik and Justice Kim Jae-hyung as to the invalidity of the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case

A. The key issue of the instant case is whether the instant provision, which allows comparative negligence for calculating the amount of deduction benefits under the School Safety Act, goes beyond the scope delegated by the School Safety Act. Ultimately, the issue is determined depending on whether the “matters necessary for the payment standards, etc.” such as survivors’ benefits, etc. as prescribed by the School Safety Act and the “matters necessary for the calculation and payment method, etc. of disability benefits” as prescribed by Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree are included in the “proceds or negligence offsetting.”

The majority opinion argues that the provisions of Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act only stipulate the detailed criteria for the payment of deduction benefits and the method of calculating the amount of benefits under the Enforcement Decree, but does not directly stipulate the grounds for the restriction of deduction benefits or delegate them to the Enforcement Decree. Article 43 of the School Safety Act only allows the restriction of deduction benefits only for the reasons directly listed in the said provision, and does not delegate other restrictions to the Enforcement Decree. However, the majority opinion is unreasonable in light of the language and legislative intent of the School Safety Act.

B. Article 35 of the School Safety Act provides that the school safety mutual aid association shall pay the beneficiaries of the students, school employees, etc. who have suffered damage to their lives and bodies as a result thereof (Articles 36(1), 37(1), 38(1), 39(1), and 40(1)), and that the mutual aid benefits paid by the school safety mutual aid association shall be divided into the medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34) for each type of mutual aid benefits, and shall determine the mutual aid benefits pursuant to Articles 36 through 40 (Article 35). This Act provides that “The matters necessary for the payment standards, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree” (Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), 40(2), and 40(2) and (3) shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

Articles 14 through 19 of the Enforcement Decree shall provide for detailed matters concerning the standards for payment by item of each benefit and the elements for calculating the amount to be paid, and Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides, “The Mutual-Aid Association may provide mutual-aid benefits except for the expenses incurred in treating the already existing disease, injury, physical disability, etc. where the disease, physical disability, etc., which existed to the beneficiary has deteriorated due to school safety accidents in determining the amount to be paid pursuant to Article 35 of the School Safety Act,” and Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Decree provides, “The Mutual-Aid Association may offset the amount of disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family's benefits where it is negligent in calculating the amount to be paid by the beneficiary pursuant to Articles 37 through 39 of the School Safety Act” in paragraph (3) of the same Article.

In the event of injury to the beneficiary due to a school safety accident, the amount of the mutual aid benefits shall be determined pursuant to the School Safety Act. However, the question may be raised as to whether the amount of the beneficiary would be reduced compared to the case of the beneficiary where there exists any evidence of the beneficiary or negligence of the beneficiary. In contrast to such a case, it may be clearly prescribed by the Enforcement Decree that the said Act may delegate the “necessary matters concerning the payment standards, etc.” and the “matters necessary for the calculation and payment method, etc. of the disability benefits” to the Enforcement Decree, and the “matters necessary for the calculation and payment method, etc. of the disability benefits” to the Enforcement Decree. In such a case, whether the beneficiary of the mutual aid benefits may be allowed to deduct the medical expenses from the amount of the mutual aid benefits (Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree) and whether the negligence of the beneficiary in calculating the amount of the mutual aid benefits should be considered (Article 19-2(2) of the Enforcement Decree).

C. (1) Since Article 43 of the School Safety Act provides for the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits, the Majority Opinion cannot determine the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits due to the increase in the king and negligence.

However, the grounds for restrictions on payment under Article 43 cannot be deemed to exclude the beneficiary from setting the amount in consideration of the beneficiary’s rushness or negligence in cases where the beneficiary’s injury, etc. becomes worse due to the beneficiary’s failure to comply with the medical care institution’s instructions, or where it is evident that the beneficiary would interfere with the medical care institution’s medical treatment due to the beneficiary’s failure to comply with such instructions, and where the beneficiary is liable for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act and the beneficiary’s failure to pay the amount due to the cause attributable to the beneficiary. Accordingly, even if Article 43 of the School Safety Act lists the grounds for restrictions on the payment of the mutual aid benefits under Article 43, the payment of the mutual aid benefits cannot be restricted due to any other reason. Rather, it is difficult to view that Article 43 of the School

(2) The Majority Opinion separates the calculation and calculation of the amount to be paid and the restriction on the payment, and considers the amount to be paid or offsets the amount to be paid by negligence, rather than the area of calculation and calculation of the amount to be paid. This is similar to distinguishing between setting the scope of compensation for damages and setting the limits on liability for damages in the event of nonperformance or tort liability for damages.

However, the area of “the scope of damages and the calculation and calculation of damages” and “the limitation of damages” are not strictly distinguished. Furthermore, the part of the damage suffered by the beneficiary, which contributed to the king or which has a causal link with the fault of the beneficiary, shall not be deemed to constitute damage suffered by school safety accidents.

(A) First, we examine the king evidence.

In a number of rulings, the Supreme Court ruled that "if damage occurs or is expanded due to concurrent factors between the perpetrator and the victim's side, it is irrelevant to the cause of the victim's side, such as the risk of physical personality or disease, the court shall determine the amount of compensation in cases where the perpetrator compensates the whole amount of the damage in light of the form, degree, etc. of the disease is contrary to the principle of fairness and may apply the legal principle of comparative negligence to consider the factors of the victim who contributed to the occurrence or expansion of the damage by analogical application of the principle of comparative negligence." (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Da1576, Mar. 27, 2008; 2012Da37251, Apr. 24, 2014; 2014Da16968, Jul. 10, 2014).

As can be seen, applying the legal doctrine of comparative negligence by prescribing the amount of damages, or taking the king into account in the form of limitation of liability is to easily calculate the amount of damages. Inasmuch as it is apparent that king does not fall under “the negligence” as referred to in comparative negligence, the Supreme Court may apply the provision of comparative negligence instead of applying the provision of comparative negligence. Medical expenses incurred in king may not be deemed as losses incurred due to nonperformance or tort. When compensating for losses incurred due to nonperformance or tort, it may be difficult to strictly calculate the amount of damages incurred due to king, even though it may be difficult to strictly separate it from the damages incurred due to nonperformance or tort. However, in a conceptual and logical sense, medical expenses incurred in king may be deemed as denying causation between the act of the debtor or the perpetrator, or excluded from the scope of compensation. Therefore, it is merely a matter of whether to consider the scope of compensation for damages or the calculation of the amount thereof, or, in the absence of king, to limit liability for the expenses incurred in relation to king following the amount of damages.

The purpose of Article 2 subparag. 4 of the School Safety Act and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of the school safety accident compensation mutual aid program to compensate students, teachers and staff, and participants in educational activities for “damage caused by school safety accidents” in a prompt and proper manner. Accordingly, the damage caused by the physical nature of a victim among the total damage cannot be deemed to be “damage caused by school safety accidents,” and even if excluded therefrom, it does not deviate from the legislative purpose of the School Safety Act. The above Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof can be seen as more clearly provided for the purport of the School Safety Act.

(B) As to comparative negligence, we examine the following:

In a case where a creditor is negligent with respect to nonperformance, the court shall consider the liability for damages and the amount thereof to be determined (Article 396 of the Civil Act). This provision shall also apply mutatis mutandis to tort damages (Article 763 of the Civil Act). The comparative negligence set-off system requires the creditor to take into account such ancillary principle in calculating the amount of damages in accordance with the principle of equity in a case where the creditor or the victim neglected to exercise due diligence required under the principle of good faith. Therefore, in light of the principle of good faith, when the creditor or the victim did not exercise due diligence required under the social norms or community life, it shall be deemed that there was negligence on the part of the creditor when damage occurred or expanded (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da35389, Jun.

Article 393 of the Civil Act and Article 396 of the same Act concerning offsetting the scope of damages can be deemed as a provision for detailed calculation of damages under Article 390 of the Civil Act in the case of nonperformance of obligation. In addition, the aforementioned provisions on offsetting the scope of damages and comparative negligence apply mutatis mutandis to tort damages (Article 763 of the Civil Act). From this point of view, it can be deemed as a provision for detailed calculation of damages under Article 750 of the Civil Act. From this point of view, the scope of damages or calculation of the amount of damages and the degree of comparative negligence or limitation of liability should be operated in different areas, which are clearly distinguishable from each other. In order to determine the scope of damages that should be compensated, the concept of causation, scope of damages, comparative negligence, and limitation of liability is used. In addition, in the case of nonperformance of obligation, the scope of damages and comparative negligence can only be deemed as a provision for detailed calculation of damages under Article 750 of the Civil Act. From this point of view, it is difficult to view that there is an obligee’s fault or negligence.

The Supreme Court repeatedly determined that “if there is any negligence on the part of the victim with respect to the occurrence or expansion of damages caused by tort, such reason shall be taken into account as a matter of course in determining the scope of compensation for damages of the perpetrator” (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da44401, Apr. 12, 1994; 96Da54560, Feb. 28, 1997; 2003Da6873, Feb. 27, 2004; 2010Da52126, Oct. 28, 2010). The Supreme Court repeatedly determined that “if there is any negligence on the part of the victim with respect to the occurrence or expansion of damages caused by tort, such negligence shall be taken into account in determining the scope of compensation for damages, and that the comparative negligence is for convenience in calculating the amount of compensation for damage.

The School Safety Act imposes an obligation on the Superintendent of an Office of Education, the principal of a school, etc. to prevent school safety accidents, and, in the event of a school safety accident, the Superintendent of an Office of Education, the principal of a school, etc. provides mutual aid benefits to the beneficiaries of students, teachers, etc. who have suffered damage due to school safety accidents (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da11961, Dec. 13, 2012). However, comparative negligence is not denied on the ground that the liability to pay mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act is strict liability.

Setoff liability in liability for oil pollution damage can also be acknowledged as strict liability based on the concept of fairness or the principle of good faith. There are cases where comparative negligence is explicitly acknowledged in the current law. Under the Mining Industry Act, strict liability for mining damage caused by excavation of land, discharge of pit water or waste water, piling of waste stone or mineral scrap, and discharge of mine smoke (Article 75). It is recognized as comparative negligence (Article 78). The shipowner’s liability for oil pollution damage caused by oil tanker (Articles 5(1), 6, and 8 of the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act) or product liability (Article 3 and Article 8 of the Product Liability Act) is also strict liability, but the Supreme Court recognizes comparative negligence liability for the reason that the seller is not liable for the owner of a structure under Article 758(1) of the Civil Act, and recognizes comparative negligence for the reason that it is not applied mutatis mutandis to the seller’s liability for strict liability for damages under Article 209 of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da3168, Feb. 9, 1993).

(3) In light of the legislative purport of the School Safety Act and the nature of the mutual aid benefit, even if the legal doctrine that takes into account the victim’s symptoms and negligence in determining the amount of compensation under the Civil Act in order to calculate and calculate the amount of compensation under the School Safety Act, it does not go against the purport or purpose of the School Safety Act, which has established the mutual aid benefit scheme. Even if the nature of the mutual aid benefit under the School Safety Act is not itself the compensation for damages, the part caused by slives or negligence among the damages suffered by the beneficiary, which is the part to be responsible for by the beneficiary himself/herself, does not constitute “damage caused by school safety accidents” under the School Safety Act.

(4) Ultimately, it is unreasonable to regard the civil damages as falling under the scope of damages or the calculation of damages as falling under the “limit on compensation for damages” and the “limit on compensation for damages” as pertaining to comparative negligence and comparative negligence, and as such, it cannot be deemed that the scope of compensation for damages or the calculation and calculation of damages are irrelevant to the scope of compensation for damages or the “limit on payment” under the School Safety Act. Thus, considering comparative negligence and comparative negligence, it is not reasonable to regard the amount as falling under the scope of restriction on payment, rather than the area of calculation and calculation of the amount to be paid. Accordingly, each “standards on payment, etc.” under Articles 36(5), 38(2), 39(2), and 40(2) of the School Safety Act, and “the calculation and method of payment, etc. of disability benefits” under Article 37(2) of the School Safety Act as having delegated matters concerning the amount to be paid and the scope of payment of benefits to be paid, it is not reasonable to deem that the school safety regulations have been excluded from the scope of delegation of the law.

D. The “standards for the payment of bereaved family’s benefits, etc.” under the School Safety Act includes the subject of payment, scope of deduction benefits, method of calculating the amount of payment, and factors to be considered when determining the amount of payment. Furthermore, the “standards for the payment, etc.” can be understood as including matters similar thereto in addition to the criteria for the payment. Furthermore, the “necessary matters concerning the standards for the payment, etc.” can be understood as a greater range than those prescribed above. In particular, the aforementioned provisions of the School Safety Act uses the term “as regards .....” In particular, the said provisions may delegate the term “related matters” to the Enforcement Decree regarding the standards for payment or the method of payment, thereby opening the possibility of broad interpretation. Moreover, the “necessary matters concerning the method for the calculation and payment, etc. of disability benefits” under the School Safety Act can be seen as

E. Supreme Court Decision 201Da111961 Decided December 13, 2012 cited by the Majority Opinion determined that the principle of comparative negligence liability or the theory of comparative negligence is not applicable to the wage payment liability under the School Safety Act, and that the legal principle of comparative negligence in civil damage compensation cases, which considers the contribution to the expansion of the damage, cannot be deemed as being applied as it is to the deduction benefit under the School Safety Act. Supreme Court Decision 2011Da77238 Decided the same day and Supreme Court Decision 2012Da48572 Decided December 13, 2012 (hereinafter the above Supreme Court Decisions 201Da111961, 201Da77288, and 2012Da485722, supra, the aforementioned legal principle of comparative negligence and the aforementioned legal principle of comparative negligence, etc. can be applied to the portion of the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision 201Da111961, supra.

Except in exceptional cases where legislators must follow the principle of parliamentary reservation as essential matters that ought to be regulated by law by themselves (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 2012Du23808, Aug. 20, 2015), the National Assembly may enact not only a method prescribed by law by itself but also a method delegated by Presidential Decree (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Order 2001Hun-Ma82, Mar. 25, 2004; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ma514, Apr. 30, 209). Therefore, “law” as referred to in Supreme Court Decision 201Da11961, Apr. 30, 209 should be deemed to include the Enforcement Decree following the delegation of the School Safety Act. The Majority Opinion’s determination of whether there is a ground provision on delegation of the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act as a mother corporation also can be deemed based on the premise that the above “Act” includes the provision on delegation of the School Safety Act.

Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961 Decided the amount of payment in the conclusion and did not take into account the comparative negligence or the king evidence. However, since the time of the occurrence of the school safety accident is before April 1, 2012, the enforcement date of the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case, it can be deemed that there was no judgment of the Supreme Court on whether there was any provision of delegation to the School Safety Act of the mother corporation. Accordingly, even if the enforcement decree of the instant case is valid in the judgment on the grounds of delegation to the mother law, it does not conflict with Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc.

In addition, the Supreme Court denied the payment of medical care benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, the medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act, and the medical care compensation under the Seafarers Act, or offsetting negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Meu351, Oct. 13, 1981; 2007Da84420, Mar. 27, 2008; 2010Du5141, Aug. 19, 201). However, the Supreme Court has no provision on offsetting evidence or comparative negligence under the law and the Enforcement Decree thereof.

F. In full view of these points, the instant provision of the Enforcement Decree, which provides that the beneficiary may be considered in calculating the amount and comparative negligence, shall not be deemed to have exceeded the bounds of delegated legislation, as it has specified the necessary contents for determining the amount and scope of the deductible benefits as stipulated in Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act.

G. Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise that the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, although there was no provision or delegation on the grounds of the mother law regarding the restriction on payment of mutual aid benefits, is invalid because it limits the mutual aid benefits as prescribed by the law, and thus, rejected Defendant’s assertion of reduction of king and comparative negligence. In so doing, it erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, we express our concurrence with the Majority Opinion.

7. Opinion concurring with the Majority Opinion by Justice Park Poe-dae and Justice Park Poe-young

A. The deduction benefits system under the School Safety Act is not a fundamental compensation system. It is a special compensation system under the School Safety Accident Compensation Mutual Aid Fund (hereinafter “Mutual Aid Fund”) implemented by the Superintendent of an Office of Education to compensate students, teachers, and participants in educational activities who have suffered from a school safety accident. The victim is entitled to receive the deduction benefits, but the legal nature of the deduction benefits paid by the Mutual Aid Association, which is a business operator of a Mutual Aid Fund, is not the same as the liability insurance, performing the duty of compensation on behalf of the perpetrator, such as the liability insurance system for damages of the automobile transport business operator. The deduction benefits are not compensation, but only a kind of legal bond relationship, which directly compensates the beneficiaries of the damages caused by the school safety accident at the level of consideration of the safety of the school curriculum. Even if it is caused by a school safety accident that occurred during educational activities, it is different from the general compensation system in terms of the nature of the accident compensation system, and it is also a kind of legal liability based on the law, such as industrial accident compensation insurance.

If the deduction benefit has the nature of compensation for damages, it can be reasonable to apply the limitation of liability due to the king certificate or the legal principle of comparative negligence.However, if it has the nature of legal liability due to special law other than compensation for damages, the scope and limitation of the deduction benefit should be in accordance with the law, and it is not a foundation by the general damage compensation system under the civil law.

B. The fundamental system of mutual aid under the School Safety Act is established prior to the enactment of the Act. Since it is difficult for a school to receive damages due to various accidents that occur during its educational activities, one of the causes attributable to the undeveloped students is difficult. It is the starting point of the system to fill the gap in compensation, and to ease the burden of liability for damages due to unexpected accidents through the operation of mutual aid programs. On the other hand, it is difficult for the school operator to ensure the necessary compensation and its financial resources to use the funds accumulated by the school for the purpose of mutual aid. It is not similar to the industrial accident compensation insurance system, because it is difficult for the school to adopt the current regulations on the method of calculating the amount of compensation for damages, such as comparative negligence or liability limitation on the industrial accident. It is not the same as that of the current regulations on the method of calculating the amount of compensation for damages, which is not the same as that of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, but also the same as that of the current regulations on the method of calculating the amount of compensation for damages.

C. We examine the above provisions in detail, which reflects the nature of the deduction benefits under the School Safety Act.

(1) First of all, the principal is the school principal (Article 12 of the Act, “Act” refers to the School Safety Act in the indication of Article 12; hereinafter “Act”). Since the state, public school, or private school is a school foundation or individual, the principal of the school is the State, a local government, or a private school, so if the principal is liable for damages due to the school safety accident such as the user’s liability, the liability for damages due to the defect of the structure, or the State’s liability for damages due to the school safety accident, the principal is not the person liable for the compensation, but the principal is the principal who is not the person liable for the compensation, and the liability for the payment of the mutual aid is also the principal (Article 12 and Article 49(1) of the Act). The principal is entitled to collect the mutual aid from the students or the teachers and staff who are the beneficiaries of the mutual aid benefits, but is not necessary (Article 49(1) proviso of the Act). It is not possible to collect the mutual aid fund from the State or the local government (Article 51).

(2) Mutual aid programs under the School Safety Act are very diverse from kindergartens under the Early Childhood Education Act to elementary and secondary schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, lifelong education facilities under the Lifelong Education Act, and Korean schools under the Act on Education Assistance, etc. to Korean Nationals Abroad (Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Act on Educational Assistance, etc. of Korean Nationals Abroad). The types and contents of school safety accidents that may occur therefrom are different. The types of education for the prevention of traffic safety, health and hygiene education, safety education, disaster prevention education, education for prevention of school violence, education for prevention of sexual violence, education for prevention of sexual violence, education for prevention of sex trafficking, and education for prevention of safety accidents related to experience-oriented educational activities are very diverse and broad (Article 8(1) of the Act). Accordingly, it is clear that liability for damages arising from school safety accidents can also be fully diverse, such as tort liability prescribed by the Civil Act, as well as tort liability prescribed by individual laws.

However, the School Safety Act provides that a beneficiary of mutual aid benefits shall not be paid the amount of mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act within the scope of compensation or compensation (Article 45(2) of the Act). On the other hand, where a beneficiary of mutual aid benefits has received compensation pursuant to the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the beneficiary is completely excluded from the beneficiary of mutual aid benefits under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (Article 43(1) proviso and Article 43(1)3 of the Act). Ultimately, where the victim has received compensation pursuant to the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, even if the amount of compensation is less than the amount of mutual aid benefits under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the beneficiary cannot claim additional deduction benefits, but if the amount of compensation or compensation is less than the amount of mutual aid benefits under other Acts and subordinate statutes, the amount of compensation can claim for mutual aid benefits equivalent to the difference. However, it appears that the legislative intent of mutual aid benefits is indirectly different from the amount of mutual aid benefits under the former School Safety Act.

(3) Article 44(1) of the School Safety Act provides that a person who caused a school safety accident or his/her guardian, etc. may file a claim for the amount equivalent to the deductible benefits paid in the event of a school safety accident due to the beneficiary’s intentional or gross negligence (Article 44(1) of the Act). However, if the mutual aid benefit system under the School Safety Act has the nature of liability insurance for the State, local governments (in the case of national and public schools) and school foundations (in the case of private schools), the insured, the school safety mutual aid association should be able to completely seek reimbursement from the causing offender. If the causing actor is a beneficiary of liability insurance for the student, teachers and staff, and participants of educational activities, the said mutual aid system is limited to the extent of intentional or gross negligence. Furthermore, if the mutual aid benefit system has the nature of liability insurance for the student, school staff, and participants of educational activities, even if the victim pays the mutual aid benefits to the victim, it should not be able to claim reimbursement to the student, school staff, etc. who are in the status of the insured.

(4) The duty of the principal of a school or a teacher to protect and supervise an accident that occurred in a school is recognized only in an indivisible relationship with his/her educational activities, with predictability and possibility of avoidance (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da44205, Apr. 11, 200). Although liability for damages caused by illegal or non-performance of obligation should be premised on the offender’s cause attributable to the perpetrator, the amount of deductible benefits under the School Safety Act is statutory liability recognized as non-performance of liability without fault even if there is no cause attributable to the school’s fault. In light of the legislative process data, the legislative bill was originally submitted by the government, but it was deleted during the National Assembly even though there was a provision that excludes damage caused by natural disasters from subject to compensation. Accordingly, this is a simple expression of the nature of the deduction benefits. Accordingly, the beneficiary is merely asserting and proving that the accident falls under safety accidents in a school without the need to discuss the causes attributable to the school or other students. Of course, even though this is not possible, this is not in the nature of liability for compensation under the Mining Industry Act.

(5) Specific criteria for calculating deductible benefits under the School Safety Act differs from the criteria for calculating the amount of compensation for damage caused by illegal acts against human beings. For example, nursing benefits under the School Safety Act are all liable for the period of hospitalization and expected future amount of reimbursement. However, nursing benefits under the School Safety Act provide that “after a person who has received medical care benefits has received medical care benefits at all or from time after receiving medical care benefits, it shall be paid to the beneficiary or his/her guardian, etc. who actually receives nursing care (Article 38(1) of the Act).” Here, “after receiving medical care” should be construed as “after the treatment cannot be expected any longer and its symptoms are fixed” (Supreme Court Decision 2013Da78976 Decided August 20, 2014). Ultimately, nursing benefits under the School Safety Act cannot be claimed for the payment of social environment benefits only after receiving medical care benefits due to changes in the number of care expenses and care expenses after receiving medical treatment (Article 38(1) of the Act). It can be seen as “after the time limit to the payment of non-school benefits due to the payment.”

D. Meanwhile, mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act are the rights and obligations to pay the amount in accordance with the payment criteria prescribed by the relevant Act if the cause for payment happens, and it is not considered to determine the amount of payment affected by the occurrence of an accident or the degree of damage. Therefore, in the mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, king may be discussed at the country where the causal relationship between the occurrence requirement of the cause for payment of mutual aid benefits and the damage is followed. However, once an accident occurred during educational activities, it cannot be excluded from the contributory portion by a documentary evidence as to whether the obligation to pay mutual aid benefits in accordance with the payment criteria prescribed by the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes arises. While examining the legislative progress data, it was examined to exclude the student from the object of mutual aid benefits due to the student’s military register or the king’s disease during the initial drafting process, but it was also deleted in the legislative proposal process. If there is a causal relationship between the school safety accident and the damage, it is not considered to have been paid even if the benefits overlap due to the accident. This is not considered to reflect the amount of the contributory portion in the foregoing.

E. Ultimately, the deduction benefits under the School Safety Act are different from the liability for damages, and it is a separate area where the general principle of the limitation of liability is not applied due to comparative negligence in relation to illegal acts, etc. under the civil law or due diligence. Therefore, insofar as the provisions of the applicable law clearly and obviously do not exist or legitimate delegation provisions do not exist, it is inappropriate to expand and interpret the scope of restriction of rights. The enforcement Decree of the instant case is not only inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the deduction benefits, but also is deemed null and void as it is prescribed without delegation by the mother law. I express my concurrence with the Majority Opinion.

Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)