[1] The method of remedying Gap's rights in a case where Gap's possessor of land, the prescriptive acquisition of which has been completed, obtained a provisional disposition against the owner and completed the registration, after completing the registration, the ownership of the land exceeds Byung

[2] In a case where a person purchases land from an unentitled person or purchases and occupies a basic property of a school foundation without permission from the competent authority, whether such possession is possession frequently (affirmative with qualification)

[3] In a case where co-owners on the registry possess each specific part of co-owned land in trust with the belief that they co-owner co-owned land co-owned land co-owned, whether each possession is a possession of a third party by nature

[1] A person liable for the registration of ownership transfer for the completion of the acquisition by prescription is the owner at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription, and thereafter a person who purchased the real estate from the owner and completed the registration of ownership transfer shall not be deemed to succeed to the above obligation, barring any special circumstances. The same applies to a case where the possessor whose acquisition by prescription period has expired obtains a decision of prohibition of disposal and completes the registration in order to preserve the right to claim the registration of ownership transfer for the completion of the acquisition by prescription against the owner at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription. Even after the registration of prohibition of real estate disposal is effective, the status of the provisional disposition obligee alone does not have the right to claim the cancellation of the registration made after the provisional disposition is entered, and the provisional disposition obligee

[2] Where a purchaser of land acquires possession of the land in accordance with a sales contract, it shall be interpreted that the purchaser's possession of the land is the intention of possession, unless there are special circumstances, even if the purchase and sale of the land is not possible as a sale of another person's land. Further, even a purchaser of basic property of a school foundation does not commence possession with the knowledge of the conclusion of the contract without permission of the competent administrative agency.

[3] Unless there exist any special circumstances, even if one co-owner occupies all of the co-owners, it shall be deemed to hold another co-owner's share within the limit of the ratio of shares of the other co-owners due to the nature of the source of authority. However, in a case where co-owners believe that each part of the entire area of the land before the partition is divided, and have completed the registration of ownership transfer as to the portion equivalent to the approximate area of the portion of each possession, even if the co-owners are the co-owners of each land, their possession cannot be deemed to be the possession by the nature of the source

[1] Article 245(1) of the Civil Act, Articles 714 and 719(3) of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 197(1) and 245(1) of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 197(1), 245(1), and 262 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da12349 delivered on February 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 101), Supreme Court Decision 93Da5066, 50673 delivered on April 12, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1422) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da37751 delivered on May 8, 1992 (Gong1992, 18194 delivered on December 8, 1992 (Gong193, 412), Supreme Court Decision 93Da186 delivered on October 12, 1993 (Gong193, 193Ha, 3065) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da37751 delivered on April 13, 1994 (Gong94, 194, 193Da19493, Apr. 193, 1995)

Plaintiff 1 and six others (Attorney Lee Dai-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

School Foundation, a Private Teaching Institute, and eight others (Defendant's Counsel for the defendant-appellant and three others)

Defendant 10 and eight others

Seoul High Court Decision 95Na6108 delivered on November 9, 1995

All appeals filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant Education Institute of Education, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9 are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant.

1. We examine the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal.

According to the records, the plaintiffs' claim of this case is clear that they sought the implementation of the procedure for the transfer registration of ownership for each portion of the above land owned by each of the plaintiffs as to the above plaintiffs' co-ownership. It is the owner at the time of completion of the period for the transfer registration of ownership for the completion of the period, and the purchaser of real estate thereafter can not be viewed as succeeding to the above obligation unless there are any special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da5066, 50673 delivered on April 12, 1994). This is the same as in the case where the possessor who completed the period for the transfer registration of ownership receives the provisional disposition against the owner at the time of completion of the acquisition, and completes the registration for the transfer registration for the above part for the execution of the transfer registration of ownership for the above 10-party 2's ownership, and the remaining right to claim the transfer registration for the transfer registration for the completion of the acquisition of ownership for the above 9-1's ownership after the completion of the period can not be claimed from the plaintiff 194.

In addition, if the plaintiff 3 exercises the above non-party 1's right to claim the transfer of ownership on the ground of the completion of the acquisition by prescription against the defendants of the above non-party 1 on behalf of the above non-party 1, the plaintiff cannot seek the above plaintiff's direct execution of the registration procedure even after the plaintiff demanded the above non-party 1 to perform such procedure. Meanwhile, the plaintiff's right to claim the transfer of ownership on the ground of the restoration of the real name can not be claimed against the above plaintiff's own execution of the transfer registration procedure directly against the present registered titleholder based on the ownership in a way to restore the registration name (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 89Meu12398 delivered on November 27, 190). Thus, the possessor for whom the acquisition by prescription is completed cannot seek the implementation of the transfer registration procedure based on the restoration of the real name.

In the same purport, the judgment of the court below which rejected the plaintiffs' primary and conjunctive claim against the defendant 10 and the plaintiff 3's claim against the defendants (including the conjunctive claim against the defendant 10) is justifiable, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the effect of the registration of ownership transfer and provisional disposition for the restoration of the real name as in the lawsuit.

All arguments are without merit.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal by the Defendant Education Institute, the Defendant 2, the Defendant 3, the Defendant 4, the Defendant 5, the Defendant 6, the Defendant 7, the Defendant 8, and the Defendant 9.

(A) As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, and Defendant 6’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and Defendant 7, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9

Where a purchaser of land acquires the ownership of the land in accordance with a sale and purchase contract, the possession of the purchaser shall be deemed to be the possession of the land by the intention of the purchaser, barring any special circumstances, even though the sale and purchase of the land is not possible as a sale and purchase of another person's land (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da42494, Dec. 8, 1992; 93Da1886, Oct. 12, 1993); and even a person who purchased basic property of a school foundation, even if he/she purchased the basic property of the school foundation without permission of the competent agency, if he/she does not commence possession while he/she is aware of the fact that the contract was concluded without permission of the competent agency, such possession shall not be deemed to be the possession (see, e.g.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the remaining plaintiffs or all of them purchased each part of their possession from the non-party 3, defendant school foundation, or defendant 3 as stated in its holding, and held that possession of the remaining plaintiffs and all of them is presumed to be an independent possession. The plaintiff 1, 2, and 7 purchased the remaining part of their possession from the above non-party 3, who was the original owner of the land before the division of this case, on the condition that the above non-party 3 was decided as a legitimate owner in the lawsuit claiming cancellation of ownership registration. Since the above non-party 3's non-party 4 and the non-party 3's non-party 3's non-party 1 and the non-party 4's non-party 5's non-party-party-owner's non-party-owner's non-party-owner's non-party-owner's non-party-owner's non-party-party right's non-party-party right's non-party-party right's purchase was reversed or invalid.

Meanwhile, co-owners cannot be deemed to possess shares within the scope of shares held by other co-owners in light of the nature of their title (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da38904, Feb. 23, 1993). However, according to the facts and records established by the court below, the above non-party 3's claim against the non-party 3 in the above lawsuit between the non-party 3, the non-party 4, and the non-party 4 was rejected on around 1972, but the above non-party 4's claim was partly accepted, which eventually became final and conclusive as the head of the school foundation and the non-party 4 owned shares 5/8, and thereafter, the non-party 2/8's share in the above non-party 4-5/8's share was transferred to the defendant 2, who acquired the remaining part of the land from the above co-owners or the remaining owners of the above non-party 2, who acquired the right to purchase the land in question.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of facts against the rules of evidence or in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the disposal of the jointly owned property and the possession independently.

In addition, the presumption of independent possession cannot be reversed solely on the basis that the registration of provisional disposition by Defendant 9, etc. was made on a part of the shares of each land of this case and the remaining plaintiffs knew of such circumstances. In the prescription period for the acquisition of possession, the possession is in good faith and without negligence.

All arguments are without merit.

(B) As to the ground of appeal No. 3 by Defendants 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6

A lawsuit claiming the performance of the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer for the portion acquired by prescription against co-owners on the ground of the completion of prescriptive acquisition cannot be deemed a necessary co-litigation (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da3280, 32897, Dec. 27, 1994). The Plaintiffs do not seek the partition of co-ownership, and thus, the lawsuit of this case cannot be deemed unlawful on the ground that Nonparty 6, a part of co-owners of each land of this case, is not a party to the lawsuit of this case, as in the theory of lawsuit, on the ground that the lawsuit of this

It is not reasonable to discuss that the instant lawsuit is a requisite co-litigation.

(C) As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 4, 5, and 6 by Defendants 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6

The debate is about facts that the court below did not recognize or about the legal relationship of land in Eunpyeong-gu Seoul ( Address omitted), which was not determined by the court below, and the judgment of the court below on the recognition of the court below does not seem to have a

All arguments are without merit.

3. Therefore, all appeals by the plaintiffs and the above defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)