(a) Whether the indication of a party is corrected by successors in a lawsuit filed against the deceased;

(b) Whether a retrial is appropriate where a conviction is found after the filing of retrial;

(c) Procedures for nationalization of real estate registered in the name of Japanese Army and Army from the sunset;

D. Whether a witness’s false statement constitutes grounds for retrial, which does not affect the text of the judgment

E. Whether the retrial court is detained by the contents of a conviction that became grounds for retrial

A. In a case where a plaintiff who had already died after the decision for retrial became final and conclusive, and subsequently filed a lawsuit for retrial, the de facto defendant is the deceased's heir, but it is reasonable to interpret that the deceased's heir is merely a misunderstanding of the indication. Therefore, the petition for lawsuit lawsuit filed by the heir to correct the indication of the party is lawful.

B. In a case where the false statement of a witness under Article 422(1)7 of the Civil Procedure Act as grounds for retrial serves as evidence of a final judgment, in principle, there should be a judgment of conviction of perjury. However, if a final judgment of conviction has been rendered even when a lawsuit for retrial was filed without waiting the final judgment, and a judgment of conviction has been rendered even when the lawsuit for retrial was filed, such lawsuit is lawful

(c) Real estate in the Republic of Korea registered in the name of the Army, an agency of the Japanese government before the date of the disaster, is property devolved to the Government of the Republic of Korea under Article 2 of the Military Administration Act and Article 5 of the first Agreement on Finance and Property between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America. In order to nationalize the property devolving upon the State, each Ministry shall make proposals and obtain approval from the President via the Prime Minister under Article 4 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of

(d) Even if the false statement of the witness becomes evidence of the judgment, if the recognition of the witness's false statement does not affect the judgment of the order, or if the witness's testimony does not affect the judgement of the order, even if the witness's testimony is false, the testimony is quoted at home or additionally in the reason of the judgment, or the testimony of perjury has no relation to the recognition of the issue, even if the testimony of perjury is excluded, there is no ground for retrial.

(e) The retrial court shall not be bound by the final judgment of perjury, but may freely render a substantial judgment on the existence of facts such as the contents of the conviction, and may reject the request for retrial even if new evidence has not been submitted if it considers that the judgment subject to retrial is justifiable as a result of that judgment.

A. Articles 211 and 227(2) of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 422(1)4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State. Article 422(1)7(e) of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 430 of the same Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 69Da1840 delivered on June 30, 1971; Supreme Court Decision 70Da1271 delivered on September 27, 1972; Supreme Court Decision 70Da1271 delivered on September 17, 1970; Supreme Court Decision 72Da1822 delivered on November 28, 1972; Supreme Court Decision 74Da1643 delivered on July 22, 1975; Supreme Court Decision 80Da915 delivered on September 9, 1980

[Defendant-Appellant] Defendant 1 and 7 others (Law Firm Jong-jin et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant Kim Jong-hwan et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-appellant

The legal representative of the Republic of Korea and an associate of Justice

Seoul High Court Decision 78Na16 delivered on January 29, 1982

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal by the supplementary intervenor Kim Jae-hwan, et al. (the supplementary appeal by the supplementary intervenor attorney Park Jong-chul, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff Lee Jae-gu et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant and four others, except for the plaintiffs and the above plaintiffs, and the remaining plaintiffs and the supplementary intervenor Kim Jong-chul, et al., Counsel for the supplementary appeal by the supplementary intervenor Kim Jong-sung, et al., Counsel for the supplementary appeal by the supplementary intervenor Lee Jong-chul-gu et al., was submitted after the deadline, and the above grounds of appeal are also examined.).

(1) As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 1-2 of the Grounds of Appeal for the said Chuncheon

In a case where a plaintiff who had already died after the decision for a retrial became final and conclusive, and subsequently filed a lawsuit for a retrial, it is reasonable to interpret that the actual defendant is the heir of the deceased, but it is only a misunderstanding of the indication (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da1840, Jun. 30, 1971). Since the court below's opinion above is a party member's decision that it is reasonable to interpret that the defendant is the deceased's heir, it is reasonable (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da1840, Jun. 30, 1971). Under the above opinion, the court below decided that the defendant, who had been the plaintiff of the judgment subject to a retrial, was aware of the fact of death of the deceased party, and received the request for a re-adjudication to correct the indication of the party as the heir, and then the court below's decision to accept the request for a re-adjudication as legitimate. The Supreme Court's decision in the lawsuit is just

(2) As to the grounds of appeal No. 2-1 and the first part of the grounds of appeal for the appeal for the above Switzerland No. 1, 1978, the theory of the lawsuit is to be deemed to have been aware of the grounds for retrial on the day when the judgment of conviction against the non-party 1 became final and conclusive on April 8, 1978, and if the result was notified to the Supreme Prosecutors' Office on the same day, the defendant represented by the Minister of Justice was aware of the grounds for retrial on the same day. Even though the court below's notice of the result without delay after the pronouncement of a criminal judgment pursuant to Article 32 of the Rules on Court Affairs is merely notifying the prosecutor's office of the contents of the judgment, it cannot be known about the facts of the judgment, especially since the prosecutor's office received the notice of the result of the criminal judgment against the non-party 1, and it cannot be viewed that the defendant's legal representative or the defendant's country was aware of the grounds for retrial of this case, which does not constitute a legitimate ground for retrial, contrary to the legal principles of appeal No.1.

(3) As to the latter part of No. 1-1 of the Grounds for Appeal by the Jininsom

In principle, where a witness’s false statement under Article 422(1)7 of the Civil Procedure Act is a ground for retrial when the final judgment became final and conclusive, a final judgment of conviction should be made. However, it should be interpreted that there is a final and conclusive judgment of conviction even if a lawsuit for retrial was filed without waiting for the final and conclusive judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 72Meu3, Jun. 27, 1972). In this regard, even if a lawsuit for retrial was instituted prior to the final and conclusive judgment of conviction of perjury, as long as the judgment of conviction became final and conclusive prior to the final and conclusive judgment of conviction prior to the judgment of retrial of this case, the judgment that the lawsuit for retrial of this case was lawful is not reasonable and reasonable, and the judgment of Supreme Court Decision 62Nu218, Feb. 7, 1963, which did not require a final and conclusive judgment of conviction as to such crime on the ground that there was a document forged in the final and conclusive judgment, but it does not constitute an unlawful ground for retrial prior to the final and conclusive judgment of this case.

(4) As to the ground of appeal No. 4 of the above Chuncheon

In order to nationalize the property devolving upon the Government of the Republic of Korea under Article 4 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the Government of the Republic of Korea and Article 5 of the first Agreement on the Finance and Property between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America, the real estate in the Republic of Korea, which was registered in the name of the Government of the Republic of Korea prior to the piracy, is the property devolved to the Government of the Republic of Korea. In accordance with the reasoning of the judgment below, the decision of the court below is identical to the theory of lawsuit by the party members who proposed the proposal of the Minister of Department under Article 4 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State Council and must obtain approval from the President via the Prime Minister. However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below confirmed that the real estate in this case was purchased in the name of the Republic of Korea to use it as a shooting practice site on August 1938, and confirmed that it was registered in the name of the Government of the United States.

(5) As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2-2, 3, and 5, the latter part of No. 1-1, and No. 2, of the conflict of interest as to Switzerland’s grounds of appeal No. 2,

Even if a witness's false statement is admitted as evidence of the judgment, if it does not affect the judgment of the original court, it does not constitute a ground for retrial (Supreme Court Decision 879 delivered on August 18, 192; Supreme Court Decision 70Da1271 delivered on September 17, 197). If the witness's testimony is false, it cannot be a ground for retrial (Supreme Court Decision 70Da1271 delivered on September 17, 1970; 72Da1822 delivered on November 28, 1975; 74Da1643 delivered on July 2, 197; 71Nu133 delivered on October 12, 1970). The court below's conclusion that the witness's testimony was not a new ground for retrial but a new ground for retrial as one of the grounds for retrial, and it cannot be admitted that the witness's remaining testimony was not a new ground for retrial.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jung-soo (Presiding Justice) and Lee Jong-young's Lee Jong-young