Whether the presumption of registration is broken solely on the ground that a person who completed registration pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Forest Land has asserted different from that stated in a letter of guarantee or a written confirmation as to the cause of acquisition

Even if a person who has completed registration pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Forest Land (hereinafter referred to as the "Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership"), claims that he/she acquired a right according to another reason for acquisition even if he/she recognizes the fact different from the fact in the letter of guarantee or written confirmation, it cannot be deemed that the presumption of registration completed pursuant to the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Forest Land has broken down solely on the above reason, unless there are special circumstances, such as where it is clear that the registration cannot be completed in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Forest Land, or where it is apparent that the content of his/her assertion is a dead-end, or where it is obvious that the content of his/her assertion is a dead-end, unless there are any special circumstances, such as where the fact that the reason for acquisition was newly asserted

Article 5 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land; Article 186 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 92Da17938 delivered on October 27, 1992 (Gong1992, 3265), Supreme Court Decision 92Da32067 delivered on December 8, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 434 delivered on October 27, 2000 (Gong200Ha, 2413)

Plaintiff 1 and four others (Attorney Kim Jung-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and three others (Attorney Lee Jae-sik, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daegu District Court Decision 99Na17652, 17669 delivered on November 8, 2000

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

1. As to the misapprehension of legal principles on presumption of registration and allocation of burden of proof

The court below found that each of the above registrations in Defendant 1's name was completed under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land (amended by Act No. 2111 of May 21, 1969, which was later effective, hereinafter referred to as the "Special Measures Act") with respect to the real estate of this case, the ownership transfer registration in the name of Nonparty 1 was presumed to correspond to the substantive legal relationship. However, in light of the relations between Nonparty 1 and Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 and the real estate of this case, it is presumed that the ownership transfer registration in the name of Nonparty 1 was completed under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land (amended by Act No. 2111 of May 21, 1969) and the former Act on August 7 of the same year, and determined that it was difficult for Defendant 1 to assert that the above registration was completed under the name of the title truster 1 and the above registration was made under the name of the title truster 1 as to each of this case.

The presumption power of registration of initial ownership or registration of transfer shall not be reversed unless it is proved that registration conforms to the substantive legal relationship, and that registration of initial ownership or registration of transfer is false or forged under the Act on Special Measures, or that it is not legally registered due to other reasons. Here, false letter of guarantee or written confirmation refers to a letter of guarantee or written confirmation that the substantive contents of the changes in rights are inconsistent with the truth (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da33775, Oct. 27, 200). The meaning of false letter of guarantee or written confirmation in this context is different from that of the special measures in criminal cases. Even if a person who completed registration pursuant to the Act on Special Measures recognizes that the acquisition cause stated in the letter of guarantee or written confirmation is different from the fact, it shall be assumed that the new statement or written confirmation is not identical to that of the special measures in accordance with the Act on Special Measures 97, and it shall not be presumed that the new statement or written confirmation is unreasonable or unreasonable within the extent of 97, unless it proves that there is a new fact or apparent reason for its acquisition.

In light of the above legal principles, the court below determined that the presumption power of each transfer of ownership by Defendant 1 was reversed solely on the ground that Defendant 1 asserted the facts that are different from those recorded in the guarantee certificate without deliberating and determining as to the fact of donation that it was the actual cause of acquisition, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the presumption power of completed registration under the Act on Special Measures, which led to the defendants to bear the burden of proof.

However, according to the records, it is difficult to readily recognize that the Defendants purchased each of the instant real estate and trusted it to the same residents, because one-third of the shares in the name of Nonparty 2 was trusted to Nonparty 2, and Defendant 1 received a donation from Nonparty 1, the title truster, around 1938, when the registration of ownership transfer was made under the name of Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3, and it was merely 17 years old, and it is difficult to accept the fact that Nonparty 1 purchased each of the instant real estate and title trust was made to the same residents. In order to clarify that the Defendants would not sell each of the instant real estate to others, it is difficult to accept the circumstance of title trust that the Defendants completed the registration of ownership transfer under the name of Nonparty 1’s own title trust and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the name of Nonparty 1, the status of Nonparty 1, the wife of the instant real estate, which had been presumed to have been inherited by Nonparty 1, the head of the instant property, even after the completion of the registration of ownership transfer.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that held that the presumption power of each transfer registration of ownership in this case was reversed is just in conclusion, and contrary to the grounds of appeal, even if there were errors by misapprehending the presumption power of transfer registration or the legal principles on the distribution of burden of proof under the Act on Special Measures, this does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, the ground of appeal as to

2. As to the incomplete hearing on the conformity of substantive relations

As seen above, there is no room for acceptance of the assertion that the presumption power of each transfer registration of ownership of this case was broken as a result of the proof that the facts alleged by the Defendants were not true. The court below's determination that the presumption power of the transfer of ownership was reversed prior to the reversal of the presumption power of the transfer of ownership registration, and that it was inappropriate for the court below to reject the determination as to the suitability of the substantive relations after the reversal of the presumption power of the transfer of ownership registration. However, the court below's determination that rejected the Defendants' assertion on this point is just in conclusion, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. As to the violation of the law regarding the prescriptive acquisition and the violation of the rules of evidence

According to evidence, the court below rejected the defendants' defense of the prescriptive acquisition on the ground that it is difficult to find that the above facts alone are not enough to recognize that the defendant 1 occupied the entire real estate of this case where the nine period of time is now located in the ship's grave as owned by the will to own the entire real estate of this case as owned by the defendant 1, in light of the fact that the non-party 1, along with the non-party 4 in 1969, cultivated part of the real estate of this case as an orchard by reclaiming part of the second real estate of this case as stated in the judgment of the court below and died in May 1976, and that the non-party 4 occupied and used approximately 3,000 square meters corresponding to the limit of 1/3 of the above real estate of this case as owned by the defendant 1 as owned by the intention to own it.

The purport of the judgment of the court below is that although the possession of the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 is recognized, the intention of the defendant 1 is not recognized even if the possession of the defendant 1 is recognized, and the defendant's intention is not recognized, but only the intention of possession is not recognized. According to the records, although the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 possess part of each of the real estate of this case, the court below's finding that the defendant 1 actually occupied it is just and there is no error in the violation of the rules of evidence or the incomplete deliberation (in the records, there is no evidence to deem that the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 occupied as the defendant 1's assistant, and as long as the defendant 1's assertion that the non-party 1 received each of the real estate of this case cannot be accepted as a donation of the real estate of this case, the court below's finding that the defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer cannot be accepted, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the defendant 1's possession or the prescription.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

The final judgment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Presiding Justice) shall be delivered with the assent of all Justices Song Jin-hun who is a member of the maintenance wall of Song Jin-hun.