[1] The meaning and limitation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in a criminal trial and the meaning of "reasonable suspicion" in the formation of conviction

[2] The probative value of “injury Medical Certificate” submitted by the victim of injury

[3] The case holding that the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant on the charge of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of free evaluation of evidence, although there is sufficient room to acknowledge the charge of violation of

[1] Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for the principle of free evaluation of evidence, provides that the probative value of evidence shall be decided by the judge’s free evaluation of evidence is appropriate for the discovery of substantial truth. As such, a judge of the fact-finding court who has the exclusive authority to determine evidence should take into account the perception obtained in the trial in fact-finding and the evidence investigated. Furthermore, the judge’s determination on the probative value of evidence should conform to logical and empirical rules, and the degree of formation of a conviction for the conviction in a criminal trial should be the extent that there is no reasonable doubt. However, it is not required to exclude all possible doubts, and rejection by causing a suspicion without reasonable grounds recognized as having probative value is not allowed beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence. The aforementioned reasonable doubt refers to a reasonable doubt about the probability of a fact that cannot be compatible with the facts that is based on logical and empirical rules, and it cannot be said that there is a reasonable doubt based on an abstract doubt or abstract possibility.

[2] The written injury diagnosis submitted by the victim of the crime of injury generally grasps the cause of injury on the basis of the victim's statement, stating the part, degree, etc. of the injury observed and determined by the doctor by mobilization of medical professional knowledge, and it is insufficient to be a direct proof of the fact that the injury as stated above was caused by the criminal act of the defendant. However, in a case where the date and time of the diagnosis of the injury are close to the time of the occurrence of the injury, there are no special circumstances to suspect the credibility of the injury in the process of the issuance of the written injury diagnosis, and where there is no reason to suspect the occurrence of injury and the degree of the injury are consistent with the cause and circumstance of the injury alleged by the victim, unless there are special circumstances such as the victim's act of assault from a third party or the fact that the victim discovered any circumstance that there was a false intention or prepared a false diagnosis report, such injury diagnosis shall be sufficient evidence with the victim's statement and it shall not be rejected without reasonable grounds.

[3] The case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the principle of free evaluation of evidence on the grounds of the main facts charged that "the defendant's testimony by the police or testimony by the court below is hard to believe that the defendant's act of the defendant was injured, and the evidence, such as the certificate of injury diagnosis, the letter of agreement, and copy of medical record, are insufficient to recognize it."

[1] Articles 307 and 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 257 (1) of the Criminal Act, Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [3] Articles 2 (1) 3 and 3 (1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2004Do2221 Decided June 25, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1290) Supreme Court Decision 2004Do362 Decided April 15, 2005, Supreme Court Decision 2006Do5407 Decided November 23, 2006 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2007Do136 Decided May 10, 207

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Jeong-mo

Seoul Western District Court Decision 2010No378 decided September 14, 2010

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Western District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for the principle of free evaluation of evidence, provides that the probative value of evidence shall be determined by the judge’s free evaluation of evidence. As such, a fact-finding judge who has the exclusive right to the determination of evidence shall take into account the perception obtained in the trial proceedings in fact-finding and the evidence examined. Furthermore, the judge’s determination of probative value of evidence shall conform to logical and empirical rules, and the degree of formation of a conviction for conviction in criminal trials should be free to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt. However, it is not required to exclude all possible doubts, and rejection by causing any doubts recognized as probative value beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence is not allowed. The reasonable doubt here refers to a reasonable doubt about the probability of an injury that the victim may not be proven in accordance with logical and empirical rules, and it does not constitute a reasonable doubt that the victim, without any reasonable doubt or abstract evidence of the victim’s testimony, submitted by the victim, to the extent that there is no other reasonable doubt that the victim would be an injury from the victim.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below stated to the effect that "the defendant was unable to do so on June 20, 2009, by using the wind club 57-49 at the main point of Mapo-dong, Seoul, and inflicted an injury on the victim's left side," the main facts charged, and the purport of "the defendant was that "the defendant had a freeboard with the victim's right at the above date, time, place, and so the freeboard was faced with the victim's left part, so it is difficult for the police to find the victim guilty of the facts charged," and the court of first instance that "the defendant's testimony cannot be seen as being rashed by the victim's free will with the victim's free will," and that "the defendant's testimony was rashed by the victim's free will with the victim's free will," and that "the defendant's testimony was rashed by the victim's free will with the victim's free will," and that "the defendant's testimony was 2 free will."

However, such determination by the court below is difficult to accept in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the following circumstances.

First, although the victim's testimony and testimony of the court below are different in terms of the situation where the victim suffered the injury of this case due to the defendant's act, it is obvious that the victim's testimony and testimony of the court of first instance are contrary to the victim's investigative agency's testimony and testimony of the court below in that the victim suffered the injury of this case regardless of the defendant's act. Ultimately, the court below's finding that there is no proof of the victim's primary and conjunctive facts of this case's primary and preparatory facts of this case's testimony is more important than that of the victim's injury regardless of the defendant's act in light of the victim's testimony of the court of first instance and the statement of non-indicted 1, etc.

However, according to the court below's and the first instance court's evidences, the victim was found to have been treated immediately after the occurrence of the instant accident. The court below's conclusion that the victim was not aware of the fact that the victim was not aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that the victim was not aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had not been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had not been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact that he had been aware of the fact.

On the other hand, the court below acquitted the defendant of the facts charged in this case on the ground of its stated reasoning, although there is sufficient room to acknowledge the facts charged in this case that the defendant's act suffered the injury of this case due to the defendant's act. In determining the probative value of evidence, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the principle of free evaluation of evidence by making judgment contrary to the empirical and logical rules. The prosecutor's ground of appeal pointing this out

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-chul (Presiding Justice)