[1] The case where the Supreme Court can ex officio determine ex officio a mistake in interpreting and applying the substantive law, even though the requirement of "when the Supreme Court makes a decision contrary to the precedents," which may be the grounds of appeal for small claims, is not satisfied

[2] In a case where the beneficiary caused a school safety accident due to the passage of time, whether the school safety mutual aid association can exercise the right to indemnity against the beneficiary after paying the mutual aid benefits to the beneficiary (negative), and the purport that the school safety mutual aid association allows the beneficiary who is liable for damages to exercise the right to indemnity only limited to the beneficiary

[3] Whether a beneficiary who caused a school safety accident can exercise the right to indemnity against the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association in a case where the beneficiary first paid damages to the victim (affirmative)

[4] In a case where the School Safety Mutual Aid Association paid the deductible benefits to the beneficiary who was damaged by the school safety accident, whether the beneficiary who is liable for damages can exercise the beneficiary’s direct right to claim the insurance money (affirmative), and whether the same applies to the case where the beneficiary who is the insured under liability insurance causes the school safety accident due to the lapse of time (affirmative)

[1] In a case where there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of statutes applicable to a specific case in a small-sum case where there is a number of cases where the interpretation of the said statutes is pending in the lower court, and there is a case where the Supreme Court does not make a decision on the interpretation of the statutes on the grounds that it is a small-sum case, the legal stability of people’s lives may be harmed if the case is terminated without making a decision on the interpretation of the statutes on the grounds that it is a small-sum case. Therefore, in such a case where there is no special circumstance, even if the Supreme Court did not meet the requirement that “when it makes a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court,” which may be a ground for appeal, it may be determined

[2] Under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”), when the School Safety Mutual Aid Association has paid the deduction benefits to beneficiaries with respect to the damages caused by school safety accidents, the Mutual Aid Association and the Insured, etc. shall be exempted from liability for the said damages (Article 45(1)). In addition, in cases where school safety accidents occur due to the intent or gross negligence of the beneficiaries, or the intentional or gross negligence of the beneficiaries, and where the Mutual Aid Association and the Insured have paid the deduction benefits, they may exercise the right to indemnity against the persons who caused school safety accidents within the scope of the amount of the deduction benefits (Article 44(1)). In other words, in cases where the beneficiaries caused school safety accidents due to the passage of the beneficiaries, they shall not be entitled to indemnity from the School Safety Mutual Aid Association even if the deduction benefits are paid to the beneficiaries.

As can be seen, allowing the beneficiary who is the party to educational activities to exercise the right to indemnity only limited to the beneficiary who is liable for damages (hereinafter referred to as “victims”), the beneficiary who is the perpetrator of the school safety accident should promptly and properly compensate for the damage caused by the school safety accident in order to ensure the stable participation in educational activities, and the beneficiary’s liability to compensate for the damage should be limited to a certain degree. In particular, in the event that the beneficiary who is the perpetrator causes the school safety accident due to the passage of time, the beneficiary is exempted from the liability to compensate for the damage to the victim, as well as from the liability to compensate the school safety mutual aid association. Accordingly, the school safety mutual aid association is ultimately bearing the final burden between the beneficiary who caused the school safety accident and the beneficiary who caused the occurrence of the accident. This can be deemed to have given special consideration to the protection of the beneficiary who is the perpetrator of the school safety accident.

[3] In a case where the beneficiary who is liable for damages (hereinafter referred to as the "victim") causes a school safety accident due to the lapse of time, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association shall be liable to compensate for the damages within the scope of the amount of the deduction benefits. Therefore, in such a case, if the perpetrator is first the victim, it is reasonable to deem that the amount equivalent to the deduction benefits can be claimed by the School Safety Mutual Aid Association. On the other hand, if the perpetrator who caused the school safety accident first pays damages to the victim, the perpetrator who first pays damages, is deemed unable to claim the reimbursement to the School Safety Mutual Aid Association, then the person who finally becomes liable for damages depending on who first pays the damages would be different, and such result would be likely to cause delay in compensation or compensation, and it also contravenes the purpose of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents, which would protect the perpetrator who caused the school safety accident.

[4] The victim may exercise a direct claim against the liability insurer under Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act in the event the insured is liable for the accident. On the other hand, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association shall, after paying the benefits to the beneficiary, subrogate the beneficiary’s right to claim damages against the person who caused the accident at school within the scope of the benefits to be deducted under Article 44(1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”). Accordingly, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association may exercise the beneficiary’s right to claim direct claim against the beneficiary who caused the accident at school after paying the benefits to the beneficiary. This applies likewise to the case where the beneficiary, who is the insured under liability insurance, caused the accident at school, to the beneficiary’s expiration of the period. In other words, if the beneficiary, who is the perpetrator, has caused the accident at school, the victim’s right to claim reimbursement should not be applied to the beneficiary who is the beneficiary’s right to claim reimbursement, regardless of the lapse of the insurer’s liability insurance policy.

[1] Article 3 subparagraph 2 of the Trial of Small Claims Act / [2] Articles 44 (1) and 45 (1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents / [3] Articles 44 (1) and 45 (1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Safety Accidents / [4] Articles 44 (1) and 45 (1) of the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Safety Accidents, Article 724 (2) of the Commercial Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2003Da1878 Decided August 20, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1571), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da50420 Decided December 11, 2008 (Gong2009Sang, 6) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 2013Da82401 Decided December 15, 2016 (Gong2017Sang, 77)

Case non-life insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Cheongju, Attorneys Don-dong, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Gyeonggi-do School Safety Mutual Aid Association (Law Firm LLC et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2017Na80082 Decided October 19, 2018

The part of the judgment below against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Central District Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Where there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of statutes applicable to a specific case in a small-sum case, and there is a case where a number of small-sum case at issue of interpretation of the same Act is pending in the lower court, and there is a case where a decision is made in accordance with the full bench, the legal stability of people’s lives may be harmed if the Supreme Court terminates the case without making a decision on the interpretation of the relevant statutes on the grounds that it is a small-sum case. Therefore, in such special circumstances, even if the Supreme Court did not meet the requirement that “when a decision is made contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court,” which may be the ground for final appeal, it may be determined as to the error of interpreting and applying substantive laws in order to perform the essential function of the Supreme Court, which is the unification of statutory interpretation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2003Da1878, Aug. 20, 2004; 206Da50420, Dec. 11, 20

The key issue of the instant case is the right of recourse between the liability insurer who is the insured and the school safety mutual aid association, which is the business operator of the pertinent school safety mutual aid program, in the event that the beneficiary of the school safety mutual aid program (hereinafter “school safety mutual aid”) under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (hereinafter “School Safety Act”) causes school safety accidents due to the passage of time, and this is related to the interpretation of Article 44(1) of the School Safety Act. However, since there is no Supreme Court precedent on this issue, and there is no lower court’s decision, it is necessary to determine whether to interpret and apply this part of the lower court.

2. A. The purpose of the School Safety Act is to: (a) impose an obligation on the Superintendent of an Office of Education, the principal of a school, etc. to prevent school safety accidents; and (b) to protect the lives and bodies of students, teachers, and staff members, etc. from school safety accidents by providing mutual aid benefits to the students, teachers, and staff members, etc. who have been damaged without asking the superintendent of an office of education, the principal of a school, etc., whether they are responsible for the occurrence of such accidents; and (c) to build a substantial school safety network by compensating them promptly and appropriately in case of inevitable damages (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 20

B. According to the School Safety Act, when the School Safety Mutual Aid Association has paid the deduction benefits to the beneficiary for the damages caused by the school safety accidents, the insured and the beneficiary, etc. who are liable to compensate for the said damages shall be exempted from liability (Article 45(1)). In addition, in cases where the school safety accidents occur due to the intent or gross negligence of the beneficiary, or the intentional or gross negligence of the beneficiary, or where the school safety mutual aid association has paid the deduction benefits, it may exercise the right to indemnity against the person who caused the school safety accidents within the scope of the amount of the deduction benefits (Article 44(1)). In other words, in cases where the beneficiary caused the school safety accidents by the passage of the beneficiary, even if the deduction benefits are paid to the beneficiary, the right to indemnity from the school

As can be seen, allowing the beneficiary who is the party to educational activities to exercise the right to indemnity only limited to the beneficiary who is liable for damages (hereinafter referred to as “victims”), the beneficiary who is the perpetrator of the school safety accident should promptly and properly compensate for the damage caused by the school safety accident in order to ensure the stable participation in educational activities, and the beneficiary’s liability to compensate for the damage should be limited to a certain degree. In particular, in a case where the beneficiary, who is the perpetrator, caused the occurrence of the school safety accident, the beneficiary would be exempted from the liability to compensate the victim if the benefits are paid to the beneficiary, as well as from the liability to compensate the school safety mutual aid association. As a result, the school safety mutual aid association will be ultimately bearing the final burden between the beneficiary who caused the school safety accident and the beneficiary who caused the occurrence of the school safety accident. This can be deemed to have given special consideration to protect the beneficiary who is the perpetrator of the school safety accident.

In full view of the legislative purport and provisions of the School Safety Act, the school safety mutual aid system mainly aims at compensating the beneficiaries for damages caused by school safety accidents at the level of mutual aid and social security, but it also plays a role in the stable implementation of educational activities by exempting the victims from liability for damages in case they meet certain requirements in consideration of the characteristics of the school safety accident.

C. As seen earlier, in the event a beneficiary who is the perpetrator causes a school safety accident due to the lapse of the accident, it is reasonable to view that the School Safety Mutual Aid Association is entitled to claim compensation for the amount equivalent to the deduction amount if the perpetrator first pays damages to the victim. In such a case, if the perpetrator who caused the school safety accident first pays damages to the victim, it would be reasonable to view that the amount equivalent to the deduction amount would be entitled to claim compensation from the School Safety Mutual Aid Association. On the other hand, if the beneficiary who caused the school safety accident first pays damages to the victim, the perpetrator would not be entitled to claim compensation from the School Safety Mutual Aid Association based on who first pays the damages first, then the perpetrator would be entitled to claim compensation for damages. This would result in a difference between the perpetrator and the beneficiary who caused the school safety accident. In addition, this would also violate the purpose of

D. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between the insurer of liability insurance and the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association where the perpetrator who caused the school safety accident as the insured.

The victim may exercise a direct claim against the liability insurer under Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act in the event that an accident requiring the insured’s liability insurance occurs. On the other hand, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association shall, after paying the benefits to the beneficiary, subrogate the beneficiary’s right to claim damages against the person who caused the accident at school within the scope of the benefits to be deducted under Article 44(1) of the School Safety Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da82401, Dec. 15, 2016). Accordingly, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association may exercise a subrogation of the beneficiary’s right to claim the direct claim against the beneficiary, who caused the accident at school, after paying the benefits to the beneficiary. This likewise applies to the case where the beneficiary, who is the perpetrator, has caused the accident at school, even if the beneficiary, has caused the accident at school due to the expiration of the period, the victim’s right to claim compensation for damages cannot be applied to the beneficiary who is the victim at school, regardless of the nature of the beneficiary’s right to claim for compensation as well.

3. We examine the instant case in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records.

The court below determined that, in this case where Nonparty 1, the beneficiary of the defendant, inflicted an injury on Nonparty 2, the beneficiary of the other beneficiary, and the plaintiff, the liability insurer of Nonparty 1, paid the damages to Nonparty 2, the non-party 1, the insurer of the non-party 1, can claim reimbursement to the defendant within the limit of the amount of deduction benefits, and the plaintiff can claim reimbursement against the defendant by subrogation of the insurer under Article 682 of the Commercial Act.

However, subrogation under Article 682 of the Commercial Act acquires the rights of a policyholder or the insured against a third party within the limit of the amount paid by the insurer who paid the insurance money in the event of loss caused by the third party's act. In this case, since the damage occurred by the non-party 1, the insured, and the defendant or the non-party 2 did not take part in this act, subrogation is not applicable to the insurer under Article 682 of the Commercial Act. In addition, if the plaintiff pays the insurance money to the non-party 2, the defendant is exempted from the liability for paying the insurance money. This is subject to Article 45 (2) of the School Safety Act, which provides that "If the beneficiary has received the compensation or the compensation equivalent to the benefits under this Act within the scope of the compensation or the compensation, the Mutual Aid Association shall not pay the insurance money within the scope of the compensation or the compensation, so it cannot be deemed that the defendant gains unjust profits, contrary to which the non-party 2 who is the victim takes double benefit or is unfairly exempted from the liability. Rather, even if considering the above legal principles, the plaintiff cannot be held the defendant 2.

In conclusion, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the indemnity relationship between the liability insurer and the school safety mutual aid association under the School Safety Act. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jae-hyung (Presiding Justice)