[1] Whether a state-owned land determined and publicly announced as a site for an urban planning facility under the Urban Planning Act is a preserved property (negative)

[2] The case holding that an application for purchase of state-owned land, permission for use and profit, and application for postponement of payment of indemnity is a waiver of prescription interest

[1] In order to fall under the "property to be preserved by the State under the provisions of Article 4 (3) of the State Property Act", the State must act directly or in accordance with the laws and regulations as a preservation public object. It cannot be said that there was an act of designating a preservation public object pursuant to the provisions of Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act without being designated as a preservation public object. In addition, Article 2 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act should fall under any of the subparagraphs of Article 2 (2) of the same Act for the "property to be preserved by the State" to fall under any of the "property to be included in the land determined as a parking lot site, which is an urban planning facility under Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act."

[2] The case holding that where the possessor submitted an application for purchase of state property to purchase the land in his possession and signed and sealed the provisional contract for purchase and sale of state property, but the state failed to sell the land after the fact-finding survey on the land, and the possessor again took possession of the land without any title, and then applied for permission for use or profit and postponement of the deadline for payment of indemnity, the possessor renounced the prescriptive interest on the land in his possession

[1] Article 4(3) of the State Property Act, Article 2(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act, Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act / [2] Articles 184(1) and 245(1) of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 93Da42658 delivered on April 28, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1955) Supreme Court Decision 93Da44395 delivered on September 5, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3343), Supreme Court Decision 95Da18956 delivered on September 15, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3396), Supreme Court Decision 94Da30751 delivered on September 29, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3599), Supreme Court Decision 95Da7369 delivered on March 12, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 196Sang, 195Da196399 delivered on April 195 (Gong196, 1238) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 96Da19645 delivered on April 1965, 1995

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Young-con et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Busan District Court Decision 93Na15684 delivered on October 5, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. 원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은, 그 판시 증거를 종합하여 원래 귀속재산이던 원심판시 별지 목록 기재 5필지의 토지(이하 이 사건 토지라 한다.)에 관하여 1959. 12. 15. 피고 명의로 소유권이전등기가 경료되고, 같은 목록 기재 제4토지[부산 서구 (주소 생략) 대 671㎡]에 관하여 피고로부터 소외 1 등 3인 명의로 일부 지분 이전등기가 경료되어 피고 앞으로 671분의 580 지분만 남아 있는 사실, 이 사건 토지 중 청구취지 기재 ㉮㉰㉱㉳㉵ 부분 합계 77㎡(이하 이 사건 주택부지라 한다)는 소외 2, 원고의 장모인 소외 3을 순차로 거쳐 1962. 2. 4.경부터 원고에 의하여 그 지상 주택의 부지 및 그 부속 토지로 점유·사용되어 오고 있는 사실을 인정하고, 원고는 이 사건 주택부지가 시효취득의 대상이 되는 국유 잡종재산임을 전제로 위 토지를 1962. 2. 4.부터 20년간 소유의 의사로 평온, 공연하게 점유함으로써 1982. 2. 4.에 이르러 그 점유취득시효를 완성시켰다고 주장하여 피고에게 그 소유권이전등기를 구하고, 피고는 위 토지는 원고의 취득시효완성 전에 도시계획시설(주차장) 부지로 결정·고시되어 취득시효의 대상이 되지 않는 국유재산으로 변경되었다고 주장함에 대하여, 그 판시 증거에 의하여 이 사건 주택부지는 1972. 8. 26. 부산시고시 제173호로 도시계획시설(정류장)로 결정·고시된 토지에 포함되어 도시계획법 제82조 의 규정에 의하여 위 도시계획으로 정하여진 목적 이외의 목적으로 이를 매각하거나 양여할 수 없는 토지로 된 사실을 인정한 다음, 이에 의하면 위 토지는 그 후로는 위 도시계획결정이 있을 때까지 법령의 규정 또는 기타 필요에 의하여 국가가 보존하는 재산으로서 국유재산법(이하 법이라 한다.) 제4조 제3항 소정의 보존재산에 해당하고 잡종재산에는 해당하지 아니하게 되었다 할 것이고 보존재산으로 된 시점이 원고의 시효취득완성 전임은 역수상 명백하다고 하여 원고의 청구를 배척하였다.

2. As to the third ground for appeal

원심이 위와 같이 이 사건 토지 중 그 판시 별지 목록 기재 제4토지에 관하여 소외 1 등 3인에게 그 일부 지분이 양도된 사실을 인정하면서, 한편으로는 위 토지 중 ㉵ 부분 16㎡는 1972. 8. 26. 자 도시계획 결정·고시에 의하여 매매 또는 양도가 불허되는 보존재산이 되었다고 판시하고 있음은 소론과 같다.

그러나 을 제4호증의 1(토지이용계획확인서)의 기재에 의하면, 위 원심판시 별지 목록 기재 제4토지 671㎡ 중 원고가 주택부지로 사용중인 ㉵ 부분 16㎡를 포함한 일부만이 이 사건 도시계획시설인 주차장(정류장)용지로 결정되었고, 나머지는 위 주차장용지에 포함되지 아니하여 위 주차장용지에 포함되지 아니한 특정 부분이 소외 1 등 3인에게 양도되었던바, 그 이전등기는 편의상 위 토지를 분할하지 아니하고 공유지분 이전 방식으로 한 것으로 보여지므로, 이 점을 가리켜 원심판결에 이유모순의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 논지는 이유 없다.

3. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

A. Article 4 (3) of the State Property Act provides that "property to be preserved" means property preserved by the State in accordance with the provisions of Acts and subordinate statutes or for other needs, and Article 2 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "property preserved by the State for other needs" means any of the following property: 1. In the future, Article 4 (3) of the same Act provides that property determined to be used within five years by the management agency in the future, or property determined to be preserved by the office of general administration as it is deemed necessary by the State; 2. In order for the land to be preserved as preserved property, it should fall under

First, in order to fall under the "property preserved by the State" under Article 4 (3) of the above Act, the State must have an act of directly designating it as a preservation object under the law or in accordance with the law (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da42658 delivered on April 28, 1995). It is apparent that no specific law has been designated as a preservation object with respect to the housing site in this case, and that there was a determination and public notice of urban planning under Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act, it cannot be said that there was an act of designating it as a preservation object under the law (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da44395 delivered on September 5, 195). Thus, it cannot be said that the housing site in this case constitutes "property preserved by the State under the provision of Article 4 (3) of the above Act."

Next, Article 4 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act should fall under any of the subparagraphs of Article 2 (2) of the same Act, because the housing site in this case is included in the land determined as a parking lot site, which is an urban planning facility under Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act, or the property decided to be preserved by the office of general administration as it is necessary to be used within five years in the future by the state under Article 2 (2) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act or subparagraph 2 of Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act, the housing site in this case cannot be deemed to fall under the "property to be preserved by the State for other needs" under Article 4 (3) of the Act. The court below is not the case where the housing site in this case is included in the land determined as a parking lot site, which is an urban planning facility under Article 12 of the Urban Planning Act, and thus, it cannot be deemed to fall under the preservation property under Article 82 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act.

In addition, there are no other data to acknowledge that there was a public start-up act as a preservation object on the instant housing site. Thus, the above land cannot be deemed as a preservation property not subject to prescriptive acquisition. Thus, the court below's decision that the instant housing site became a preservation property under Article 4 (3) of the Act and Article 2 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Article 4 (3) of the State Property Act and Article 2 (2) of the same Act.

However, the court below's assertion of Article 82 of the Urban Planning Act does not purport that the instant housing site is not subject to prescriptive acquisition under Article 82 of the Urban Planning Act, but it should be interpreted that the preservation property should be made if the urban planning facility is determined on the state and public land in light of the purport of the above provision that limits the disposal of the state and public land necessary for urban planning facilities, and it does not constitute a legal basis to block prescriptive acquisition, but rather a preservation property of the instant land in light of its legislative intent. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the preservation property under Article 4 (3) of the State Property Act (the ground of appeal No. 1) or by misapprehending the legal principles under Article 82 of the Urban Planning Act (the ground of appeal No. 2). Therefore, the ground of

B. However, according to the evidence Nos. 1-1 (written application for purchase), 2-2 (written application for provisional purchase), 3-3 (written application), 4-4 (Investigation Report) and 2 (written application for postponement of term), the plaintiff submitted an application for purchase of State property to the head of Si/Gun/Gu on June 1989 in order to purchase the housing site of this case and submitted an application for a provisional contract for purchase of State property as of December 29 of the same year to the head of Si/Gun/Gu under the defendant as of December 29 of the same year, but it was impossible for the head of Si/Gun/Gu under the defendant to sell the above land as the stop site after the fact-finding survey on the above land, and the plaintiff again did not have any authority to possess the housing site of this case to the defendant on March 2, 1991, and there is no reason to acknowledge the plaintiff's credibility and credibility of the above written application for purchase as the reasons for refusal of payment period and non-party 4's testimony.

Therefore, with respect to the housing site of this case, the plaintiff did not have the right to claim the transfer of ownership since it did not waive the prescription benefit and the plaintiff did not have the right to claim the transfer of ownership. Accordingly, the decision of the court below that dismissed the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified in the conclusion of the judgment below. Therefore, the error of misapprehending the legal principles as to the preserved property such as Article 4 (3) of the State Property Act as seen in the

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)