[1] Whether an employer’s provision of the rules of employment as a new ground for dismissal irrelevant to the grounds for dismissal under the collective agreement is contrary to the collective agreement (negative with qualification)

[2] The case holding that the interpretation of the provisions of the collective agreement does not purport that a worker shall not be dismissed for reasons other than those stipulated in the collective agreement

[3] The validity of the rules of employment stipulating that the act of false entry or omission or abolition of a worker's career at the time of employment shall be subject to disciplinary action (limited validity)

[4] The case holding that the act of concealing the final academic background constitutes a ground for disciplinary action under the rules of employment by stating only the high school which graduated from the university without stating the graduation from the university or the withdrawal from the university in the curriculum curriculum of employment

[5] The validity of a resolution of the disciplinary committee where a worker's disciplinary committee member did not attend if the worker denies or refuses to select a disciplinary committee member under the collective agreement (effective)

[6] Whether the defect in the disciplinary procedure is cured in a case where the person subject to disciplinary action was present at the disciplinary committee and sufficiently explained without objection to the notification procedure without any time limit prescribed by the collective agreement (affirmative)

[7] In a case where a defect in a disciplinary procedure is corrected in the course of a retrial, whether the defect is cured (affirmative)

[8] In a case of dismissal due to a justifiable ground for dismissal, whether an employer constitutes an unfair labor practice if an employer makes an employee’s labor union activity unfortunately or an employer’s intent is presumed to be unfair (negative)

[1] The corporate order is essential for corporate existence and smooth operation of business. Therefore, an employer may establish rules of employment governing employees' violation of corporate order within the scope not contrary to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Labor Standards Act, as long as it is deemed necessary and reasonable to establish and maintain such corporate order, and the rules of employment provide for the grounds for disciplinary action, such as dismissal, in the rules of employment as to misconduct involving employees other than the violation of corporate order, which are regulated by the collective agreement, falls under the original authority of the employer. Thus, the collective agreement provides that "any dismissal shall be governed by the collective agreement, and shall not be dismissed by the rules of employment," or that "workers shall not be dismissed for reasons other than those stipulated in the collective agreement" shall not be dismissed unless the rules of employment explicitly stipulate that the procedures for dismissal and dismissal shall be governed by the collective agreement, or if the same grounds for disciplinary action or disciplinary procedure conflict with each other with those stipulated in the collective agreement, an employer may determine new grounds for dismissal which are not related to the grounds for dismissal as stipulated in the collective agreement. Although the grounds for dismissal may be excluded from the collective agreement.

[2] The case holding that the interpretation of the provisions of a collective agreement is not the purport that a worker cannot be dismissed for reasons other than those stipulated in the collective agreement

[3] The reason why the company requires the resume or the certificate stating an employee's academic background or experience while employing the employee is not only to evaluate employee's work ability, i.e., the employee's work ability, but also to determine the employment through a prior personal judgment such as the worker's intelligence and experience, level of education, suspension from office, and settlement of work and adaptation to work, etc. Therefore, it is reasonable to punish the employee as a legitimate ground for dismissal, unless there are special circumstances such as the employer's wrongful entry of the false facts in the employee's work experience or work experience at the time of the employee's employment, or the reason why the employee's work experience or work experience in the employee's employment, which is required to be submitted for this purpose, is not an important negative factor about the worker's suspension from office, but also to make a prior personal judgment against the employee who intends to employ. Therefore, the rules of employment, etc., which provide for the reason that the employee's act of false entry or work experience in the employee's employment are subject to disciplinary action.

[4] The case holding that the act of concealing the final academic background constitutes a ground for disciplinary dismissal under the rules of employment by stating only the high school that graduated from the university without stating the graduation from the university or the withdrawal from the university in the curriculum curriculum of the job placement process

[5] The issue of whether a violation of the procedure for dismissal under a collective agreement is invalid or not shall not be uniformly determined in accordance with the purport of the provision, and if a collective agreement violates the disciplinary procedure despite the fact that the representative of the worker is required to participate in the organization of the disciplinary committee, the exercise of the right to disciplinary action shall be deemed null and void, regardless of whether the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized. However, even if the worker provided the worker with an opportunity to select a disciplinary committee member, if the worker voluntarily refuses to select a disciplinary committee member or refuses to do so, it shall not be deemed null and void even if the disciplinary action was taken by the disciplinary committee which did not participate in the disciplinary committee.

[6] Where disciplinary action is taken against a member in a collective agreement, it is wrong that the employer notifies the person subject to disciplinary action that the person subject to disciplinary action has been referred to the disciplinary action without any time limit prescribed in the collective agreement even though the collective agreement provides that the person subject to disciplinary action shall notify the person subject to disciplinary action before the disciplinary committee, but if the person subject to disciplinary action appeared in the disciplinary committee and made sufficient vindication without raising any objection to the notification procedure,

[7] The review procedure for a disciplinary action is a kind of disciplinary action procedure, along with the original disciplinary procedure. The legitimacy of the procedure should be determined as to the whole of the disciplinary procedure. Thus, even if the violation of the procedure is discovered in the original process of disciplinary action, the defect of the procedure is cured if it is supplemented in the review process.

[8] Where an employer is deemed to have dismissed a worker on the ground of an employer’s legitimate union activity, unlike the grounds for dismissal, such dismissal shall be deemed unfair labor practice. In the case of dismissal due to justifiable grounds for dismissal, it shall not be deemed unfair labor practice inasmuch as the ground for dismissal is merely merely a ground for dismissal, even if the employer is not a union activity of the worker or the employer is presumed to have the intent of the labor union, it shall not be deemed unfair labor practice.

[1] Article 27(1)(see current Article 30(1)) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5309, Mar. 13, 197); Article 97(1)(see current Article 99(1)); Article 36(1)(see current Article 33(1) of the former Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 524, Dec. 31, 1996) / [2] Article 27(1)(see current Article 30(1) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5309, Mar. 13, 1997); Article 97(1)(see current Article 9(1)) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 1970, Dec. 31, 196); Article 97(3) of the former Labor Standards Act (see current Article 9(3) of the former Labor Standards Act)

[1] 대법원 1994. 6. 14. 선고 93누200115 판결(공1994하, 1974) 대법원 1994. 6. 14. 선고 93다26151 판결(공1994하, 1939) 대법원 1995. 1. 20. 선고 94다37851 판결(공1995상, 888) 대법원 1995. 4. 7. 선고 94다30249 판결(공1995상, 1821) 대법원 1997. 6. 13. 선고 97다13627 판결(공1997하, 2174) [3][4] 대법원 1990. 12. 7. 선고 90다카23912 판결(공1991, 437) 대법원 1992. 6. 23. 선고 92다8873 판결(공1992, 2259) 대법원 1992. 9. 25. 선고 92다18542 판결(공1992, 2993) 대법원 1994. 8. 12. 선고 93누21521 판결(공1994하, 2307) 대법원 1995. 3. 10. 선고 94다14650 판결(공1995상, 1573) 대법원 1995. 8. 22. 선고 95누5943 판결(공1995하, 3286) 대법원 1997. 12. 26. 선고 97누11126 판결(공1998상, 529) [5] 대법원 1994. 6. 14. 선고 93다29167 판결(공1994하, 1941) 대법원 1997. 5. 16. 선고 96다47074 판결(공1997하, 1830) [6] 대법원 1991. 2. 8. 선고 90다15884 판결(공1991, 960) 대법원 1992. 11. 13. 선고 92다11220 판결(공1993상, 95) 대법원 1993. 5. 11. 선고 92다27089 판결(공1993하, 1674) 대법원 1995. 3. 3. 선고 94누11767 판결(공1995상, 1623) 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 95누6434 판결(공1995하, 3804) [7] 대법원 1981. 6. 9. 선고 80다1769 판결(공1981, 14056) 대법원 1992. 9. 22. 선고 91다36123 판결(공1992, 2954) 대법원 1993. 10. 26. 선고 93다29358 판결(공1993하, 3182) 대법원 1993. 11. 9. 선고 93다17690 판결(공1994상, 69) 대법원 1994. 8. 23. 선고 94다7553 판결(공1994하, 2503) 대법원 1997. 11. 11. 선고 96다23627 판결(공1997하, 3750) [8] 대법원 1994. 12. 23. 선고 94누3001 판결(공1995상, 691) 대법원 1996. 4. 23. 선고 95누6151 판결(공1996상, 1609) 대법원 1996. 5. 31. 선고 95누2487 판결(공1996하, 2039) 대법원 1996. 12. 20. 선고 95누18345 판결(공1997상, 405) 대법원 1997. 6. 24. 선고 96누16063 판결(공1997하, 2187) 대법원 1997. 7. 8. 선고 96누6431 판결(공1997하, 2394)

Gyeong Industrial Co., Ltd. (Attorney Choi Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

The Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission

Defendant 1 and 3 others

Seoul High Court Decision 95Gu38082 delivered on January 13, 1998

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal by the Defendant’s Intervenor are assessed against the same assistant intervenor, and the remainder of the appeal are assessed against the Defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal and ground of appeal No. 2 by the Defendant’s Intervenor 2 (hereinafter “the Intervenor”).

The corporate order is essential to ensure the existence and smooth operation of businesses. Therefore, an employer may establish rules of employment to regulate employees' violations of corporate order within the extent not contrary to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Labor Standards Act, as long as it is deemed necessary and reasonable to establish and maintain such business order. The rules of employment to provide for the grounds for disciplinary action, such as dismissal, in the rules of employment for workers other than violations of corporate order, falls under the original authority of the employer. Thus, the collective agreement provides that "any dismissal shall be governed by the collective agreement and shall not be dismissed by the rules of employment" in the rules of employment, or that "workers shall not be dismissed for reasons other than those provided for in the collective agreement" shall not be dismissed unless the rules of employment expressly provide for the grounds for dismissal and procedures for the same disciplinary action or disciplinary procedure, or if the provisions of the collective agreement and the rules of employment conflict with each other, an employer may determine new grounds for dismissal which are not related to the grounds for dismissal provided for in the collective agreement, and even if so, the grounds for dismissal shall be excluded from the rules of employment.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, Article 3 of the company's collective agreement provides that "this agreement takes precedence over the part of the company's labor contracts which are set forth in the Labor Standards Act, and any other individual labor contracts shall be null and void, and the part which falls short of or shall conform to the Convention." Article 23 provides that "Personnel rights shall be recognized, but the principle of personnel management for members shall be governed by this Convention." Article 97 (1) or (2) of the former Labor Standards Act provides that the rules of employment shall not be against the collective agreement applicable to the workplace, unless otherwise provided for in Article 30 of the company's collective agreement, which provides that "this case's employees shall not be subject to disciplinary action against the worker" and Article 36 (1) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5305, Mar. 13, 1997; hereinafter the same shall apply) shall not be subject to dismissal unless otherwise stated in the ground for appeal No. 36 (1) of the same Act.

2. As to the Intervenor’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 4

The reason why a company requires the resume or certificate stating the academic background or career while employing workers requires not only to evaluate the worker's work ability, but also to determine whether to employ workers through a prior personal judgment, such as the worker's intelligence and experience, degree of education, suspension of duty, and adaptation to work, so that it is necessary for the company to determine whether to employ workers. For this purpose, false career in the resume required to be submitted is an important element for the worker's suspension of duty, but also requires a prior personal judgment against the worker who intends to employ the company (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da14650, Mar. 10, 1995; 97Nu1126, Dec. 26, 1997; 97Nu126, Dec. 26, 1997; see, e.g., the act of false entry or career in employment at the time of employment is an error in the rules of employment as a result of disciplinary action, or its disciplinary action is not reasonable in accordance with social norms 197.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the records, the intervenor 1 graduated from the Spool Department through the Spool Spool Department, the intervenor 3 retired from the Spool Department and the fourth grade. The intervenor 4 was discharged from the Spool Department through Spool Department and the intervenor 4 was in the fourth grade. The intervenor 5 graduated from the Spool Ppool Department through Spool, and the intervenor 2 graduated from the Spool Ppool Department with Spool, and the intervenor 2 was in the second grade course with Spool, the intervenor 2 did not accept the plaintiff company's final academic background because the intervenor graduated from the university or did not enter the fact that he attended the university. The intervenor's above academic background was not justified in the misapprehension of the legal principles or in the dismissal of the intervenor's final academic background based on the ground that the intervenor's act did not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 29 (4) 11 of the Rules of Employment, or in the absence of legitimate grounds for dismissal.

3. On the third ground for appeal by the Intervenor

The issue of whether dismissal procedures for workers in violation of the collective agreement is invalid or not shall not be uniformly determined in accordance with the purport of the provision. If a collective agreement provides that workers shall participate in the composition of the disciplinary committee, the exercise of the right to disciplinary action against workers in violation of the disciplinary procedure shall be deemed null and void, regardless of whether the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized. However, if workers have given workers an opportunity to exercise the right to select disciplinary committee members, even though they have given workers an opportunity to exercise the right to select disciplinary committee members, it shall not be deemed null and void (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da4774 delivered on May 16, 1997) even if the disciplinary action is taken against workers who have not attended the disciplinary committee (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da47074 delivered on May 16, 1997). If a member of the collective agreement provides that workers subject to disciplinary action should be notified of the referral of disciplinary action to the person subject to disciplinary action not later than the prescribed period from the date on which the disciplinary committee is held, referring to the original procedure of disciplinary action or disciplinary action 979.9

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, Article 31 provides that "two or less members of the Labor Union shall be composed of six or less members of the Labor Relations Commission," and Article 3 Paragraph (1) provides that "if the intervenor wishes to take disciplinary measures against the intervenor, seven or more days shall be notified in writing, and the Disciplinary Committee shall withhold disciplinary measures within ten days after the date of receipt of such disciplinary measures against the intervenor's appearance, which is the first instance court's ruling for the same reason as above, that the intervenor would not have been subject to such disciplinary measures against the intervenor." This decision that the intervenor would not be subject to such disciplinary measures against the intervenor for the same reason as stated in the Rules of the Labor Relations Commission that the intervenor would have been present before the second instance court's second instance court's appearance, and that the intervenor would not have been subject to such disciplinary measures against the intervenor for the same reason as the intervenor's remaining before the second instance court's appearance of the disciplinary measures against the intervenor for the same reason." The intervenor's education and dismissal will be referred to the same seven days.

4. As to the Intervenor’s ground of appeal No. 5

If an employer is deemed to have dismissed a worker on the ground of his/her legitimate partnership activity, unlike the ground of dismissal, the dismissal shall be deemed to be an unfair labor practice. In the case of dismissal on the ground of a justifiable ground of dismissal, the dismissal shall not be deemed to be an unfair labor practice, as it does not constitute an unfair labor practice inasmuch as the ground of dismissal is merely an original part of the ground of dismissal, even though the employer was unable to conduct labor union activities of the worker, or even if the employer was presumed to have the intent of the labor union, it shall not be deemed that the ground of dismissal is merely an unfair labor practice (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu6151, Apr. 23,

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, the court below is justified in holding that the dismissal of the Intervenor in this case does not constitute an unfair labor practice, and it cannot be said that there were errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the Trade Union Act, or incomplete deliberation, etc. The grounds of appeal pointing this out are not acceptable.

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal by the intervenor 2 are assessed against the same intervenor and the remainder are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)