[1] If the relevant statutes were amended and enforced before the application for authorization and permission was made, whether a disposition was made in accordance with the new statutes and standards for permission

[2] Whether the Seocho-gu Tourism Complex can be seen as a general recreation business establishment under the former Tourism Promotion Act

[1] In principle, an administrative act shall be conducted based on the statutes and permission standards in force at the time of the disposition, and when an application for permission has already been made before the enforcement of a new Act and subordinate statutes after the application for permission was made before the enforcement of a new Act and subordinate statutes, it shall not be determined whether the permission was granted under the previous Act and subordinate statutes at the time of the application for permission, unless there is a transitional provision to the effect that the previous Act and subordinate statutes are followed. Even if the competent administrative agency accepts the application for permission and delays the disposition without justifiable grounds, it shall not be deemed unlawful in accordance with

[2] Article 3 (1) 3 of the former Tourism Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4645 of Dec. 27, 1993) and Article 2 subparagraph 3 (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14310 of Jun. 30, 1994) cannot be deemed as a general recreation business establishment.

[1] 행정소송법 제1조 [행정처분일반] [2] 구 관광진흥법(1993. 12. 27. 법률 제4645호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제3조 제1항 제3호 , 구 관광진흥법시행령(1994. 6. 30. 대통령령 제14310호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제2조 제3호 ㈏목

[1] Supreme Court Decision 84Nu77 delivered on May 2, 1984 (Gong1984, 1145), Supreme Court Decision 92Nu13813 delivered on December 8, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 474), Supreme Court Decision 92Nu4390 delivered on February 12, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 1001)

Plaintiff

The commissioner of the Gyeongbuk-do Police Agency

Supreme Court Decision 93Nu16901 Delivered on January 25, 1994

Daegu High Court Decision 94Gu829 delivered on July 7, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal and each supplementary appellate brief submitted after the expiration of the period are examined as well.

On the first ground for appeal

In principle, an administrative act shall be conducted based on the statutes and permission standards in force at the time of the disposition. When the relevant statutes were amended after the application for permission was made, unless there is a transitional provision that the previous provisions apply when the application for permission was made before the enforcement of the new Acts and subordinate statutes, it shall not be determined according to the Acts and subordinate statutes at the time of the application for permission. Even if the competent administrative agency accepts the application for permission and delays the disposition without justifiable grounds, it shall not be deemed unlawful in accordance with the new Acts and subordinate statutes and permission standards unless there is a change in the Acts and subordinate statutes and permission standards (see Supreme Court Decisions 92Nu13813, Dec. 8, 192; 92Nu4390, Feb. 12, 1993). The judgment of the court below to the same purport is justifiable, and there is no error of law by mistake in the application of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes as pointed out in the theory of lawsuit.

On the second ground for appeal

The issue is that the Gyeongmun Tourism Complex itself, which is located in the hotel house, which is the place of business of the invested company in this case, is a general recreation complex under Article 3 (1) 3 of the Tourism Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4645 of Dec. 27, 1993) and Article 2 subparagraph 3 (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14310 of Jun. 30, 1994). However, this is merely a criticism against the judgment of the court below from its independent opinion.

On the third ground for appeal

According to Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the Enforcement Decree of the Regulation of Speculative Acts, etc. (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13986, Oct. 5, 1993) (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13516, Dec. 17, 1991), with respect to the requirements for permission for a person who has obtained a license for a invested company under the previous provisions of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the permission may be granted only once under the previous provisions, notwithstanding the amended provisions. However, according to the records, the plaintiff filed a new application for the permission after the closure of the business as of July 10, 198 for the invested company permitted under the previous provisions. Thus, the argument that the court below erred in the abuse of discretionary power against the principle of equity, compared with the renewed business under the above supplementary provisions, is clear. Accordingly, even if the court below failed to make a decision, this does not affect the conclusion of the judgment, and this is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)