In the case of a land substitution, whether the possession of a specific part of the previous land is identical before or after the designation of a land substitution area.

In a case where a replotting disposition exists, even if it is a land substitution disposition, the previous land is a land substitution disposition that changes the cadastral, shape, and location of the entire land due to the replotting. As such, where a land substitution is designated prior to the completion of prescriptive acquisition and the land substitution becomes final and conclusive during the possession of some specific portions of the previous land, barring special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that the occupant of the previous specific portion of the land occupies the relevant specific portion on the land substitution or the land substitution, even before the land substitution is designated, unless there are special circumstances.

Article 245 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Han-sung, Attorneys Park Jae-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Defendant 1 and 13 Defendants, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Supreme Court Decision 93Da18327, 18334 delivered on April 29, 1994

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na16436, 16443 decided Feb. 22, 1995

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) In the case of a replotting disposition, even if it is a land substitution disposition, the previous land has changed to the land’s point, shape, and location of the entire land due to the replotting, and thus, it is designated as a land substitution place prior to the completion of prescriptive acquisition among the possession of some specific parts of the previous land, and where a replotting becomes final and conclusive, even if the specific portions of the previous land were located within the land scheduled for replotting or the land determined for replotting, barring special circumstances, the possessor of the previous land cannot be deemed to have occupied the relevant specific portions on the land scheduled for replotting or the land determined for replotting even before the land substitution is designated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da30306, May 14, 1993; 8Meu18795, Sept. 2

The court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning by taking full account of the evidences. According to the facts of recognition, it is clear that the 20-year period of possession as to the above forest land has not elapsed since 1967 or October 27, 1973, which claimed that part of the previous forest land in Gangnam-gu Seoul ( Address 1 omitted), which was the previous land prior to the substitution by Nonparty 1 or 2, had started to occupy each of the above building sites, etc. from the present site, until October 27, 1973, which was designated as a planned land substitution. Meanwhile, even if the above planned land substitution was calculated from October 27, 1973, it is obvious that the plaintiffs who were the reasons for suspending the acquisition by prescription were the filing date of the lawsuit in this case, and it is obvious that the period of possession was not elapsed for 20 years until April 23, 191, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the above part of the land in this case's possession.

The possession is de facto controlled by the object, and the designation of the land scheduled for replotting or the disposition of replotting does not result in any change in the de facto control of the object as it does not result in any factual act, and it is not accepted as an independent opinion that determination of the prescription period for the acquisition of possession is extremely unfair in light of the legislative intent and equity that recognized the prescriptive acquisition system as well as the disposition of replotting.

(2) In the event of recognizing the prescriptive acquisition of the co-ownership shares in the land substituted without recognizing the prescriptive acquisition of possession for a specific portion, the theory that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the ratio of co-ownership acquired by the occupant, thereby recognizing the ratio, thereby recognizing the removal obligation to the occupant of this case who acquired more than a majority of the co-ownership, is nothing more than criticize the lower court’s additional and assumptive

(3) Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)