(a) Methods of claiming the payment of medical expenses to be continuously disbursed in the future or for the loss of nursing expenses;

(b) Criteria for calculating the expense for nursing a person;

C. Requirements for the claim of nursing costs not later than the time the argument in fact-finding proceedings is concluded

(d) Whether fact-finding or setting the ratio of the grounds for liability mitigation or negligence falls under the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court

(a) In the event of damages for which continuous disbursement of medical expenses or nursing expenses is required due to the aftermath of the injury inflicted by a tort, the parties may seek reimbursement of such damages out of the money for the said damages, and may also seek reimbursement of the said expenses by calculating the current price after deducting the intermediate interest, in a lump sum.

(b) If there is a need to obtain the assistance of a nursing due to physical freedom, the nursing costs shall be calculated on the basis of the amount of wages equivalent to the number of days per the period of time during which the nursing is required, unless there are special circumstances to the contrary.

C. Even if the victim caused a sudden disability resulting from an accident, it is necessary to claim for the opening of the nursing costs until the closing of the fact-finding trial proceedings, even if the victim actually received the opening of the nursing, or did not actually disburse the opening of the nursing costs, at least the victim’s parents or spouse, etc. who actually received the opening of the nursing costs.

D. Where the victim was negligent in causing or expanding damages in a claim for damages due to tort, it should be taken into account as a matter of course in determining the scope of liability for damages, but the fact-finding or the ratio of comparative negligence is subject to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity.

(b)Article 763, Article 393 (d) of the Civil Code; Article 763, Article 396 of the Civil Code; Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Meu26102 Decided November 9, 1990 (Gong1991,51) (Gong1991,851). Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2731 Decided March 14, 1989 (Gong1989,58) (Gong1988), Supreme Court Decision 90Meu15171 Decided October 23, 1990 (Gong1990,238), Supreme Court Decision 87Da1332 Decided December 8, 1987 (Gong198,269) (Gong198,4079), Supreme Court Decision 86Da26269 Decided 198, Dec. 19, 198 (Gong198,407) (Gong19639, Oct. 16, 1996)

Plaintiff 1 and six others

Attorney Park Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 89Na11022 delivered on January 18, 1991

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant as to the plaintiff 1's property damage shall be reversed.

Part of the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

Costs of appeal dismissed shall be borne by the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (the supplementary appellate brief is submitted after the deadline for submitting the appellate brief, and it is judged to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief).

1. The point of property damage;

(a)with respect to the passive damage part:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff 1 was an early soldier at the time of the accident, and calculated the amount of actual income of the same plaintiff due to the accident of this case based on the average wage for early art work around that time. In light of the records, the court below acknowledged the above facts, which appears to have employed Gap evidence 5-2, 5-2, and 1 of the first instance court witness. First of all, the above evidence No. 5-2, and evidence No. 5-4 (labor contract) which the court below did not employ, stated that the above plaintiff 1 was an early art worker at the time of the accident. However, the witness of the first instance court, who was employed by the court below, stated the above plaintiff 1 as an early art worker after receiving a contract for early art work as stated in the judgment of the defendant, and concluded the above plaintiff's agent's first time after executing the same construction work as a early art worker at the time of the first time, but rather, it did not directly receive the above plaintiff's testimony as an early art worker.

Nevertheless, the court below's determination that the above plaintiff was a co-ordification of the evidence without any reasonable ground to reject the contents of the above counter-versive evidence is an illegal act that misleads the facts against the rules of evidence. Therefore, the argument that points this out is reasonable.

(b)with respect to affirmative damage:

(1) In the event of damages incurred in the course of continuing medical expenses or nursing expenses due to the aftermath of the injury inflicted by a tort, the parties may seek payment of the damages with the fixed fund in their claim for compensation, and may seek payment by calculating the present price after deducting the intermediate interest. Thus, the court below's order the payment of the medical expenses and nursing expenses in lump sum as claimed by the above plaintiff cannot be said to be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit, by ordering the payment in lump sum (see Supreme Court Decision 90Meu26102, Nov. 9, 1990). The precedents pointing out in the lawsuit are different from the cases in this case, and the judgment of the court below ordering the plaintiff to make a lump sum payment, and it does not seem to be appropriate in this case as the purport that there is no illegality in the judgment of the court below ordering the payment in the lump sum.

In addition, in light of the fact that the monthly number of working days of workers is 25 days, the expenses for nursing shall be recognized only for the 25th day of each month. However, in the event that there is a need to obtain the assistance of a nursing person due to the freedom of the body, the expenses for nursing shall be calculated based on the amount of wages equivalent to the total number of days during the period required for nursing, unless there are special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Meu15171, Oct. 23, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2731, Mar. 14, 1989; Supreme Court Decision 87Meu1577, Dec. 22, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 84Meu928, Aug. 20, 1985). Therefore, it is unreasonable to discuss each of the above points.

(2) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court ordered the Defendant to compensate for the 367-month period from December 20, 198, the next day following the completion of treatment, on the ground that the above Plaintiff’s request for nursing expenses as indicated in its monthly judgment during the period from December 20, 1988 to the

However, even though the victim caused a subsequent disability requiring nursing due to an accident, in order to claim for nursing expenses until the closing of argument in the trial court, it is required to actually receive nursing expenses or to actually receive nursing expenses (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2626, Jan. 19, 198; Supreme Court Decision 87Meu1332, Dec. 24, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2366, Feb. 24, 1987; etc.). Further, even according to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, there is no explanation about the fact that such nursing expenses were actually paid from the day following the completion of the treatment to the closing of argument in the court below, or that the relative provided nursing expenses was actually supported by the above plaintiff, and there is no evidence to acknowledge it even if it is based on the record.

The court below, without disclosing the above points, generally recognized the opening costs during the above period, is erroneous in misapprehending the legal principles on the opening costs, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and thus, it is reasonable to point this out.

C. As to comparative negligence:

In a claim for damages caused by a tort, if the victim was negligent in causing or expanding damages, it must be taken into account as a matter of course in determining the scope of liability for damages, but the fact-finding or the ratio of comparative negligence is subject to the exclusive authority of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Meu3062, Apr. 25, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 85Meu191, Nov. 26, 1985; etc.). In light of the overall circumstances at the time of the accident recognized by the records, the assessment of the victim's fault ratio by the court below is deemed appropriate, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to comparative negligence, such as the theory of lawsuit.

The issue is groundless.

2. We examine the consolation money part.

Although the defendant filed an appeal against the entire judgment of the court below, he did not pay any ground of appeal against the consolation money portion, and this part of the appeal is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, among the judgment of the court below, the part against the defendant as to plaintiff 1's property damage is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination, and the defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal for the part dismissed are assessed against the losing party, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)