[1] In a case where the possessor who asserts the prescriptive acquisition uses the possession of the former possessor, the choice at the stage of recourse (affirmative) and the selection at the time of voluntary selection during the period of possession of the former possessor (negative)

[2] The case holding that the starting point of the acquisition by prescription is different for each co-owner, who is a registered titleholder, by different stages of using the former possessor's possession

[1] In a case where the occupancy, which is the basis of the prescriptive acquisition, continues to continue over the statutory period, the prescriptive acquisition shall be the starting point of the commencement of the possession, and the person who asserts the prescriptive acquisition shall not choose the starting point at his own discretion. However, in the case where the possession is succeeded in succession in succession, the person who asserts the completion of the prescriptive acquisition has the right to assert only his own possession, or, at the same time, his own possession and the possession of the former possessor. In addition, in a case where the former possessor claims the possession, the person who asserts it at any stage has the right to choose to assert at any time the possession at any time. However, in addition, in a case where the former possessor claims the possession at any time, the former possessor cannot choose at any time during the period of possession at any time, and such legal principle cannot be viewed as

[2] The case holding that each co-owner, who is a registered titleholder, separately recognizes the starting point of the acquisition by prescription as different stages of using possession by all co-owners

[1] Articles 199 and 245(1) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 199 and 245(1) of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 80Da2614 delivered on April 14, 1981 (Gong1981, 1390), Supreme Court Decision 81Da826 delivered on January 26, 1982 (Gong1982, 298), Supreme Court Decision 91Da26577 delivered on October 22, 1991, Supreme Court Decision 92Da9968, 9975 delivered on December 11, 1992 (Gong193, 444)

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Attorney Choi Young-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Jeonju District Court Decision 96Na2494 delivered on November 21, 1997

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below concluded the following facts based on the evidence of the court below. The non-party 1 concluded that the non-party 1 occupied the above part of the land and the above part of the land, which was delivered to the non-party 3 omitted, with the knowledge that the above part of the land was owned by the non-party 1 and the above part of the land was owned by the non-party 3 omitted due to the following facts: the non-party 1 occupied the above part of the land and the above part of the land, which was delivered to the non-party 3 omitted; the non-party 1 occupied the above part of the land, including the above part of the cement gate and the pent roof 1 omitted; the non-party 1 and the part of the land of this case, which was located in the non-party 3 omitted; and the non-party 4 and the non-party 5 were sold to the non-party 3 without the permission of the above part of the above land, and the defendant did not err in the misapprehensioning the above part of the ground for appeal.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In cases where the occupancy, which forms the basis of the acquisition by prescription, continues to remain above the statutory period, the acquisition by prescription shall begin at the time when the possession, which serves as the basis for the commencement thereof, is the starting point of the acquisition by prescription, and the person who asserts the acquisition by prescription shall not choose the starting point at his own discretion. However, in cases where the possession is succeeded in succession, the person who asserts the completion of the acquisition by prescription has the right to assert only his own possession, or at the same time he/she may assert both his/her own possession and the possession. In addition, in cases where he/she claims the possession of the former possessor, the person who asserts it at any stage has the right to choose the starting point of the possession at any discretion during the period of possession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da2614, Apr. 14, 1981; 81Da826, Jan. 26, 1982; 201Da267584, Oct. 22, 1991).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the time of commencement of possession of the land of this case against Plaintiff 1, the starting date of possession by Plaintiff 1, and the acquisition by prescription against Plaintiff 2 was completed at the expiration of 20 years from the starting date of possession by Nonparty 4, respectively. In light of the above legal principles and records, it is reasonable in light of the above legal principles and records, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the starting date of possession and acquisition by prescription, or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the starting date of possession by autonomy and acquisition by prescription as otherwise alleged in

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)