[1] The meaning of "the act of suggesting patients" under Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act

[2] Whether the payment of the price to a hospital sending patients constitutes a private act under Article 25(3) of the Medical Service Act (affirmative)

[3] Whether it is a blanket crime to pay the price to a person who has continuously forwarded a patient for a given period whenever he/she sent the patient (affirmative)

[4] In the case of a blanket crime, the specific degree of the facts charged

[1] "Referral and good offices" under Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act refers to the act of mediating or assisting patients to enter into a contract for medical treatment delegation between a patient and a specific medical institution or a specific medical person; "inducing" refers to the act of inducing patients to enter into a contract for medical treatment delegation with a specific medical institution or a specific medical person by deception or cruel means; "inducing" refers to the act of inducing others to enter into a contract for medical treatment entrustment with a specific medical institution or a specific medical person; and "inducing such act" refers to the act of inducing others to resolve to introduce, mediate, or induce patients to a specific medical institution or a specific medical person for profit-making purposes; and as a result, the determination of whether a certain act constitutes a private act shall be based on the general public as to whether the act constitutes an act of inducing or inducing patients for profit-making purposes, but as long as the act is similar to the act of inducing a specific medical institution or a specific medical person, the act in question should be introduced or required to introduce the act as a result of inducing or inducing.

[2] If a medical institution or a medical person provides a person who introduced, arranged, or entices a patient to himself/herself with an attitude to provide the patient with money under any pretext, such as case expenses, acceptance expenses, cleaning expenses, cleaning expenses, emergency treatment expenses, etc. without any legal obligation, it would be sufficient to have the medical institution or medical person resolve to introduce, arrange, or induce the patient to receive money from the patient in the future. Thus, the act of paying money by a medical institution or medical person constitutes a private act prohibited under Article 25(3) of the Medical Service Act, and such private act cannot be justified on the ground that it is widely conducted in the medical industry or that it is a practice.

[3] Where a number of acts falling under the name of the same crime continues to be conducted for a certain period under the single and continuous criminal intent and the legal benefits from such damage are the same, each act should be punished by a single comprehensive crime. Thus, where the price is paid each time when the patient was sent to the person who sent the patient continuously for a certain period, it constitutes an inclusive crime.

[4] In the case of an inclusive crime, even if not specifically specified for each act forming part of the crime, the whole crime, the time and completion period, method of the crime, frequency of the crime, the sum of the damages, and the victim or the other party are specified. In addition, since the facts charged in the indictment is required to limit the object of the trial to the court and facilitate the exercise of defense by specifying the scope of defense against the defendant, it is desirable to clearly specify the facts that are possible, such as the date, time, place, method, etc. of the crime, and so long as it is necessary, it may hinder the institution and maintenance of the public prosecution. Thus, it is sufficient to specify the time and place of the crime to the extent that it does not conflict with the time and time of the crime, and to the extent that the territorial jurisdiction can be measured, and in the method and method, it is sufficient to specify the elements of the crime to the extent that it indicates the constituent elements

[1] Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act / [2] Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act / [3] Article 37 of the Criminal Act / [4] Article 37 of the Criminal Act, Article 254 of the Criminal Procedure

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Do1765 delivered on February 9, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1010) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 96Do417 delivered on April 23, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1649) Supreme Court Decision 97Do508 delivered on June 27, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 2424), Supreme Court Decision 97Do2609 delivered on December 26, 199 (Gong198Sang, 475) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 92Do1532 delivered on September 14, 1992 (Gong192, 2932), Supreme Court Decision 97Do3949 delivered on September 25, 199, 197 (Gong305Do1974 delivered on September 197).

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendants

Attorneys Kim Jong-soo et al.

Suwon District Court Decision 97No153 delivered on April 8, 1997

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to each of the grounds of appeal No. 1 (the grounds of appeal regarding the public offering) by the Defendants’ defense counsel

Examining the evidence of each of the first instance judgment maintained by the court below in light of the records, the court below's maintenance of the first instance judgment which acknowledged the fact that Defendant 1 conspired with the managing director, Nonindicted 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, the managing director of the first instance court, and Defendant 3 committed each of the crimes in collusion with the managing director, Nonindicted 3, the managing director of the first instance court is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to co-principal, violation of the rules of evidence,

2. As to the grounds of appeal No. 2 by the Defendants’ defense counsel (the grounds of appeal regarding the act of deception as stipulated in Article 25(3) of the Medical Service Act)

Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act provides that "any person shall not introduce, arrange, or induce a patient to a medical institution or a medical person for profit." The term "inducing or arranging a patient" refers to the act of inducing a patient to enter into a medical treatment delegation contract with a specific medical institution or a medical person by deceit or cruel means, and the term "inducing a patient" refers to the act of inducing a patient to enter into a medical treatment delegation contract with a specific medical institution or a medical person, and the term "inducing a patient" refers to the act of inducing another person to introduce, mediate, or induce a specific medical institution or a medical person for profit. Determination of whether an act constitutes an act of inducing a patient shall be based on the general public to determine whether an act constitutes an act of inducing a patient to introduce, arrange, or induce a specific medical institution or a medical person for profit. In addition, as long as an act of inducing a person to commit a crime is similar to the act of inducing a person to commit a crime, it shall be limited to the actual act of inducing or inducing the patient.

Therefore, in a case where a medical institution or a medical person, without any legal obligation, provided a person who introduced, arranged, or induced a patient to himself/herself with an attitude to provide the patient with money in return for the future, regardless of the name of the case cost, acceptance cost, cleaning cost, cleaning cost, emergency treatment cost, etc., it would be sufficient for the medical institution or the medical person to resolve to introduce, arrange, or induce the patient to receive the money in return for the future. Therefore, the act of paying money by a medical institution or the medical person constitutes a private act prohibited by Article 25(3) of the Medical Service Act, and it cannot be justified on the ground that such a private act is widely conducted in the medical industry at present, or that it is a practice.

In light of the records, the court below's decision that recognized that the defendants paid money to the persons who introduced, mediated, or induced traffic accident patients as stated in its decision and maintained the judgment of the court of first instance which judged that this constitutes a private act under Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act is just, and there is no violation of the legal principles of Article 25 (3) of the Medical Service Act or any violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete hearing, or omission of judgment, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. All arguments are without merit.

3. As to each of the grounds of appeal No. 3 (the grounds of appeal regarding the specification of the facts charged) by the defense counsel of Defendant 1 and Defendant 3

If a number of acts falling under the same name of crime continues to be committed for a certain period under the single and continuous criminal intent and the damage legal interests are the same, each act shall be punished by a single comprehensive crime (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do417, Apr. 23, 1996). Thus, if the Defendants offered money to each of their own persons who introduce, mediates, and entices traffic accident patients, to the persons who introduce, mediates, and induce traffic accident patients in the future, they shall be provided with case expenses under the single and continuous criminal intent to purchase them by expressing their intention to purchase them, and if Defendant 1 provided a single and continuous criminal intent to purchase them from January 1, 1993 to October 1996, Defendant 1 introduced and arranged a traffic accident to Nonindicted 4 from around 1993 to KRW 10,060,000 and KRW 5870,000,000,000 for each of the transportation officers belonging to the Song Police Station, thereby inducing or arranging the traffic accident by each of the patients from around 10, 190.

In the case of an inclusive crime, even if it is not specifically specified as to the individual acts forming part of the crime, if the whole crime is committed, the crime is specified by specifying the time, termination period, method of the crime, frequency of the crime, the total amount of damages, and the victim or the other party (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do414, May 30, 1997). In addition, since the facts charged in the indictment are required to limit the object of the trial against the court and facilitate the exercise of defense by specifying the scope of defense against the defendant, it is desirable to clearly specify the facts as far as possible, such as the time, place, method, etc. of the crime, but if it is necessary, it may interfere with the institution and maintenance of the prosecution. Thus, the date and time of the crime may not conflict with those of double prosecution or prescription, the place may be able to estimate territorial jurisdiction, and it is sufficient to specify the elements of the crime to the extent that it is possible to clarify the constituent elements of the crime (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do235, Dec. 25, 1992).

Therefore, in light of the records, each of the facts charged against the Defendants is deemed to constitute a crime by comprehensively taking into account each of the acts committed by the Defendants for a certain period of time, and thus, specified the facts charged by specifying the whole period and completion period of the crime, method of the crime, the total sum of the amounts provided for the private act, and the other party of the privateism. Even if the other party of the act constituting part of the part of the facts charged against Defendant 1 stated “the traffic police officer, etc. belonging to the Songpa Police Station, etc.” among the individual acts constituting one of the facts charged against the Defendant 1, the purport of the facts charged is that the Defendant: (a) provided a certain amount of money without asking the traffic police officers in the jurisdiction of the Defendant to whom the traffic accident occurred; and (b) provided the introduction, good offices, or inducement of the patient by paying a certain amount of money whenever he takes aboard the victim of the traffic accident; and (c) therefore, it cannot be deemed that the other party of the private act is not clear that it

In this purport, the judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the specification of the facts charged. All arguments are without merit.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)