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(영문) 대법원 1976. 2. 24. 선고 75누128 전원합의체 판결
[갑종배당소득세과세처분취소][집24(1)행,39;공1976.4.1.(533) 9009]
Main Issues

Whether the principle of dumpism applies to an appeal suit seeking revocation in the sense of declaring the invalidity of an administrative disposition as a matter of course

Summary of Judgment

In an appeal litigation as stipulated in the former part of Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act that seeks to revoke or change an administrative disposition on the ground that it is illegal, the principle of sub-delivery as stipulated in Article 2 of the same Act shall apply to an appeal litigation as stipulated in the former part of Article 1 of the same Act. Therefore, in a lawsuit seeking revocation on the grounds that the head of a tax office, which is an administrative agency, should undergo a method of appeal for re-examination and reexamination as stipulated in the National Tax Examination Act, which was first enforced at the time, and even in a case seeking revocation in the sense that it declares the invalidity of the said disposition, it is an illegal lawsuit that does not meet the requirements for filing a lawsuit, as long as it is an appeal litigation, in that it seeks revocation by the competent agency

Plaintiff-Appellant

Daesung Industrial Company

Defendant-Appellee

Litigation Performers of the Director of the Supreme Court of the District Public Administration, Rule 5

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 74Gu360 decided May 7, 1975

Text

The appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal by the representative of the Plaintiff company.

In the so-called appeal litigation of the court below under the former part of Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act that seeks revocation or alteration on the ground that an administrative disposition is unlawful, the principle of good faith as stipulated in Article 2 of the same Act shall apply to the appeal litigation of the court below for the revocation of the national tax imposition disposition against the plaintiff of the defendant administrative agency on the ground that it is unlawful or unjust. Thus, in the lawsuit for the revocation of the national tax imposition disposition of this case against the plaintiff of the defendant administrative agency, it should be done through a re-inspection, examination and reexamination as stipulated in the National Tax Examination Request Act (repealed as of April 1, 1975), which was enforced first at the time of the first time, through the method of appeal over the three stages of the review, examination and reexamination. Thus, the court below'

In addition, the plaintiff's claim includes the purport of seeking revocation within the meaning of declaring the invalidity of a taxation disposition by the defendant. However, in this sense, as long as an appeal suit is filed in that it seeks revocation by a competent authority with respect to an administrative disposition existing on the part of the defendant, the above procedure of the previous trial cannot be considered as a litigation requirement, and as such, a claim without the previous trial procedure is not different in that it does not meet the litigation requirement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 70Nu125, Feb. 25, 1971; 67Nu119, Dec. 9, 1969; 429Nu116, Oct. 12, 1961; 207Nu16, Oct. 14, 1961; 207Nu16, Oct. 14, 1971; 205Nu16, Oct. 17, 2017).

Therefore, the lawsuit of this case is not dismissed in the end because the court below did not make a clear judgment as to this point, but dismissed the lawsuit for other reasons because the plaintiff has no interest in the lawsuit of this case. Thus, it is right to maintain its conclusion.

Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal which attacks the judgment of the court below is without merit. This appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost the judgment of the court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all the remaining judges except for the interest of the judge of the Supreme Court, Kim Young-young, the judge of the Supreme Court, the judge of the Supreme Court, the nurse of the Supreme Court, the replacement of the judge of the Supreme Court, the police officer of the Supreme Court, and the number of the

In this regard, the former judge of the Supreme Court, Kim Young-chul, the former judge of the Supreme Court, the two judges of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court decision

The small number of opinions of the Korean Supreme Court Judge, the Korean Supreme Court Judge, the Korean Supreme Court Judge and the Supreme Court Judge are as follows:

As seen above, the Majority Opinion has the authority to take an administrative disposition that exists on the external basis.

Since the cancellation is sought, even if it is sought for cancellation in the sense of seeking confirmation of nullity, it is demanded to go through a prior trial procedure by viewing it as a part of an appeal litigation.

However, in the sense of seeking confirmation of invalidity, seeking revocation of an administrative disposition is merely a mere form that disregards the substance of the administrative disposition and forms only, even though it takes the form of an appeal litigation, it is reasonable to deem that it is not necessary to take a prior trial procedure in such a case. If it is required to take a prior trial procedure even in such a case, it is not desirable for the court to impose the burden on the parties and to impose the burden on the parties. Furthermore, it is highly likely that the balance between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff would be lost compared with the Plaintiff seeking confirmation of invalidity of the administrative disposition from the beginning.

From this point of view, the minority opinions support and oppose the majority opinions that have recently been decided by the decisions (Supreme Court Decision 73Nu215 delivered on April 22, 1975, Supreme Court Decision 74Nu96 delivered on May 28, 1974, Supreme Court Decision 73Nu104 delivered on December 11, 1973).

Justices Kim Jong-young (Presiding Justice)

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