A. Whether it is admissible in the event that co-defendant's protocol of interrogation of co-defendant's protocol of examination of co-defendant's protocol of examination as evidence is not admitted (affirmative)

B. Whether confiscation, confiscation, or collection is subject to strict certification, or whether the recognition of collection is subject to strict certification (negative)

(c) Where the time, place, content, etc. of the public offering are not specified, and whether the facts charged are specified;

(d) The meaning of Article 68 subparagraph 5 of the Foreign Trade Act "a person who has obtained the approval or approval of modification under Article 19 (1) by deceit or other unlawful means"

(e) The relationship between the crimes corresponding to subparagraph 5 of Article 68 of the Foreign Trade Act and the crimes corresponding to subparagraph 2 of Article 181 of the Customs Act (=actual concurrent crimes).

A. As long as co-defendant's protocol of examination of co-defendant's protocol of examination of prosecutor's protocol recognizes the formation and voluntariness, it is admissible even if the defendant gives consent.

(b)the recognition of confiscation, whether the collection is subject to confiscation, or whether it is subject to collection, or that of collection is not subject to strict certification.

C. The specification of the facts charged is sufficient to specify the time, place, method, etc. to the extent that the facts constituting the offense charged can be distinguished from those of other facts charged. Even if the time, place, content, etc. of the public offering are not clearly indicated, insofar as the facts charged can be identified by other facts indicated, etc., it cannot be said that the facts charged is not specified solely on the same ground.

(d) “A person who has obtained the approval or approval of modification under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 19 by deception or other unlawful means” in Article 68 Item 5 of the Foreign Trade Act means a person who has obtained the approval through a deceptive scheme or other acts which are considered to be unfair by social norms, even though it is impossible to obtain the approval or approval of modification in accordance with normal procedures.

E. Article 68 subparag. 5 of the Foreign Trade Act, which provides a penal provision for the approval or change of the export and import of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy by fraud or other improper means, and Article 181 subparag. 2 of the Customs Act, which is a penal provision for the act of obtaining the export and import license from the head of the customs office, is separate from each other. Thus, in a case where the import approval of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy is obtained by filing a report in an unlawful manner and the import license of the head of the customs office is granted by filing a report, the relevant crime under Article 181 subparag. 2 of the Customs Act, in addition to the relevant crime under Article

A. Article 312(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act: Article 48 of the Criminal Act; Article 307 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 254(d) of the same Act; Article 68 Subparag. 5 of the Foreign Trade Act; Article 181 Subparag. 2 of the Customs Act; Article 37 of the Criminal Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Do314 delivered on April 23, 1991 (Gong1991,1561) 91Do1984 delivered on November 8, 1991 (Gong1992,155) 92Do42 delivered on April 14, 1992 (Gong1992,1647) 2. Supreme Court Decision 73Do279 delivered on April 17, 197 (Gong1973,7318), 81Do3049 delivered on February 9, 1982 (Gong1982, 3199), 87Do399 delivered on April 14, 198 (Gong1987, 849) 198Do2949 delivered on April 29, 209 (Gong19849) 198Do29499 delivered on April 29, 2982)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Ha Man-young et al.

Busan District Court Decision 90No2316 delivered on November 27, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. On the first ground for appeal

The protocol of examination of co-defendant 1 of the prosecutor's protocol of examination on the co-defendant 1 of the first instance court's protocol of examination that the co-defendant 1 of the prosecutor's protocol of examination that the co-defendant 1 of the first instance court adopted as evidence is admissible, even if the co-defendant 1 of the defendant admitted as evidence and consented to it as evidence. (See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Do2362, Dec. 26, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 91Do314, Apr. 23, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Do42, Apr. 14, 1992; etc.). According to the records, each protocol of examination on the suspect's examination on the co-defendant 1 of the first instance court's protocol of examination is admissible as evidence; since the defendant consented to it as evidence and the co-defendant 1 of the first instance court did not respond to the summons of the court below's prosecutor's protocol of examination.

In addition, according to the records, the court below's adopted evidence including these evidences and the adopted evidence of the court of first instance as cited by the court below are examined in comparison with the records, and the remaining evidences except the interrogation protocol as to the co-defendant 2 of the court of first instance as argued by the theory of lawsuit, which are cited by the court below, shall be excluded from the fact that the defendant participated in obtaining the original approval of income due to the special case to bring in property abroad (in collusion with the co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance) as cited by the court below, i.e., the defendant, in collusion with the co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance, etc. of the court of first instance, in collusion with the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy with the Minister of Trade, and the co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance who obtained the approval of the import (violation of the Foreign Trade Act) as stated by the court of first instance, it cannot be deemed that a prosecution has been instituted as to the part of obtaining the original approval of the import from the head of Ulsan customs office.

In addition, in light of the records, we affirm the judgment of the court of first instance that the court below determined the amount of confiscation based on the market price appraisal by customs officers (the price appraisal by customs officers at the time of committing the crime of this case) attached to the investigation records (the price assessment by domestic wholesale of this case at the time of the crime of this case) as well as whether the amount of confiscation or collection is subject to strict certification, or whether the amount of collection is subject to confiscation or collection is subject to strict certification.

This part of the judgment of the court below is without merit since it is not erroneous in the violation of the rules of evidence or incomplete hearing.

2. On the second ground for appeal

A. The specification of the facts charged is sufficient to indicate the date, time, place, method, etc. to the extent that it can distinguish the facts charged from other facts charged, and even if the time, place, contents, etc. of the public offering are not specified, it cannot be said that the facts charged are not specified solely for the reason that it can be specified by other facts stated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 85Do1465, Sept. 24, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 92Do1395, Aug. 18, 192; 92Do1532, Sept. 14, 1992; etc.). In full view of the facts charged against the defendant, the facts charged against the defendant cannot be said to have been specified solely on the ground that the defendant did not specify the date, place, etc. of the public offering with the co-defendant 1, 2, etc., and therefore, it cannot be deemed that there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the specification of the facts charged.

B. Article 68 subparag. 5 of the Foreign Trade Act provides that “A person who has obtained approval or approval of change under the provisions of Article 19(1) of the Foreign Trade Act by fraud or other improper means” means a person who has obtained such approval by an act which is deemed unfair under social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 84Do341, Jun. 26, 1984; 90Do2002, Jan. 25, 1991). Examining the facts charged in the instant case and applicable provisions of the Foreign Trade Act, the Defendant et al. did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles regarding the fact of the instant crime from 0.0 to 10.0 to 10.8 of Japan’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s second-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s second-class vessel’s first-class vessel’s import clearance.

C. Article 68 subparagraph 5 of the Foreign Trade Act, which is a punishment provision for the act of obtaining approval of export and import or the change thereof from the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy by deceit or other unlawful means, and Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act, which is a punishment provision for the act of obtaining a license for export and import from the head of the customs office, shall be an independent constituent element. Thus, in case where the import approval of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy is obtained by filing a report and a license for import is granted from the head of the customs office by the head of the customs office, the crime under Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act shall be applied separately in addition to the crime under Article 68 subparagraph 5 of the Foreign Trade Act, and the above two crimes shall not be deemed as a substantive concurrent act (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do1471, Sept. 13, 191). Accordingly, the court below's decision is justified and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the ex post facto concurrent act.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)