[1] Criteria for determining similarity of combined trademarks

[2] Whether the trademark "PHENXS" and "PHENX" are similar (affirmative)

[1] Whether a trademark is similar or not shall be determined by whether there is a possibility of mistake or confusion as to the origin of the goods by observing the appearance, name, and concept of two trademarks in an objective, overall, and separately, and based on a direct perception that ordinary consumers or traders feel with respect to the trademark. However, in the case of a combined trademark consisting of each constituent element of letters, letters, or letters and diagrams, it is not necessarily a name, concept, but a separate observation of each constituent element is not necessarily an integral combination to a degree that it is deemed natural in the trade, unless the separate observation of each constituent part is made in an indivisible way to a degree that it is not natural in the trade. In addition, if it is possible to think two or more names or concepts from one trademark, the two trademarks are similar.

[2] Examining the similarity between the original trademark and the cited trademark registered prior thereto, the original trademark is: (a) on the basis of the transformation of ordinary events, it is possible to separately observe three parts of the original trademark as the three parts of the original trademark, and on the other hand, it is difficult to have any specific name or concept, and thus, on the other hand, it is a relatively small English person marking “PHENX” as a relatively smallest English person; (b) on the top below, it is a combination trademark consisting of diagrams and English characters marked by cutting the “SUS” with a large number of letters, and on the other hand, it is difficult to see that the above diagrams and letters are not new concepts due to the combination, nor are they combined with each other to the extent that they are natural if they are separately observed, they can not be seen as being identical with those of the original trademark, so it is naturally difficult to have any specific name or concept, and thus, it is difficult to see that the original trademark is identical or similar to those of the designated goods so that it can be citing or similar to those of the “IHNES or users”.

[1] Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act / [2] Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Hu1179 delivered on January 25, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 832), Supreme Court Decision 94Hu1824 delivered on May 12, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 2124), Supreme Court Decision 95Hu1395 delivered on December 22, 1995 (Gong196Sang, 553 delivered on April 23, 1996)

Vienna Business, Rocop (Patent Attorney Gangnam-gu, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

The Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office

Korean Intellectual Property Office Decision 94Na1091 dated September 5, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the applicant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The similarity of trademarks shall be determined by whether there is a possibility of mistake or confusion as to the origin of goods by observing the appearance, name, and concept of two trademarks in an objective, overall, and separately, and based on a direct perception that ordinary consumers or traders feel with respect to the trademark. However, in the case of a combined trademark consisting of each constituent element of letters, letters, or figures, it is not merely a name, concept, but a separate observation of each constituent element is not an integral combination to a degree that it is deemed natural in the trade. In addition, if two or more names or concepts among the constituent parts can be considered from one trademark, if the name, concept is deemed identical or similar to that of another trademark, the two trademarks are similar (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Hu1938, Dec. 15, 1994; 97Hu1954, Apr. 195, 195);

Examining the record as to the similarity between the applied trademark of this case (hereinafter referred to as the "original trademark") and the cited trademark registered prior (registration number omitted), this original trademark is distinguishable from the trademark of this case. Based on the transformation of ordinary events, it is possible to separate the trademark of this case into the upper part of the upper part and to separately observe the trademark of this case and to mark it as "PHENX" in a relatively small English, and it is a combination trademark of the figures and English characters marked "SUS" in the upper part below, and the above diagrams and letters are combined with a large letter, and it is difficult to see that there is no new concept due to the combination, and it is difficult to see that there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the trademark of this case, since it is difficult to have any name or concept of the original trademark of this case, it is naturally recognized that there is no possibility of confusion between the original trademark and the original trademark of this case and the original trademark of this case, and thus, it is difficult to see that there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to recognize that the trademark of this part of this case.

This original trademark is a well-known trademark consisting of the name of "PHENXS" and the core mark inherent in the team of the professional farming team belonging to the NBA of the United States of America (NBA) widely known domestically and overseas. Therefore, there is a special distinctive character of the trademark in itself, and therefore, the grounds of appeal that there is no concern about mistake or confusion between the original trademark and the cited trademark, on the premise that recognizing the figure and the cited part are separated from one another in a combination of parts to the extent that the nature of the nature of the nature of the trademark is not identical, shall not be accepted as it is merely an independent opinion. The precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from the case of this case, and it is not appropriate to invoke this case. All of the grounds of appeal are dismissed.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)