[1] The method of determining the similarity of a combined trademark composed of a combination of names

[2] The case holding that the registered trademark "GNI VERSACE" and the trademark "ALFREDDDCEE" are similar

[3] The case holding that the non-exclusive licensee of another person's trade name cannot assert that the trademark is not infringed on the grounds of Article 51 subparagraph 1 of the Trademark Act

[1] Whether a trademark is similar should be determined by whether there is a concern for misconceptions or confusions as to the origin of the trademark by observing two trademarks used for the same kind of product in terms of appearance, name, and concept in general, objective, and apart from the perspective of appearance, name, and concept, and on the basis of a direct perception that ordinary consumers or traders feel with respect to the trademark. The same applies to a combined trademark consisting of each constituent element of letters, letters, or figures, not necessarily by the entire constituent part, but by the term, concept, unless each constituent element is an indivisible combination to the degree that it is deemed natural in the trade, if the separate observation of each constituent element is made, that part of its constituent part may be briefly named, conceptualized, and conceptualized, and that combination of names shall also apply to a combined trademark consisting of a combination of names.

[2] The case holding that the registered trademark "GNI VERSACE, etc., and the trademark "ALFREDDDDAE" can be abbreviated only by "VERSACE", and the two trademarks are similar to each other; the product with both trademarks are different manufacturing and selling routes and store operation methods; and there is no difference between the sales price and the sales price, it cannot be readily concluded that there is no concern for consumers to mispersive or confuse the quality or origin of the product in the trading society

[3] The case holding that the non-exclusive licensee of another person's trade name cannot assert that the trademark is not infringed on the grounds of Article 51 subparagraph 1 of the Trademark Act

[1] Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act / [2] Articles 7 (1) 7 and 66 of the Trademark Act / [3] Article 51 subparagraph 1 of the Trademark Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Hu1824 delivered on May 12, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 2124), Supreme Court Decision 96Hu313, 320 delivered on March 25, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 1231), Supreme Court Decision 98Hu2627 delivered on April 11, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 1197) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 200Hu1658 delivered on November 28, 200 (Gong201Sang, 200)

Nais Haba Guide (Law Firm Haba, Attorneys Choi Ho-ro et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 201Na1448 delivered on August 1, 201

Seoul High Court Decision 99Na16301, 16318 delivered on December 6, 2000

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the debtor.

1. Determination on the Debtor's Day, Inc.

The appeal filed by the debtor did not contain any grounds of appeal and did not submit a statement of grounds of appeal within the prescribed period.

2. Determination as to the debtor, a small and medium-sized company

A. Ground of appeal No. 1

(1) Whether a trademark is similar or not should be determined by whether there is a concern for mistake or confusion as to the origin of a trademark by observing two trademarks used for the same kind of product in terms of appearance, name, and concept in general, objective, and apart from the perspective of appearance, name, and concept, etc., and on the basis of a direct perception that ordinary consumers or traders feel with respect to the trademark. The combined trademark combining each constituent element of letters, letters, or diagrams is not necessarily named, conceptualized, and conceptualized by the entire constituent part, unless the separate observation of each constituent part is an indivisible combination to the degree that it is deemed natural in the trade. This likewise applies to a combined trademark consisting of a combination of names (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Hu313, 320, Mar. 25, 1997; 98Hu267, Apr. 11, 200).

(2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the trademark "ALF REDDO" used by the debtor cannot be deemed as being indivisiblely combined to the extent that it is deemed natural in the transaction. Thus, the trademark "ALF REDO" or "VERSACE" can be simplifiedly named, concept, and the same applies to the trademark "AVIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIO" or "VERIIIIIII", and that the trademark "VIIIIIIIIIIO" or "VIIIIIIIIIIO" is identical to the trademark "VIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIO", the remaining creditors who can be called solely with "VIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIOIIIIIIIIIIIIIER." and it is identical.

(3) In light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below on this issue is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the similarity of trademarks, or misunderstanding of facts as alleged in the grounds of appeal. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision that the appellant raised objection is different from this case

B. Judgment on the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that Article 51 subparagraph 1 of the Trademark Act does not have the effect of the registered trademark right, unless it is used for the purpose of unfair competition after the establishment of the trademark right was registered. However, since the debtor's trademark is not the debtor's name but the name trademark of the U.S. D. D. D. D. D. D., the defendant's name but the name trademark of the U.S. D. D. D. D., the defendant

In light of the records, the decision of the court below on this is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to Article 51 subparagraph 1 of the Trademark Act as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

All of the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-in (Presiding Justice)