Defendant 1 and 21 others

Both parties

Landscape Constitution

Attorneys Kim Jong-young et al.

1. Suwon District Court Decision 2009Dahap100, 109 (Consolidated) decided February 12, 2010 (hereinafter “the first judgment”) / (2) Suwon District Court Decision 2009DaMa1684 decided June 3, 2010 (hereinafter “the second judgment”) Decided Suwon District Court Decision 2009DaMa1684 decided June 3, 2010 (hereinafter “the second judgment”).

1. All of the convictions of the first instance judgment and the second lower judgment on Defendant 1 shall be reversed.

A. Defendants 1, 2, and 22 (Defendant 21 of the Supreme Court Decision) are punished by imprisonment with prison labor for three years, and by imprisonment for one year and six months, with prison labor for each of the following three years: (a) Defendant 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19 (Defendant 18 of the Supreme Court Decision); (b) and (c) Defendant 10, 16, 18 (Defendant 17 of the Supreme Court Decision) and 20 (Defendant 19 of the Supreme Court Decision).

(b) However, as regards Defendant 2, and 22 from the date this judgment became final and conclusive, the execution of the above punishment shall be suspended for each of the four years; as regards Defendant 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 21 for each of the three years; as regards Defendant 10, 16, 18, and 20 for each of the two years.

C. All of the facts charged in the instant case are not guilty.

1) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective action, deadly weapons, etc.) against Nonindicted 2 on May 11, 2009 by Defendant 2 and 6

2) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act against Defendant 16 (a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a crime of violence to groups, deadly weapons, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the arrest of groups, deadly weapons, etc.), special arrest or injury, special obstruction of performance of official duties, injury

3) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapon, etc., an injury), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapon, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapon, etc.), and a special arrest or injury to Defendant 13

4) Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 22-2 of the Act on July 22, 2009, the special obstruction of performance of official duties against Nonindicted 3 and the special obstruction of duties against Nonindicted 4 and 5 of the Act on July 24, 2009

5) Violation of the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act against Defendant 1

2. The prosecutor's appeal concerning the non-guilty part of the first judgment shall be dismissed;

Summary of Grounds for Appeal

1. Defendants

A. misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles as to the legitimacy of industrial action (related to the crime of paragraph (1) of the judgment of the first instance): other Defendants except for Defendant 10, 16, 17, 18, 20

The issue of the implementation of layoffs cannot be considered to be the object of labor dispute, and even if the industrial action in this case is considered to be different, it is not solely aimed at the issue of layoffs, but mainly at the change of wage, work hours, work form, etc., and even if there was no problem of layoffs, it is sufficient to find it legitimate in its purpose because there is sufficient possibility that the industrial action would take place in other negotiations, such as wage, etc.

In addition, the industrial action of this case is justified even in the procedure of the industrial action of this case, since the industrial action of this case was conducted not only by the vote of union members prior to the industrial action of this case, but also by applying for mediation of labor disputes to the National Labor Relations Commission and receiving administrative guidance.

Therefore, the illegality of the industrial action in this case is excluded as a justifiable act under the Criminal Act.

B. misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles as to individual violence prior to the power wave (related to the crime of paragraph (2) of the judgment of the first instance court)

1) Defendant 2 and 6 (Criminal facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment)

At the time, Nonindicted 6’s price was computed by Nonindicted 2’s front and rear elbows in the process of destroying the hack pipe, it cannot be said that Nonindicted 6 had the intention of injury to Nonindicted 6. Even if the intention of injury was acknowledged with respect to Nonindicted 6, the said Defendants cannot be deemed to have a contact with Nonindicted 6 on the part of Nonindicted 6’s failure to witness or to recognize the act of injury. Thus, the said Defendants cannot be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of injury.

2) Defendant 5, 9, and 15 (Other paragraphs of the crime No. 2 of the judgment of the first instance)

A) At the time, the Defendant 9 and 15 did not witness the above scene of the assault, and thus, the above Defendants cannot be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of injury.

B) Defendant 5, at the time of manufacturing quality1 team office from around 22:05 to 22:35, committed an act of damaging with Nonindicted 8. However, Defendant 5 did not participate in an act of destroying at the place where the production management team office, etc. was located from around 22:35 to 22:45, or in an act of injuring Nonindicted 7.

C. misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles as to the act of violence during the period of occupation and departure (related to the crime No. 4 of the judgment of the first instance court)

1) Whether the co-principal was established

A) The remaining Defendants except Defendant 1, 10, 18, and 20

(1) The first instance court: (a) viewed the remaining Defendants except Defendant 10, 18, and 20 as the so-called “sponing-up force”; and (b) held the above Defendants liable as a co-principal in relation to the act of violence committed during the course of occupation and strike; (c) however, the remaining Defendants, except Defendant 1, who were aware of the individual acts of violence committed by the members of the occupation and strike business; and (d) admitted the remaining Defendants without any restriction, cannot be said to have had the intent to co-processing them even if they were to commit such act. Furthermore, considering the position, role, control, and power over the process of occupation and strike, the above Defendants cannot be deemed to have functional control over them through the inherent contribution to the crime, and thus, they cannot be held liable as a co-principal in relation to the act of violence at the time of occupation and strike.

(2) misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the admissibility of a copy of Nonindicted Party 1 (the Nonindicted Party in the Supreme Court Decision) book

The copy of Nonindicted Party 1’s book prepared by the first instance court, which was accepted as a valuable evidence as to the above Defendants’ conspiracy, is not a fact that Nonindicted Party 1 actually experienced but a re-specialized statement. Thus, it cannot be said that the statement made by the original person without specifying it, was proved to have been made in a particularly reliable state, and thus, it cannot be admissible as evidence.

B) Defendant 16

Defendant 16, the representative of the assembly 3 team, and Nonindicted 9, the representative of the assembly 9 team, went away from the power strike, was present at the central dispute subrogation meeting 2,3 times on behalf of the representative, and was delivered a schedule or delivery of the matters. Thus, it is unreasonable to consider the above Defendant as the representative of the strike 3 team, and hold the above Defendant liable as a joint principal offender.

C) Defendant 17

Defendant 17 is not a central dispute subrogation committee member, but a meeting of central dispute subrogation is less than 20 and 3 times, but the above defendant was present at the meeting of the central dispute subrogation committee, but there was no specific act related to the facts charged, and there was no right to speak. The Pyeongtaek Ho-gu's office, which the above defendant was in charge, is merely about 8 persons, and there was little fact that he was actually involved in illegal acts after the strike. Thus, it is improper to consider the above defendant as a person who was in charge of the strike and hold the responsibility as a joint principal offender.

2) Defendant 13 (Criminal facts No. 4-B, C, D, and E in the judgment of the first instance court)

Defendant 13 was arrested as a separate case from June 26, 2009 to June 27, 2009, and thus, it is unreasonable to hold the above Defendant liable for the act of violence committed at this time.

3) Defendant 18 (Criminal facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment)

Defendant 18 was a simple strike participant, who is not a strike-oriented force, on June 26, 2009, and around 15:00 on or around June 26, 2009. However, there was no act of violence in a different view or at a place. Thus, Defendant 18 is not liable as a co-principal with respect to the above date, time, act of violence not done at the place (other than No. 3 No. 1, 11, 17, 21, and 22).

4) Defendant 16 (Criminal facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment)

Defendant 16 is only the fact that the victim non-indicted 10 discovered the victim non-indicted 10 after being abused from the members of the association and prevented the members from committing an assault. As such, the above defendant cannot be held liable to commit an injury resulting from special arrest.

5) The remaining Defendants except for Defendant 10, 18, and 20 (the facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment, No. 4-F)

The non-indicted 3 (victim No. 6 No. 17 of the List of Crimes in the judgment of the first instance court) was unable to keep away from the ground during the movement of the military unit, and the non-indicted 4, 5 (victim No. 7 No. 3 and 4 of the List of Crimes in the judgment of the first instance court) was merely a dissipated on the lux factory floor of both motor vehicles. Thus, it cannot be said that the defendants or the members of the occupying business committed violence.

(d) misunderstanding of legal principles as to the maternity guns (crimes in the second instance judgment): Defendant 1

Article 11 of the Act on the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, Etc. provides that “the heading gun appears to be similar to that of the gun, and is prescribed by Presidential Decree.” Thus, the requirement that the launch vehicle of this case (the heading unit) requires “the heading unit appears to be similar to the gun” to fall under the maternity gun. Thus, the launch vehicle of this case cannot be deemed to have such similarity.

Nevertheless, the second instance court is erroneous in finding a guilty of this part of the charges due to misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles.

E. Unreasonable sentencing: Defendants

The sentence 1) that the first and second instances sentenced the Defendants is too unreasonable.

2. A prosecutor;

A. Fact-finding (not guilty part in the judgment of the first instance court)

According to the statement made by Nonindicted 11, although the remaining Defendants, except Defendant 10, 18, and 20, committed an injury to Nonindicted 11 in collusion with the members of the association in a name unresting the steel chain with the hack pipe, the first instance court erred by misapprehending the fact, and thereby acquitted the remainder of the facts charged.

B. Unreasonable sentencing

The sentence of the first instance court is too uneasible and unfair.

Judgment on the Grounds for Appeal

1. Whether the industrial action in this case is justifiable (Article 1 of the Criminal facts in the judgment of the first instance)

A. Relevant legal principles

In order for workers' industrial action to be lawful, first, the subject should be the subject of collective bargaining, second, the purpose of the industrial action should be to create autonomous negotiations between labor and management to improve working conditions, third, the industrial action shall commence when the employer refuses to conduct collective bargaining with respect to specific demands for the improvement of working conditions of workers, and barring special circumstances, it shall undergo procedures prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the decision of the union members' consent, and fourth, the means and method should be in harmony with the employer's property rights, and all the conditions that the industrial action shall not constitute violence (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do4837, Oct. 25, 2001, etc.).

On the other hand, whether to implement corporate restructuring, such as layoff or corporate merger, belongs to the high-level managerial decision of the management body, which cannot be a subject of collective bargaining, in principle, unless there are special circumstances such as it is promoted with an urgent managerial necessity or without any justifiable reason, and the trade union goes to the industrial action to substantially oppose the implementation itself, the industrial action cannot be justified even if the change in the status of workers or working conditions inevitably entail the inevitable change in the implementation thereof (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Do4893, Apr. 24, 2001; 9Do5380, Feb. 26, 2002).

In addition, if there are many other purposes pursuing an industrial action, and some of them are not legitimate, the legitimacy of the industrial action should be determined by the legitimacy of the main or genuine purpose of the industrial action. In a case where it is recognized that the industrial action would not have been conducted if the industrial action was excluded from the unfair requirements, the entire industrial action shall not be justified (see Supreme Court Decisions 2001Do1863, Dec. 26, 2003; 2002Do7368, Apr. 9, 2004, etc.).

In addition, if there are some provisions of a collective agreement that the employer shall enter into an agreement with the trade union on matters that fall under the nature of management right and cannot be subject to collective bargaining, the employer shall not easily waive part of the management right or recognize the significant restriction. The meaning of the “agreement” as stated in the said provision shall be interpreted by comprehensively examining the following: (a) the process and situation at which the collective agreement was concluded; (b) the relationship with other provisions of the collective agreement; and (c) whether the trade union bears the responsibility for the management on the basis of the principle that the responsibility is followed (see Supreme Court Decisions 9Do5380, Feb. 26, 2002; 200Do4169, Feb. 11, 2003).

(b) Fact of recognition;

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the first instance court and the trial court, the following circumstances are recognized:

① On January 9, 2009, the rehabilitation procedure began on February 6, 2009 after filing an application for commencing rehabilitation procedures with the Seoul Central District Court on January 9, 2009, when both automobiles (hereinafter referred to as “dual automobiles”) have been in serious financial standing due to pay-in, etc. in 2008, sales decline due to economic crisis, and weakening competitiveness due to research and development investments, etc.

② Accordingly, on April 8, 2009, on the basis of the results of the inspection conducted through an accounting firm, the two vehicles announced a plan for management normalization containing 2,646 employees who are 7,177 workers of both vehicles and restructuring in the way of voluntary retirement and spin-off, while obtaining loans equivalent to 250 billion won with new development investment funds, etc., on six occasions from April 8, 2009 to April 24, 2009. In addition, in order to overcome the above crisis situation of both vehicles, the two vehicles requested consultation on the desired retirement as a plan for avoiding the layoff, division, etc. on the scale and criteria of the layoff.

③ However, in the course of requesting collective bargaining rather than labor-management consultation, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission rejected the request for the above labor-management consultation on April 9, 2009. On April 13, 2009 and April 14, 2009, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission decided to convene a general meeting by holding a temporary representative meeting. On April 13, 2009, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission joined the instant industrial action after going through the pro-con voting for the industrial action aimed at “labor bargaining and crushing of layoff.”

④ Under the table of "total employment guarantee, layoff and public funds input before and after the industrial action in this case," "a worker's union shall be organized and puled," and "a worker's union shall be the total employment dispute for the purpose of taking place." If a trade union shall hold all the efforts to ensure the total employment of workers, but if it does not do so, it shall be necessary to hold any negotiations." (4. 15. Central Dispute Subrogation Report), "The 3 Team and the relevant support department shall refuse full night withdrawal from the date of the reorganization and withdrawal (5.6.00.0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0.00.0.00...00...00...00...00...00...00...00..00...00...00..00.00..00...00.00.00..00..0000..00..00..00..00..0.0.0..0.0..0.0.00000......0..00000........0000.......00000...................................00000000000........................>>>>>>>>.........>........................................................................

⑤ Meanwhile, on May 6, 2009, Nonindicted Co. 12, an inspector, submitted the inspection result to the effect that “The continuous corporate value of both automobiles as of the commencement date of rehabilitation procedures is KRW 1.327.57 billion, while the liquidation value is KRW 98.595 billion, the continuous corporate value is above KRW 3,88.984 billion, the liquidation value is below the liquidation value. However, the continuous corporate value is estimated based on the premise of a significant restructuring of 2,646 persons equivalent to KRW 77,177 and a new financing of KRW 250 billion, which is equivalent to KRW 377,000,000, the possibility of rehabilitation may be determined if the aforementioned premise is not implemented.”

C. Determination

1) As revealed in the above facts, in light of the fact that the labor union of two motor vehicles maintained the attitude that the labor union could not accept the human resources restructuring scheme itself based on the guidelines of the rehabilitation court and the result of the inspection by the accounting firm, it seems that the labor union's assertion on wage negotiations, etc. conducted at the time of the industrial action in this case is just a formal argument that the industrial action in this case would be legalized. The main purpose of the industrial action in this case is to achieve the position of the labor union union that the industrial action in this case cannot be accepted at all. Thus, the above argument in the labor union of two motor vehicles is completely denied the employer's authority on the reorganization, and thus it cannot be subject to collective bargaining because it infringes on the essential contents of the management right.

In addition, considering the fact that both automobiles were in imminent circumstances due to serious financial difficulties, it is difficult to view that the above restructuring policy of both automobiles was promoted with an imminent managerial necessity or without reasonable reasons.

2) Meanwhile, Article 48(1) of the collective agreement of the year 2008, which concluded a pair of automobiles and two cars and entered into force at the time of the instant industrial action, provides that "where it is intended to adjust the management number of the company, it shall be agreed with the union." (2) The above provision provides that the number of employees shall be adjusted in the order of temporary employees, training staff, heavy disciplinary action, etc. in preference to retirement applicants, and where applicants fall short of the reduction plan, the company shall not unilaterally implement the adjustment of the number of employees and shall make self-help efforts to avoid dismissal before dismissal. In addition, where dismissal is inevitable, the company shall set reasonable and fair criteria for dismissal. Furthermore, in full view of the fact that two automobiles at the time of the conclusion of the said collective agreement share responsibility to union managers and the situation where the labor and management jointly agreed on the management policy of the company, the employer shall refer to the opinion of the above Article 48(1) of the collective agreement to the effect that the above employer would not have agreed on the fairness of the industrial action, etc.

3) Ultimately, the industrial action of this case cannot be deemed justifiable in its purpose. Accordingly, even if the labor union of two vehicles underwent mediation procedures as prescribed by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act before the industrial action of this case or there was no illegality in the means and method of the industrial action of this case, it cannot be justified in the industrial action of this case. Thus, the remaining defendants' arguments in this part except Defendant 10, 16, 17, 18, and 20 are without merit.

2. As to the assertion of misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles as to individual violence prior to the power wave of occupation

A. Defendant 2 and 6 (Defendant 2's crime No. 2 in the judgment of the first instance);

1) Summary of the facts charged

around 19:02 on May 21, 2009, Defendant 2 and Defendant 6 shared with Nonindicted 6, 13, etc. at the office in charge of the production of the two cars, and when Nonindicted 6 took the right side and rear elbows of Nonindicted 2 with the hack pipe, Defendant 2 and Nonindicted 6 put the diversal coordinates in need of treatment for about 21 days to Nonindicted 2.

2) Determination

As to the current developments of the injury, Nonindicted 2 stated that Nonindicted 6 et al. attempted to go out of the door that occurred in his office because Nonindicted 6 et al. entered in the office and damaged the office house such as books and computers. At that time, Nonindicted 6 prices the string of the strings with the string pipe, and Nonindicted 6 was selved in accordance with the string pipe that was returned by the string, and Nonindicted 6 et al. al. did not directly attempt to make a price ( Nonindicted 2’s first instance court statement and trial record No. 1,093 et al.).

In light of the above circumstances of the injury of Nonindicted 2, it cannot be deemed that Nonindicted 6 had the intention to inflict an injury on Nonindicted 2, and therefore, the said Defendants cannot be held liable for the crime as an accomplice for the crime of injury. Accordingly, this part of the Defendants’ assertion is with merit.

B. Defendant 5, 9, and 15 (Other paragraphs of the crime No. 2 of the judgment of the first instance)

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the first instance court including Nonindicted 7’s statement in the first instance court, Defendant 5, 9, and 15 can be acknowledged that around May 22, 2009, at around 22:35, Defendant 5 and Nonindicted 8 meta-in-house factory with Nonindicted 8 (hereinafter “instant factory”), the production management team, the logistics management team, the distribution planning team, and the material procurement team, and demanded the employees in charge of the management to leave the said place to leave, thereby damaging the books, etc. In that process, Nonindicted 8 and Defendant 15 entered the production2-person office in the physical distribution management team. Nonindicted 8 and Defendant 15 moved to the production2-person office in the physical distribution management team, and Nonindicted 8 took a hack pipe and fa-ined it with Defendant 15, thereby causing injury to the victim Nonindicted 7 et al.

As above, as long as the above defendants carried a pipe for the purpose of leaving the management office members remaining in the factory of this case and caused damage to the office room located in the production management team, logistics operation team, logistics planning team, and material procurement team office with non-indicted 8, it is reasonable to view that the above defendants and non-indicted 8 are co-offenders. In light of the above defendants' purpose of finding the above office, situation at the time, time, and time and location distance between the damage act and the act of injury, the above defendants could have easily anticipated that the other co-offender would be injured. Thus, even if not directly involved in the act of injury, the above defendants are not involved in the act of injury, they should be held liable for the injury as co-offenders.

Therefore, this part of the Defendants’ assertion is without merit.

3. As to the assertion of misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles as to the violence during the period of occupation and departure.

A. Whether a co-principal constitutes a co-principal (other than Defendant 1, 10, 18, and 20)

1) Relevant legal principles

Article 30 of the Criminal Act is established upon fulfilling the subjective and objective requirements, such as the implementation of a crime through a functional control based on the intent of joint processing and its common intent. Even in cases where part of the conspiracys directly share part of the constituent elements, if it is acknowledged that there exists a functional control through an essential contribution to a crime rather than a simple conspiracys, it cannot be exempted from the so-called crime liability as a so-called co-principal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Do5112, Mar. 11, 2005; 2006Do1623, Dec. 22, 2006). In such a case, even if there was no possibility that the conspiracys had been made with respect to an individual crime, such as the means and attitude of the crime, the number of persons participating in the crime, the time and characteristics of the crime, the possibility of contact with others and anticipated factors in the process of the crime, as well as the possibility of contact with others, even if there was no reasonable possibility of the crime.

Meanwhile, as far as possible falls under the main part of the "fact that is a crime", a conspiracy or conspiracy shall specify it in detail and in detail as possible, and in exceptional cases in light of the characteristics of the crime, it cannot be deemed unlawful on the ground that some of the facts charged is written in general within the extent that it does not go against the purport that the Criminal Procedure Act specifies the facts charged (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do6103, Jan. 24, 2003). Thus, the decision of the conspiracy or conspiracy does not require a detailed determination of the mother's specific date, time, place, contents, etc., and it is difficult to establish the unity of opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do3631, Aug. 25, 2006).

(ii) the facts of recognition

According to the evidence duly admitted and investigated by the first instance court, the following facts are recognized.

① A trade union consisting of about 5,200 members, including about 560 members of the Changwon branch and about 280 members of the Maintenance Branch. A trade union consisting of about 5,200 members, including about 5,20 members of the Changwon branch. In lieu of a general meeting consisting of all the members, one of the 50 members shall be elected from among the 50 members for each constituency and make various decisions at the conference of delegates. The Trade Union and Operation Division consists of 33 members in total, including the head of the branch, the chief site, the head of the site, the secretary general, four of the secretariat, the head of the policy planning office, the head of the labor safety office, the head of the education and promotion office, the head of the external cooperation office, the head of the finance office, and the head of each office. The Trade Union and Operation Division consisting of two members and two members in full charge of the labor union activities, and has a union consisting of a full-time member or a two-time member of the Maintenance Branch.

② On the other hand, when a dispute arises between the private parties, the Central Dispute Countermeasures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Dispute Countermeasures Committee”) is organized with the highest decision-making and enforcement organization that oversees the decision-making and execution of industrial action. On April 9, 2009, the Trade Union of two motor vehicles delegated the Central Dispute Resolution Committee to determine the schedule and method of industrial action in subrogation of the Central Dispute.

③ At the time of the occupation of this case, Defendant 1 was the head of the branch office, Defendant 2 was the head of the secretariat, Defendant 3 was the head of the organization dispute, Defendant 11 was the head of the welfare office, Defendant 12 was the head of the policy planning office, Defendant 13 was the head of the education and publicity office, Defendant 14 was the head of the finance general office, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, 7, 8, and 9 was the head of the organization dispute belonging to the organization dispute room, Defendant 4 was the head of the culture and sports division belonging to the policy planning office, Defendant 15 was the head of the planning division belonging to the policy planning office, Defendant 19 was the head of the organization branch office, and Defendant 21 was the chief of the maintenance branch office.

④ The subrogation of central dispute is the highest decision-making body and the executive body, which decided to conduct the instant occupation and departure business on May 21, 2009 through vote of union members, and gave its members guidelines accordingly.

⑤ Since then, subrogation by central dispute was organized at the bottom of the assembly, and 5 weeks a week which leads the assembly. At the center of the organized dispute room, the members were organized at each team or sub-council to be placed in each base, such as the entrance door and rooftop of the factory of this case. They were prepared to fill up and divide them into union members or to place them for each base. 6 weeks a week following the preparation for clothes, mast, mast pipe, shot gun, knife, V, and chlody disease, etc.) The members were allowed to prepare for the entry of both executive officers and employees of the two motor vehicles or the police.

6) A central dispute subrogation meeting was held from time to time for important decision-making during the period of occupation and occupation, and all or the majority of the central dispute subrogation members were present at the above meeting, and all the guidelines and instructions pertaining to strike were delivered to the members through the Defendants or representative representatives, who are the central dispute subrogation members, according to the central dispute subrogation decision.

7) On May 2009, the Central Dispute Subrogation held a meeting to make its members carry a new gun and hack pipe, and Defendant 1 instructed its members to enter the meeting held around that time, and discussed the crypology, such as holding a meeting in order to prevent the entry of both executives and employees of the motor vehicle or the police, installing a container stuff, assigning the members of the group, and responding to the remaining cryption after that meeting. In addition, after the police entered the factory of this case, the National Police issued an instruction to demand that each central place of the base of the group, regardless of the method of spathic disease, etc., in order to prevent the entry of both executives and employees of the motor vehicle or the police.

④ Meanwhile, Defendant 17, as a captain of the vessel’s wing boat, directed the wing boat members during the period of the vessel occupation and led the commission of violence, such as putting down a pipe on the wing boat and putting it in contact with the officers and employees of the two vehicles and the police, etc., and actively attended the central dispute subrogation meeting without a member of the central dispute subrogation committee, and served as a captain of the vessel’s 14).

3) Determination

A) Recognition of co-principals

(1) As shown in the above facts, the central dispute subrogation in the process of the crime of this case is found to have been carried out active roles such as (i) preparation of various types of weapons, such as chain pipe, shot gun, and chloak disease, and distribution to union members by each base, and (ii) preparation for two executives and employees of the two motor vehicles or the police's entry into the crime of this case by taking advantage of the detailed methods of the crime of this case's act of violence and threat, etc., (iii) the remaining Defendants except for the above Defendants 10, 16, 17, 18, and 20 were present at the central dispute subrogation meeting to be held from time to time, and participated in the important decision-making, and (iv) the Defendants did not actively attend the meeting or deliver the contents of the act of violence and threat to union members, and (iv) the possibility of the above Defendants' act of violence and threat of collective action to union members at the time of the crime of this case.

(2) Meanwhile, the above Defendants asserted to the effect that the copy of Nonindicted Party 1’s pocketbook (Evidence No. 2,787 of the Evidence No. 2,787 of the Record), which was admitted as evidence of guilt by the first instance court, was hearsay evidence recording the fact that Nonindicted Party 1 had not experienced, and thus, cannot be admitted as evidence of guilt since the authenticity of his statement was not recognized by the original person. However, the above copy of the book No. 1 cannot be admitted as evidence of guilt. Nonindicted Party 1, the director general of the organization of the YUU, to which the two automobiles belong, was involved in the occupation and strike of this case and stayed in the factory of this case, entered the situation at the time and time in order and entered the book No. 1’s book No. 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Nonindicted Party 1, the original person, as the original person, recognized that it was made by his own writing at the first instance court and its authenticity.

(3) However, the first instance court recognized the part related to the third meeting of the tactical Planning Team held on May 22, 2009 (the part related to the 19th class through 20th class 15th class of the first instance judgment) as part of the public offering facts against the above Defendants. However, even if the above part was excluded from this part, it is sufficiently recognized that the above Defendants led the whole process of the occupation of this case as a member of the Central Dispute Resolution Committee or the 17th class register, and have functional control over the act of contributing to each individual act of violence at that time, the lower court's establishment of the public offering of the first instance court is not affected by the misapprehension of the above facts.

B) Defendant 16

According to the records, Defendant 16 is the first line of the assembly 3 team. The representative of the assembly 3 team elected through the direct vote of the representatives and the associates of the conference for representatives was Nonindicted 9; Nonindicted 9 was a representative of the assembly3 team; and Nonindicted 9 was a representative of the central dispute by participating in the occupation strike of this case and was absent from the end of June 2009; and 18), followed all other representatives within the assembly 3 team, who were present at the assembly3 team on behalf of Nonindicted 9 and sent the schedule, etc. to the members of the assembly3 team; Defendant 16 was found to have not participated in the central dispute subrogation meeting or voting.

In light of the fact that Defendant 16 participated in the central dispute subrogation meeting due to the above circumstances, but the number of the members present is insignificant and it cannot be deemed that Defendant 16 participated in active activities, such as speaking or voting, etc., and there is no obvious data to deem that the above Defendant was in charge of the leading role as the actual representative of the assembly 3 team, it cannot be held that Defendant 16 cannot be held liable for the comprehensive responsibility of each act of violence committed during the period of occupation, as a co-principal.

C) Sub-determination

Therefore, Defendant 1, 10, 16, 18, and 20, Defendant 16 cannot be held liable as a co-principal for an individual violence committed during the period of occupation and departure. Defendant 1, 10, 16, 18, and 20 are without merit, and Defendant 16’s assertion is with merit.

B. As to the Defendant’s assertion

1) Defendant 16 (All of the facts constituting the crime in the judgment of the first instance court)

A) No. 4-B, C, D, F, or I of the facts charged in the judgment of the first instance court

It is difficult to view Defendant 16 as the so-called so-called strike-based main agent, and even after examining the record, there is no sufficient evidence to recognize that the above Defendant specifically participated in the above crime-based violence or directly shared the act of execution.

B) Article 4-5 of the crime of the first instance judgment

The only crime alleged to have been involved in the act by Defendant 16 among the violence during the period of occupation and strike is the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. (Mos, Deadly Weapons, etc.) against the victim Nonindicted 10 and the special arrest or injury. As to this, the above Defendant stated that Nonindicted 10 goes beyond the floor surrounded by the members 7 and 8, and that the members of the association should be tightly sentenced to the non-indicted 10, and that at the time, it would be most safe for the members of the association to take the place with the head of the district office, because the members of the association at the time were interested and decomposed, and the only crime that was alleged to have been involved in the act by Defendant 16 to be the victim non-indicted 10 to the rooftop and the welfare Dong restaurant (Evidence record No. 2,576 et al.).

After Nonindicted 10 was assaulted twice from the non-indicted 10’s members in his name at the time, he did not receive the assault from anyone including the defendant 16, and the defendant 16 stated that other members were able to assault himself (the statement at the court of first instance, the trial record 1,486 pages). Accordingly, it conforms to the changes of the above defendant’s defense.

As above, Defendant 16 cannot be deemed to have intentionally committed the act of arrest or injury of Nonindicted 10 or shared the act of execution by Nonindicted 10, in light of the fact that Nonindicted 10 was the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim of the assault and the victim

C) Accordingly, Defendant 16’s assertion on this part is with merit.

2) Defendant 13 (Criminal facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment)

When one of the conspiracys in co-principals deserts from the relation of conspiracys before the other conspiracys reach the action, he shall not be held liable as a co-principal with respect to the subsequent acts of the other conspiracys (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Do955, Jul. 11, 1995; 94Do2654, Jan. 26, 1996).

Defendant 13 was arrested as a flagrant offender around 10:40 on June 26, 2009 and detained in the Suwon Police Station. Around June 27, 2009, Defendant 13 returned to the factory of this case. Around the following day, Defendant 13 was released on June 27, 2009 and returned to the factory of this case. An act of violence committed during the above period was committed in response to the situation where the officers and employees of the two vehicles enter the factory of this case and occupied part of them into the factory of this case. It is difficult to view that there was a prior public recruitment for such an act of violence committed during the above period, and it is reasonable to view that the above Defendant escaped from the public recruitment relationship before other competitors reached the commission of the act of commission. Accordingly, it is not held liable as a co-principal.

Therefore, this part of the defendant 13's assertion is with merit.

3) Defendant 18 (Criminal facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment)

As acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by the first instance court, the crime of violence in the factory of this case was committed on June 26, 2009 by the executive officers and employees of the two-party automobile and attempted to enter the factory, and the defendant 18 used active violence before the main pipe, which is the base designated in advance in accordance with the order of the defendant 17, as the captain of the fleet, and the rest of the members of the factory of this case committed an act of violence to the executive officers and employees with a pipe or a shot gun, etc. from each of their respective bases. In light of the above facts, even though the above defendant did not directly participate in a part of the act of violence, the above defendant was deemed to have been functionally controlled by the defendant under the agreement of the other members of the association who participated in the act of violence and continued to commit an act of violence for a considerable period of time in a very broad area.

Therefore, Defendant 18’s above assertion is without merit.

4) The remaining Defendants except for Defendant 10, 16, 18, and 20 (the facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment, No. 4-f)

A) Summary of the facts charged

On July 22, 2009, the above Defendants jointly conspired with the remaining members of the Central Dispute Subrogation Committee and carried dangerous articles by multiple force, and interfered with the legitimate execution of duties concerning the prevention and suppression of crimes by assaulting Nonindicted 3 to police officers, who were under guard duty in the vicinity of the instant factory, around July 22, 2009. ② around 15:30 on July 24, 2009 and around 15:40 on July 24, 2009, by assaulting Nonindicted 4 and 5 police officers in the vicinity of the instant factory, thereby obstructing their legitimate execution of duties concerning the prevention and suppression of crimes.

B) Determination

In light of the above, Non-Indicted 3 stated that while moving to the boundary service at the time, the union members could not get out of the ground (Non-Indicted 3's police statement and evidence record-keeping 4 books) and Non-Indicted 4 and Non-Indicted 5 entered a DNA factory in accordance with the suppression operation at the time of the suppression operation, the lux was cut down over the floor (Non-Indicted 4 and Non-Indicted 5's statement and evidence record-keeping 5's statement and evidence record-keeping book No. 5). If the circumstances are found, it is difficult to view that the union members, including the Defendants, fell short of the floor or spread lubial oil into the ground.

Therefore, this part of the Defendants’ assertion is with merit.

4. As to whether or not he was a mother: Defendant 1

A. Summary of the facts charged

On July 209, Defendant 1 instructed Non-Indicted 14 in the third-story of the factory welfare room of this case, 2009, and Non-Indicted 14, together with the 2nd instance trial co-defendant 2, 3, and 4, who is a member of the presses production team, and around that time, he manufactures 2 large 1 mpug which can emit a large quantity of electricity and tamp with gas explosion by using a string machine, iron poppy, string machine, ball machine, light gas tank, etc., and 10 mnife with a large size of gas emissions, 10 mnife with a large size of gas emissions and 20 mnife with a large size of gas emissions, 10 mnife with a large size of gas emissions, 10 mnife with a large size of gas emissions and 145 mnife with a large size of gas emissions.

As a result, Defendant 1 manufactured two guns in collusion with the sowing power and Nonindicted 14, Nonindicted 2, Nonindicted 2, Nonindicted 3, and Nonindicted 4, without obtaining permission for gun manufacturing business, or manufactured two maternity guns, which are made of materials other than metal or metal, and are likely to cause harm to human life and body by launching metal or objects other than metal (hereinafter “the launch vehicle of this case”).

B. Determination

1) Relevant provisions

Guns, Swords, Explosives, etc. Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act")

Article 11 (Prohibition of Manufacture, Sale, and Possession of Imitation Guns) (1) No person shall manufacture, sell, or possess those which seem to be similar to the Guns and are prescribed by Presidential Decree (hereinafter referred to as "marin Guns").

Article 73 (Penal Provisions)

A person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won:

1. A person who violates Article 11 (1);

Enforcement Decree

Article 13 (Criteria of Imitation Guns)

Imitation guns under the provisions of Article 11 of the Act shall be deemed to fall under annexed Table 5-2.

[Attachment 5-2] Criteria for Mod Guns (Related to Article 13)

The guns which fall under any of the following subparagraphs shall be gathered guns:

1. Those made of metal or any material other than metal, which are highly likely to be misused for crimes in the same shape as that of a gun;

2. Those made of any material, other than metal or metal, which are feared to cause harm to human life and body because they fall under any of the following:

(a) Those the size of which is less than 5.7 millimeters in diameter (hereinafter referred to as "carbon exchange") from the launched objects;

(b) Goods, the weight of which exceeds 0.2g;

(c) Those the physical energy (i.e., destruction power) of which is emitted exceeds 0.02 kilograms/m;

(d) Those which are towing because the front part of the carbon return is not treated nesnes; and

(e) The one in which net explosion exceeds 90§¯s, or the one in which inflammable flames are inflammable.

2) Relevant legal principles

The interpretation of penal provisions must be strict, and the interpretation of the meaning of the express provision to the disadvantage of the defendant is not permitted because it is against the principle of no punishment without the law (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do4758 delivered on November 24, 2005, etc.).

In addition, the enforcement decree of the law can only stipulate matters delegated by the parent law as well as detailed matters necessary for the real enforcement of the law within the scope prescribed by the law, and it can not be amended or supplemented the contents of rights and obligations of individuals provided by the law without delegation of the law, or new contents not provided by the law (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Nu8454 delivered on October 13, 1995). In particular, the enforcement decree of the law provides for matters concerning criminal punishment and expand the scope of punishment beyond the expressly delegated scope of the law cannot be allowed as it violates the principle of no punishment without law declared by Articles 12(1) and 13(1) of the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 98Do2816 delivered on February 11, 199, etc.).

3) Determination

A) As seen above, Article 11(1) of the Act provides that “a person, as determined by the Presidential Decree, appears to be similar to a guns,” is prohibited from manufacturing, etc., and Article 73 subparag. 1 of the Act provides that where a person violates this, he/she shall be punished. Meanwhile, Article 13 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that a person shall be punished for the manufacture, sale, and possession of a maternity gun in accordance with the delegation of Article 11(1) of the Act. Therefore, Article 13 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides for the scope of a maternity gun by delegation of Article 11(1) of the Act, and Article 11(1) of the Act provides for punishment for the manufacture, sale, and possession of a maternity gun in combination with the provisions of Article 73 subparag. 1 of the Act.

However, according to the attached Table 5-2 of the Enforcement Decree, which provides the detailed criteria for the maternity guns, subparagraph 1 of Article 11 of the Act provides that "any form made of materials other than metal or metal, which may be abused for crime because it is similar to a gun." On the other hand, subparagraph 2 provides that "any object made of materials other than metal or metal which may cause harm to human life and body because it falls under any of the following among launchings, sound or flames, which are made of materials other than metal or metal, or which are made of materials other than metal, and which are likely to cause harm to human life and body." However, Article 11 (1) of the Act provides that "the same shall be similar to a gun" with respect to the maternity guns prohibited from manufacturing, etc., so the requirement that "any kind of similarity in the attached Table 2 shall be similar to that that of a gun, which can be seen as essential to meet the requirements for delegation of the Act, even if it does not meet the requirements for delegation of the Act."

B) Meanwhile, it is known that the law does not have any specific definition provision on the concept of “spos” but, in general, capture is not less than a certain size of the sposcis, and it is distinguishable from the total in that there are not less than two observationors and shootings. Moreover, it is known that dissemination is distinguished from the total in that there are not less than two observationors and shootings. Moreover, it is possible to facilitate shooting by controlling or restricting the power on the sposcis and sposscis, and by controlling or restricting the power on the sposcis and sposcis (spos) to support and limit the sposcis and part of the sposcissciss to ensure that they can move into upper parts or right parts (such as reference materials for the submission of counsel and the trial records of the court of first instance, second instance, and the trial records of the court of first instance).

C) However, the launching body of this case, by using the steel pipes, steel agents, etc. in the factory in this case, has fixed the original 6.9cm in Gu 3cm in length and the original 145cm in length to the ground and approximately 45 degrees in moving-type fingers, etc., set one end in iron plates. The launching body using the launch body of this case can not be seen as a “influort” as well as a distance from the general structure of the 2nd trial record, which is considerably distinguishable from the appearance of the general public as well as the appearance of the launch body of this case.

D) Although there is no similarity in the shape, unlike the opinion of domestic affairs, it is not recognized on the premise that the launch vehicle of this case satisfies the requirements of subparagraph 2 of attached Table 5-2 of the Enforcement Decree, even if it is examined on the premise that it constitutes a mother gun if it satisfies the requirements of subparagraph 2 of attached Table 5-2 of the Enforcement Decree, according to the result of verification, etc. in the process of the first instance trial, if it is found that the launch vehicle of this case through the launch vehicle of this case would be highly likely to cause harm to human life and body (not more than 87 pages of the record of the second instance trial). However, considering all evidence submitted by the prosecutor, it is insufficient to recognize that the launch vehicle of this case satisfies one of the requirements set forth in items of subparagraph 2 of attached Table

E) Ultimately, although the launch vehicle of this case cannot be deemed to constitute a mother gun, the second instance court erred by misapprehending the facts or by misapprehending the legal principles on the mother gun, thereby finding the Defendant guilty of this part of the crime. The Defendant 1’s allegation pointing this out is with merit.

5. Regarding the prosecutor's assertion of mistake of facts

A. Summary of the facts charged

At around 15:30 on June 25, 2009, more than 3,000 executives and employees wishing to engage in the normal operation of a pair of motor vehicles participate in the "Resolution for the Promotion of Management Normalization of Both Motor Vehicles" in the latter part of the factory of this case and moved to the north and exchanged with the members of the steel network.

In the meantime, the nameless member who was in the process of occupation and wave has been sprinked with a pipe, which is a dangerous article of Nonindicted 11’s hand that was sprinking the wire-light.

As a result, the remaining Defendants except Defendant 10, 18, and 20 conspired with the other members of the central dispute subrogation committee and 900 members, including the above-mentioned names and non-indicted 11, who are dangerous objects through multiple force, used a pipe to use a pipe, which used approximately 14 days on the right side requiring treatment.

B. Determination

According to the records, Non-Indicted 11, an executive officer or employee of a pair of motor vehicles, has installed a steel network fence installed between the latter part of the factory of this case and the fourth portrait at the time, and with the members of a power wave business, he was skeing the steel network by hand to remove the steel network, and it is recognized that Non-Indicted 11 was faced with knife at the time when the steel network where Non-Indicted 11 was ske in order to prevent the association members in the factory from doing so (the first instance trial statement of Non-Indicted 11 and the first trial record of Non-Indicted 1,126 pages), and there is no other sufficient evidence to recognize that Non-Indicted 11 suffered a bodily injury by directly selling the steel pipe (the first instance trial statement of Non-Indicted 11 and the first trial record).

Meanwhile, even if Nonindicted 11 was injured due to the above circumstances, the prosecutor asserts that the non-indicted 11 did not have the intention of injury to the members on his name. However, even according to the statement made by Nonindicted 11, the above members left the wire-conditioning at a point away from 11 and 2-3 meters (as seen in the trial record, 1,134 pages). Thus, it is difficult to deem that the above members had the intention of injury, and even if the willful negligence of injury is recognized, it is difficult to find the defendant guilty without the written indictment in terms of guaranteeing the right of defense of the above Defendants, as long as the circumstances leading up to the injury suffered are completely different from the above.

Therefore, it is just that the first instance court rendered a not guilty verdict on this part of the facts charged, and the prosecutor's assertion on this part is without merit.

Conclusion

Therefore, the prosecutor's appeal on the acquittal portion of the first instance judgment is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Of the first instance judgment, the guilty part of the first instance judgment and the second instance judgment except Defendant 1, Defendant 10, 18, and 20, and the remaining Defendants' assertion of mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles has some grounds, and Defendant 10, 18, and 20 also have grounds for the allegation of unfair sentencing. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 364 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the guilty part of the first instance judgment and the second instance judgment against Defendant 1 are all reversed, and it is again decided as follows after pleading.

The summary of the facts constituting an offense recognized by this court and the evidence thereof are as follows, and it is identical to the corresponding column of the first instance judgment except for the corresponding column of the first instance judgment as follows. Thus, it is acceptable to accept it as it is in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

1. Facts constituting the crime

○ Removal of Defendant 16 in the 10th sentence of the first instance judgment

○ Paragraph 2 of the crime in the judgment of the first instance court

The 15th 13th 15th 15th 13th 15th 200 of the original judgment of the court shall delete the "Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc.

The 16th 4 and 5th 5th 16th 4 and 5th 5th 16th 19 of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter “the judgment of the court of first instance”) read as “the victim Nonindicted 2, who was the chief of the assembly1 team, was at the right side and rear elbows of the victim Nonindicted 2, who was the chief of the assembly1 team by the hack pipe, left the hacks by the hack pipe,” and read as “the 8 and 9th 9th 9th 1st 21th 1st 21th 2

○ Of the facts charged in the judgment of the first instance court, No. 2

The 17th sentence of the first instance judgment “Defendant 9” in the 13th sentence of the 17th sentence, “Non-Indicted 8,” and “Non-Indicted 8” in the 15th sentence, deleted.

○ Paragraph 4-A of the crime of the first instance judgment

Defendant 16, respectively, shall be deleted from the 19th to 20th, 15th, 20th, 18, and 19th, “based on the contents of the resolution” and the 23th, 8th, 19th, of the first instance judgment.

○ Of the crimes listed in the judgment of the first instance court, 4-B through E

Defendant 13, Defendant 16, and Defendant 16 and Defendant 27, respectively, of the first instance judgment of the court below

○ Section 4-B of the crime of the first instance judgment

Defendant 16, the 19th sentence of the first instance judgment, the 27th sentence, the 14th sentence “Defendant 16,” the 19th sentence, the 21st sentence “victim 20,” and the 6th sentence 17th sentence of the crime list, shall be deleted.

○ Of the facts constituting the crime in the judgment of the first instance court

Defendant 16 in the 16th sentence of the first judgment of the court of first instance shall be deleted, the 19th "seven police officers" shall be replaced by five police officers, and the 7th order 7th order 3 and 4th order of crime shall be deleted, respectively.

○ Under section 4-A, A, I and I of the facts charged in the judgment of the first instance court

Defendant 16, respectively, shall be deleted from the first instance judgment of the first instance, 7, 30, 12

2. Summary of evidence

Each police statement against Nonindicted 3, 4, and 5 is excluded;

1. Article applicable to criminal facts;

A. Defendants

1) Violation of the eviction of each group, deadly weapon, etc.: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 319 and 30 of the Criminal Act

2) Each interference with business: Articles 314(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

B. The remaining Defendants except Defendant 10, 13, 16, 18, and 20

1) The act of inflicting an injury on each group, deadly weapon, etc.: Articles 3(1), 2(1)3, 257(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

2) The point of violence, such as a group, deadly weapon: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 260(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

3) Arrest of each group, deadly weapon, etc.: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)2 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 276(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

4) The injury caused by special arrest: the first sentence of Article 281(1), Articles 278 and 30 of the Criminal Act

5) The injury caused by each particular obstruction of performance of official duties: Articles 144(2) and (1), 136(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

6) Each special obstruction of performance of official duties: Articles 144(1), 136(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

7) The manufacture and storage of each chlorate disease: Article 4(1) of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Use, etc. of chloded Disease; Article 30 of the Criminal Act

8) Use of each flame disease: Article 3(1) of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Use, etc. of Schloy Disease, Article 30 of the Criminal Act

C. Defendant 1, 4, 5, 8

Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 366 and 30 of the Criminal Act

D. Defendant 2

1) The point of jointly causing destruction and damage: Article 2(2) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Act

2) The point of each joint assault: Article 2(2) and (1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 260(1) of the Criminal Act

3) Damage and damage to property, such as a group, deadly weapon: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 366 and 30 of the Criminal Act

E. Defendant 3, 6, 7, 9

1) The point of each common property damage: Article 2(2) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Act

2) Damage and damage to property, such as group, deadly weapons: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 366 and 30 of the Criminal Act

F. Defendant 10

1) The point of each joint assault: Article 2(2) and (1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 260(1) of the Criminal Act

2) The point of jointly causing destruction and damage: Article 2(2) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Act

3) Each group, deadly weapon, etc.: Articles 3(1), 2(1)3, 257(1), and 30 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

4) The possession of violence, such as a group, deadly weapon: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 260(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

G. Defendant 11, 12, 16

Each common property damage: Article 2(2) and (1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Act

H. Defendant 13

1) The injury caused by each particular obstruction of performance of official duties: Articles 144(2) and (1), 136(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

2) Each special obstruction of performance of official duties: Articles 144(1), 136(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

3) The manufacture and storage of each chlorate disease: Article 4(1) of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Use, etc. of chloded Disease, Article 30 of the Criminal Act

4) Use of each flame disease: Article 3(1) of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Use, etc. of Schloy Disease, Article 30 of the Criminal Act

A. Defendant 15

1) The point of jointly causing destruction and damage: Article 2(2) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Act

2) Damage and damage to property, such as a group, deadly weapon: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 366 and 30 of the Criminal Act

3) The point of joint injury: Article 2(2) and 2(1)3 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act

(j) Defendant 18

1) The act of inflicting an injury on each group, deadly weapon, etc.: Articles 3(1), 2(1)3, 257(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act

2) The point of violence, such as a group, deadly weapon: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 260(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act

(k) Defendant 20

Article 2(2) and (1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 366 of the Criminal Act

(l) Defendant 22

1) The point of each joint assault: Article 2(2) and (1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and Article 260(1) of the Criminal Act

2) Damage and damage to property, such as group, deadly weapons: Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Articles 366 and 30 of the Criminal Act

1. Commercial competition;

Articles 40, 50 of the Criminal Act [the punishment imposed on the other defendants except defendants 10, 13, 16, 18, and 20] Article 40 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the arrest of groups, deadly weapons, etc.) and special arrest or bodily injury: Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the arrest of groups, deadly weapons, etc.) with heavy punishment

1. Selection of punishment;

Each crime of interference with business, violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (joint violence), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (joint violence), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (joint injury), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, and violation of the Punishment of Madern Disease, etc., choice of imprisonment

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

Articles 37 (former part), 38 (1) 2, and 50 of the Criminal Act [1] Articles 37 (1) [10, 16, 18, and 20] [1] Articles 38 (1) 2, and 50 of the Criminal Act [1] Articles 38 (1) [1) [1] Articles 15 of the Criminal Act shall be applicable to the rest of the defendants except for defendants 10, 16, 18, and 20; 2. Articles 37 (1) and 38 (1) 1 of the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act against the victim non-indicted 15 of the most severe crime committed; 3. Articles 16 and 20 of the Criminal Act shall be applicable to the punishment for the crime committed against the victim non-indicted 17 of the most severe punishment and sentence; 4. Articles 17 and 50 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act against the victim non-indicted 17 of the most severe punishment.];

1. Discretionary mitigation;

Defendant 1, 2, 16, 20, and 22 other Defendants: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act

1. Suspension of execution;

The remaining Defendants except Defendant 1: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act

1. As to the fundamental cause of the serious management crisis in which two automobiles had experienced at the time of the instant case, the Defendants asserted that, after acquiring the right of management of two automobiles in China around January 2005, they shown the behavior of so-called "protruding capital" such as leakage of technology of two automobiles, etc., by taking over new investment or technology development, which is the matters agreed with the two automobiles after acquiring the right of management of two automobiles, and that ○ Bank, the principal creditor bank, and the government authorities have been forced to sell the two automobiles as soon as possible without taking into account the policies on the automobile industry without taking into account the policies on the automobile industry. There are no critical opinions that raise doubt about the intention of the acquisition of the right of management of the upper automobiles before and after the acquisition of the right of management of the upper automobiles, the upper automobile did not make a new investment or new development promise under the agreement with the labor union until the acquisition of the right of management of the two automobiles for several years, and the Defendants' assertion that some of the officers and employees were under prosecution in collusion with the core technology as above.

On the other hand, while disclosing that two-one thousand and 646 workers who reach about 45% of the production workers after filing an application for commencement of rehabilitation procedures with the court, they could not be seen as having gone through sufficient consultation with the labor union in the process, and have taken a minor attitude to force layoff. On the other hand, even if two-one motor vehicles share jobs through the adjustment of working hours, they have presented a reasonable alternative to maintain the total employment, and have been making efforts to solve the problem, such as proposing the contribution of research and development expenses to KRW 100,000 to the workers' wages as security, for the rehabilitation of the company having difficulties due to the shortage of funds.

In light of the above restructuring policy of two vehicles, it is hard to say that the workers who were subject to layoff have lost their work place for a period of several hundred thousands without any special error, and thus, they would have been suffering as the most at home, and the economic training that prevents them from suffering, and that their family members will undergo in the future, in particular, once they are dismissed due to lack of flexibility in the labor market, it is not easy to obtain a new job at a similar level, and our situation where it is difficult to view that there is a social security system in preparation for actual work, even if they are sufficiently equipped. In light of the above circumstances, the meaning of dismissal of workers of two vehicles would not merely lose their work, but directly threaten their survival, and it is difficult to say that there is an exaggeration of relief, and that the defendants, who were the defendants, were the defendants' choice for the sake of protecting the right of the industrial action or the right of the strike of this case.

2. However, in any case, a statement of intent and its realization method to achieve the objectives in a democratic society should be made within the framework prescribed by the Act, and the purpose of the Act is naturally unreasonable. As to legitimate acts conducted to maintain and improve working conditions as collective bargaining or industrial action and to achieve the purpose of enhancing the economic and social status of workers, the Act recognizes the legitimate acts of the trade union as justifiable acts under the Criminal Act, and guarantees its trade union activities. However, in any case, violence or destruction cannot be deemed a justifiable act (Article 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act).

Nevertheless, the Defendants, in accordance with the law, intended to accomplish their demands by violent means beyond the ordinary acceptable limit. The Defendants, as well as the State-based industrial facilities, possessed a large quantity of inflammable dangerous substances, occupied a factory of a vehicle which is prone to large scale, without permission, and committed an act of violence against the State’s public power by armeding with a pipe, a spawn, a spadic disease, etc. that may pose a fatal risk to life, can not be used for any reason for any reason, due to an act of spreading the basis of the legal order.

In the course of this case, the two vehicles were actually in a state immediately preceding the bankruptcy due to the fact that the two vehicles had been occupied by the defendants for 77 days in the past, and due to various violence committed by the defendants, there were serious human and material damage in the size. For the rehabilitation of the two vehicles, the officers and employees of the majority of the vehicles, who made efforts to normalize the company, or the employees of the cooperation companies faced with the chain of chain due to the strike of the two vehicles, and the neighboring local residents who suffered from the body due to prolonged violence, and the general public who followed this, should also suffer severe mental and economic damage.

Therefore, the Defendants should be held liable corresponding to the above-mentioned significant result arising from the industrial action or the occupation and strike of this case.

3. However, in the process of suppression by the Defendants’ self-constition without any additional input of governmental authority through extreme compromise with the company, the fact that the Defendants’ self-constition of large rings occurred during the suppression process is a kind of trouble. There was an agreement between the labor and the management of the two vehicles to withdraw criminal complaints and accusations against the general members who participated in the strike. Since then, there was a possibility of rehabilitation by making a decision of compulsory authorization on the rehabilitation plan of the two automobiles, and the civil lawsuit filed by both automobiles against the labor and management of the two automobiles also created a settlement atmosphere such as withdrawal, etc.

Meanwhile, during the period of occupation and strike of this case, not only the officers and employees of both motor vehicles and police officers who suffered a large and small amount of injury in the course of violence by the employees of both motor vehicles and the service workers mobilized by the private side or in the course of suppression of the police. In addition to the measures of cutting-down of the medical team, there was a human rights infringement time that the police did not make any unreasonable response to the union members who were killed in the womb without being guaranteed a minimum standard of living for human beings at the time of blocking entry and exit of the medical team. Considering that some of the union members and their families who did not turn off due to layoffs from layoffs and their families were dead due to suicide, there seems to be difficult to find that there was a lack of understanding of the rules by the defendants that "I have come to move to our country," and that part of the Defendants' violence committed in a extreme state has also been held liable to the defendants due to any contingent crime.

In addition, the Defendants did not take an extreme action such as destroying the production facilities in the factory during the period of occupation and wave, and the Defendants’ suppression of fire that occurred in the factory by some interested members while continuing to exist, in order to prevent a serious loss that may occur due to the lack of paints in the painting plant facilities, and the Defendants’ efforts have been returned to prevent them, and the private sector also recognized these efforts by the Defendants. Also, the fact that the Defendants appeal against the Defendants from various social circles, including community and political rights, are also considered favorable to the Defendants.

4. As seen above, considering the circumstances leading to the occupation and departure of this case, the degree of illegal act of violence and the extent of damage caused thereby, the legitimacy of the Defendants’ assertion, etc. In light of the position of the Defendants or the role performed by the Defendants in the process of the occupation and departure of this case, the degree of participation in each act of violence, the degree of participation in the industrial action of this case and the occupation and departure of this case, and the remaining Defendants except Defendant 10, 18 are initial offenders or have no specific criminal power, and Defendant 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22 are detained for about one year by the chief executive officer of the higher-ranking office, and a certain degree of time has reached the value of the industrial action of this case. Accordingly, the court concluded that it is more consistent with the agreement between labor and management or the demand of social tolerance rather than imposing severe punishment on the Defendants. Accordingly, the head of the branch office of this case plans the industrial action of this case and its execution of the punishment corresponding to each of the Defendants.

However, this court is alerting that such a measure is not recognized as being not subject to the due method and due process prescribed in the law, and that it is only one opportunity to establish a constructive and peaceful labor-management relationship based on mutual understanding and cooperation.

1. Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapons, etc.) against Nonindicted 2 on May 11, 2009 by Defendant 2 and 6

The summary of this part of the facts charged and the determination thereof are the same as the statement of Paragraph A of Article 2 of the "Determination on the Grounds for Appeal". Thus, this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of facts constituting a crime, and thus, it is not guilty pursuant to the latter part of

2. Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act against Defendant 16 (a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the arrest of a group, deadly weapon, etc.), special arrest or injury, each special obstruction of performance of official duties, injury resulting

A. Summary of the facts charged

Defendant 16, in collusion with Defendant 1 and other labor-related union members and a large number of non-parties 1 and 2, by using dangerous things: ① 23 victims as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 26, 2009, and 23 victims were injured; ② as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance on June 27, 2009, 23 victims were injured and 1 victims were invaded; ③ as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance on June 27, 2009, 200 won was 8, 200 won were injured and 3 victims were 8,00 won were 5,00 won were 8,00 won were 9,000 won were 8,00 won were 9,000 won were 20,000 won were 9,000 won and 17,000 won were 2,000 won were 9.

B. Determination

As seen earlier, as seen in Article 3-2(b)(1) of the “Determination on the Reasons for Appeal”, Defendant 16 cannot be deemed to have a joint principal offender relationship with Defendant 1, etc. as the so-called strike-related force, and there is no sufficient evidence to acknowledge that the Defendants specifically participated in each of the above crimes or directly shared the commission of the above crimes, and the above Defendant cannot be deemed to have committed an intentional act or shared the commission of Nonindicted 10’s arrest or injury.

Therefore, this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of facts constituting the crime, and thus, is acquitted pursuant to the latter part of Article 325.

3. Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc., an injury), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.), violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the arrest of a group, deadly weapon, etc.), and a person injured by special arrest against

A. Summary of the facts charged

Defendant 13, in collusion with Defendant 1 and other labor-related parties, committed an injury to 23 victims as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 26, 2009, and assaulted two victims, such as as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 27, 2009; ② as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 27, 2009, Defendant 13 inflicted an injury on 20 victims and assaulted one victim; ③ as indicated in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 27, 2009, Defendant 5 inflicted an injury on 20 victims and three victims as indicated in the list of crimes in the list of crimes in the judgment of the first instance court on June 27, 2009; ④ arrested Nonindicted 10 on June 27, 2009; and caused the injury to Nonindicted 10.

B. Determination

As seen earlier in Article 3-2(b)2 of the “Determination on the Grounds for Appeal”, Defendant 13 shall not be held liable as a co-principal, since he left from the public contest relationship before the other competitors reach the commission of the above crimes.

Therefore, this part of the facts charged is judged not guilty in accordance with the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act because there is no proof of criminal facts.

4. Illegal obstruction of performance of official duties against Nonindicted 3 on July 22, 2009, except for Defendant 10, 16, 18, and 20, and each special obstruction of official duties against Nonindicted 4 and 5 on July 24, 2009

The summary of this part of the facts charged and its determination are the same as stated in Article 3-2(b)(4) of the "Decision on the Grounds for Appeal". Thus, this part of the facts charged is deemed to be when there is no proof of facts constituting a crime, and thus, it is not guilty pursuant to the latter part of

5. Violation of the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act against Defendant 1

The summary of this part of the facts charged and its determination are as stated in Paragraph 4 of the "Judgment on the Grounds for Appeal". Thus, this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of facts constituting an offense, and thus, it is not guilty pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

It is so decided as per Disposition for the above reasons.

Judges Kim Jae-chul (Presiding Judge)

1) Defendant 1: Imprisonment for a period of four years (the first instance court), and for a year of imprisonment (the second instance court), Defendant 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22: Defendant 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21: Defendant 10, 16, 18, 20: Imprisonment for a period of three years, each of three years, a stay of execution, and three years, a stay of execution.

Note 2) In the absence of special reference to the foregoing, the term “public trial records” and “Evidence records” mean the first instance court’s judgment, respectively.

3) In light of the above circumstances, it would be possible to rate the above Defendants as joint principal offenders of the crime causing bodily injury by negligence. However, recognizing the Defendants as criminal negligence without changing the indictment as criminal negligence would give a disadvantage to the Defendant’s exercise of his/her right of defense (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do1091, Jun. 29, 2001).

Note 4) “The T. B. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T. T.

Note 5) “I will invite On-the-spot Symnaments” (5. 24. Central Dispute Subrogation Report, No. 778 of the Evidence Record)

Note6) Each photograph (not more than 828 pages of evidence), Defendant 14’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,346 pages of evidence)

Note 7) The details of text messages sent (1,429 pages of trial records): “The 1,429 pages of trial records”: “The whole on-site emergency atmosphere for the full on-site training hours according to the results of the Emergency Congress” (6.3.), “The on-site office members shall, after the unification of uniforms, give out weapons on 13:0 p.m. and pay on 13:30 p.m.” (6.8.), “I shall proceed an explanatory session at the 14:0 p.m. conference room.” (6. 12.), “I will take an explanatory session related to the on-site training.” (6.12.m.), “I shall check 30 minutes in detail, base f.m. (6. 13.)”, “I will proceed with the on-site training session from 14:0 p.m. to 15:0 p.m., the total number of 17:7 p.m. and 7:00 p. p.m.m.” (17). p.

Note 8) Defendant 1’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,687 pages)

9) Defendant 14’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,321) and Defendant 1’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,681)

Note 10) Police Statements by Nonindicted 6 of the Policy Director (Evidence No. 3, 642 pages)

Note 11) Defendant 1’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,683)

Note 12) Defendant 5’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,079 et al.)

Note 13) Each photograph (Evidence No. 802 pages, No. 918 pages)

Note 14) Defendant 1’s prosecutor’s statement (Evidence No. 2,711 of the Evidence Record). Meanwhile, Defendant 17 did not withdraw himself from a central dispute subrogation meeting and resisted to the executive organ (Evidence No. 2,029 of the Evidence Record).

15) While the Defendants argued to the effect that there was no resolution of violence, etc. in the central dispute subrogation or that their specific roles were not outstanding, the Defendants generally acknowledged that the central dispute subrogation led the occupation of the instant case (e.g., Defendant 12’s prosecutor’s statement, evidence record 1,574).

Note 16) Each statement of Defendant 1, 12, and 3 on the date of the fifth trial of the first instance court (Records No. 2,001 of the trial record)

17) The first instance court seems to have recognized the said documents based on the documents stored in the mobile storage device (USB) seized by Nonindicted Party 1. However, the said USB analysis data (Evidence No. 2,961) submitted by a prosecutor as impeachment evidence (the second instance court records No. 1,681) and the evidence list (the fourth instance court records No. 44 of the first instance court records). The impeachment evidence is recognized to either reduce the probative value of the statement, and it is not admitted as evidence for the recognition of facts constituting an offense or indirect facts thereof (see Supreme Court Decisions 75Do343, Feb. 10, 1976; 95Do2945, Sept. 6, 196).

The prosecutor stated in the indictment that Defendant 16 was a de facto representative representative from the beginning of June 2009, and the first instance court recognized that Nonindicted Party 9 was absent from the occupation and strike around May 20, 2009, but there is no obvious evidence to regard the point of departure as above. Furthermore, even though the above Defendant received the mobile phone text message sent by the two cars’s construction after June 1, 2009 (Evidence No. 2,599), the above Defendant asserted that the said text message was sent not only to the representative, but also to the entire representatives, and it is difficult to view that Defendant 16 served as the representative representative from May 20, 209 or from June 6, 2009.

19) However, it seems that Defendant 13 went away from the public offering relationship with respect to some of the violence committed during the time of occupation and departure.

Note 20) Evidence No. 47 of the submission of defense counsel and fact-finding with respect to the chief of the Suwon Police Station of this Court

Note 21) The prosecutor indicted the initial applicable provisions of Articles 70(1)2 and 4(1) and (3) of the Act to manufacture unauthorized guns. On May 18, 2010, the applicable provisions of Articles 73 subparag. 1 and 11(1) of the Act were amended alternatively, and the second instance found the Defendant guilty of the manufacture charges of the maternity guns.

22) Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Act and Article 3(1)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, the size of the Gu border is only classified as small and medium-sized guns, Daegu Gyeongposposposposporaspospospos, Ggu pospospospospo

Note 23) As the launch vehicle of this case cannot be deemed to have specified the size or shape of the launched object, it is difficult to view that the launch vehicle of this case falls under subparagraph 2(a) or (d) of attached Table 5-2 of the above Table, and there is no evidence to view that explosion between the launching net exceeds 90 ccrax or flammables have been made.

(24) Defendants 10 and 20 did not submit the grounds for appeal other than the assertion of unfair sentencing substantially. Defendant 18’s grounds for appeal on mistake of facts have no grounds for appeal, and thus, it is necessary to separately determine the above Defendants’ assertion of unfair sentencing. In light of the criminal facts and crimes applied to the above Defendants, the degree of containing the crimes and crimes, balance in punishment with other Defendants, etc., the above Defendants’ assertion of unfair sentencing is deemed to have merit, and

25) As to the facts charged against Defendant 1 in violation of the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act, the second instance judgment among the facts charged alternatively against Defendant 1 was guilty, but this court reversed the above part of the judgment of the second instance, which recognized the grounds for appeal, and in such a case, it should be subject to the judgment of the court of this Court. However, as long as the launch vehicle of this case cannot be seen as a mother gun, it does not constitute a gun as long as it does not constitute a mother gun, the above selective facts charged constitute a case where there is no proof of criminal facts.