(a) The case holding that the disciplinary action cannot be deemed null and void due to the request for disciplinary action by the head of the general affairs office on an employee who is not a general affairs department, where the personnel management committee provides that "request for disciplinary action shall be submitted to the executive officer, each department, and the head of the department in charge of personnel management." The head of the department in charge of personnel management shall refer it to the deliberation of the personnel committee

(b) The case holding that even if a notice of attendance of the personnel committee on the person subject to disciplinary action was given before the day, it cannot be viewed as an unlawful notice because it was brupted to the extent that it would not have enough time to prepare a vindication and supporting materials, and that the disciplinary procedure cannot be viewed as null and void because it violated the provision on the right to make a statement after the request for a retrial.

C. Limits on the legitimacy of industrial action

(d) The case holding that an act of arbitrarily copying minutes kept by the chief of the general affairs division without obvious material by filing a complaint or accusation with the representative of the workplace under his/her jurisdiction, or submitting a petition, etc. containing any content that criticizes his/her character, exceeds the scope of legitimate industrial action or legitimate industrial activities, even if it is based upon the total will of its members;

A. According to the employer's personnel regulations, "request for disciplinary action shall be submitted by the executives, the departments, and the head of the department in charge of personnel affairs. The head of the department in charge of personnel affairs in receipt of the request shall refer it to the deliberation of the personnel committee, and the request for disciplinary action shall not be deemed null and void on the ground that the request for disciplinary action may be made by not only the head of the department to which the officer or the person to be disciplined belongs but also the head of other department to which the person to be disciplined does not belong, but also the head of the department to which the person to be disciplined belongs may request disciplinary action only for the employees belonging to each department and the head of the office in case of the office, and even if the above provision constitutes a violation of the procedure, it cannot be deemed null and void on the ground that the general secretary, who is the head of the department in charge of personnel affairs, referred the request for disciplinary action to the deliberation of the personnel committee.

B. The case holding that even if a notice of attendance of the personnel committee on the person subject to disciplinary action was made before the day, it is imminent that it was conducted without sufficient time to prepare a vindication and explanatory material, so it cannot be viewed as unlawful notice that the purpose of guaranteeing right to make a statement as stipulated in the personnel management regulations is unreasonable, and that if he appeared in the personnel committee and made a statement for his own interest after receiving the notice of dismissal from office, the disciplinary procedure cannot be viewed as invalid because it violated the provisions on guaranteeing right to make a statement.

(c) even if a trade union’s activities are contrary to social rules, the trade union’s justification shall be lost, and in particular, an industrial action shall be justified only if the means and methods are to force the employer to compromise by passive interference with the normal operation of its operations;

(d) The case holding that, without obvious material, filing a complaint or accusation with an investigative agency on a representative of a workplace under his/her control, or filing a petition, etc. containing any content of criticism against his/her character, and copying without permission minutes kept by the chief of the general affairs office exceeds the scope of legitimate industrial actions or legitimate industrial cooperative activities even if those minutes are made by the total will of its members;

(c)Article 27(c) of the Labor Standards Act; Article 39(1) of the Trade Union Act; Article 3 of the Trade Dispute Mediation Act;

B. Supreme Court Decision 78Nu123 delivered on November 27, 1979 (Gong1980, 12427) (Gong1991, 960 delivered on February 8, 1991) 91Da13731 delivered on July 23, 1991 (Gong1991, 2231 delivered on October 12, 1990) (Gong1990, 234 delivered on May 12, 1992). Supreme Court Decision 91Da34523 delivered on May 12, 1992 (Gong192,1838)

Plaintiff

Attorney Park Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na21765 delivered on October 23, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to the violation of disciplinary procedure

According to Article 33 of the Regulations on the Enforcement of the Personnel Regulations of the defendant corporation, "the request for disciplinary action shall be submitted by the executive officers, the division heads, and the head of the department in charge of personnel affairs. The head of the personnel management department in receipt of the request shall refer it to the deliberation of the personnel committee." Thus, the request for disciplinary action may not be deemed null and void on the ground that not only the executive officers or the head of the department to which the person to be disciplined belongs, but also the head of other department to which the person to be disciplined does not belong, but also the head of the department to which the person to be disciplined belongs, in the case of the head of each department and the head of the office, may request disciplinary action only against the employee belonging to the relevant department, and in the case of the head of the office, it is possible to request disciplinary action only against the employee belonging to the relevant department. Therefore, even if the request for disciplinary action against the plaintiff constitutes a violation of

In addition, according to the records, at around 15:40 on December 27, 1989, the plaintiff requested that the personnel committee of defendant corporation be given an opportunity to attend the meeting and make a statement at 09:00 on the following day, and thereafter the committee requested the postponement of the meeting. However, the personnel committee decided to dismiss the plaintiff with the consent of all the seven members after completing deliberation on the disciplinary cause without the plaintiff's attendance. The chairperson of defendant corporation was aware that the dismissal was made on the day before the day, but he was conducted prior to the day, but he did not have sufficient time to prepare vindications and supporting documents, so it cannot be viewed as an unlawful notification that lacks the purpose of guaranteeing the right to make a statement as stipulated in the personnel management regulations (see Supreme Court Decision 78Nu123, Nov. 27, 1979). In addition, the plaintiff cannot be deemed as being given an opportunity to attend the meeting without having expressed his opportunity to attend the above personnel committee's opinion, despite the fact that the plaintiff did not have been given an opportunity to attend the above personnel management committee.

In addition, the plaintiff's appeal against the above dismissal on December 31, 1989 is dismissed, and the plaintiff requested a review to the personnel committee on January 6, 1990, and was present at the personnel committee for review held on January 10:00 of the same month and made a statement favorable to himself/herself. Thus, the ground that the disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff violate the provision on the right to make a statement is no longer acceptable.

Therefore, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the dismissal of the plaintiff against the same purport is null and void due to its procedural illegality, and there is no illegality in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to disciplinary proceedings such as the theory of lawsuit. The argument is without merit.

2. As to the existence of grounds for disciplinary action

According to Gap evidence Nos. 1-2 (Notice of Disciplinary Action and Reasons) and Eul evidence Nos. 11-1 and 5 (Minutes of Personnel Committee) as cited by the court of first instance, each of the above disciplinary causes causes against the president of the defendant corporation at the time of original adjudication against the plaintiff shall be the violation of the Labor Standards Act at the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office on February 1989 and around March 1989, and each of the violations of the Trade Union Act at around June 18, 1989; and the plaintiff's negligence in conducting his duties to inform the National Land Unification Board of the fact that it was not a ground for disciplinary action after the deliberation of the Personnel Committee, and it is clear that the court below erred by including the same ground for disciplinary action against the plaintiff within the same period as that of the defendant corporation at the time of original adjudication against the plaintiff, and it cannot be said that the court below erred by misapprehending the Labor Standards Act No. 984, Oct. 18, 198.

However, the court below's findings of facts as to the remainder of the grounds for disciplinary action, except for the facts as seen earlier, are just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence, and further, even if the plaintiff's act, which had been deliberated by the personnel committee, constitutes the grounds for disciplinary action stipulated in the personnel management regulations, and only based on the grounds for disciplinary action, it cannot be deemed that the dismissal of the plaintiff constitutes abuse of discretionary power with regard to disciplinary action because it has considerably lost validity under social norms.

In addition, even if a trade union's activities are against the social norms, the trade union's legitimacy is lost if it is against the social rules, and in particular, an industrial action is justified only if the means and method are to force an employer by hindering the normal operation of its business. Thus, without obvious materials as seen above (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do1431, Oct. 12, 1990). In addition, it shall be deemed that the act of dismissal of the plaintiff is null and void because it goes beyond the scope of legitimate industrial action or legitimate industrial action even if it goes beyond the total scope of members' activities, and it shall not be deemed that there is no evidence to deem the dismissal of the plaintiff as grounds for disciplinary action in this case because the defendant corporation merely suspicions the plaintiff's activities as the chairperson of the labor union and actually causes it to exclude the plaintiff from the defendant corporation.

Therefore, the argument of misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles as to disciplinary reasons such as the theory of lawsuit is eventually groundless.

There is no reason for this issue.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)