[1] The indication of the order in a case where the exchange of a lawsuit is changed in the appellate court

[2] The starting date of the extinctive prescription period of a claim for damages in lieu of a defect repair of an aggregate building (=when a defect occurs)

[3] The scope of the subject of a guarantee in a contract for the warranty of defects on the part of the proof structure of a multi-family housing with a guarantee period of ten years

[4] The period of liability for the repair of defects subject to guarantee under the warranty bond issued by the Housing Business Mutual Aid Association

[1] In a case where a lawsuit is converted to an exchange in an appellate trial, the former claim is withdrawn, and the judgment of the court of first instance corresponding thereto becomes null and void, and only the new claim is subject to the adjudication of the appellate court. Thus, in a case where the court of first instance appeals to partially accept the plaintiff's claim and the appellate court cites the amount cited by the court of first instance, the appellate court shall not revoke the part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff, which is part of the appellate court

[2] The extinctive prescription period of a claim for damages in lieu of a defect repair of an aggregate building shall separately run from the time each defect occurred.

[3] Under Article 43-5 (1) 1 (a) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16283 of Apr. 30, 1999), the liability to repair defects for which the Housing Business Mutual Aid Association can perform shall be divided into the liability to repair defects and the long-term liability to repair defects, and the liability to repair defects shall be the guarantee for the repair of defects occurring during the defect liability period under Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16069 of Dec. 31, 1998), and Article 38 (16) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 5908 of Feb. 8, 199), and Article 16-2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16283 of Apr. 30, 199), the warranty period of Article 16 of the former Decree of the Housing Management and its Enforcement Rules shall not be limited to the warranty period of 10 years.

[4] Where a project proprietor has submitted an application for inspection for the use of a multi-family housing to the authority for inspection of multi-family housing and deposited the application, the period of liability for repair of defects subject to a guarantee under the warranty bond shall also be deemed to be limited to the period prescribed by each of the detailed items as prescribed by Article 11(1) [Attachment 3] of the former Rules on the Management of Multi-Family Housing (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 219, Dec. 7, 1999) from the date of inspection of the usage. Even if the warranty period for all defects is specified ten years, regardless of the period of liability for defect repair stipulated in the former Rules on the Management of Multi-Family Housing (Attachment 3), the defects subject to the warranty shall have occurred before the lapse of the period of liability for defect repair stipulated in [Attachment 3] of the former Rules on the Management of Multi-Family Housing, and even if such defects have occurred within the period of liability stipulated in the warranty bond. This is because the scope of liability of a housing project mutual-family association, the guarantor, can not exceed the scope of the

[1] Articles 262 and 408 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Article 9 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings, Article 162 (1) of the Civil Act / [3] Article 16 of the former Decree on the Management of Aggregate Buildings (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16069 of Dec. 31, 1998) (see Article 59 of the current Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act), Article 16-2 (see Article 59 [Attachment 7] of the Enforcement Decree of the current Housing Act), Article 38 (14) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 5908 of Feb. 8, 199), Article 38 (15) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (see Article 46 (2) of the current Housing Act), Article 162 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16069 of Apr. 19, 199) / [29-19 of the current Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 80Da127 delivered on July 22, 1980 (Gong1980, 13029), Supreme Court Decision 96Da2549, 25456 delivered on June 10, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 2125) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 99Da69662 delivered on February 8, 2002 (Gong2002Sang, 650) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da73333 delivered on January 26, 2007

Plaintiff’s representative meeting (Attorney Park Hong-hoon et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 200Na1478 decided May 1, 200

Daejeon High Court Decision 2007Na628 Decided November 2, 2007

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant Samdo Community, Yangyang Co., Ltd. and against the defendant Korea Housing Guarantee Co., Ltd. shall be reversed, and the part of the case shall be remanded to the Daejeon High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal on Defendant Samdo Community Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “ Samdo Community”) and Mayang Young-young Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Mayang-young”)

A. Ex officio determination

In a case where a lawsuit is exchanged at an appellate trial, the former claim is withdrawn, and the corresponding judgment of the first instance becomes null and void, and only the new claim is subject to the adjudication of the appellate court. Thus, in a case where the first instance appeal appeals against the partial acceptance of the plaintiff's claim, and the appellate court additionally accepts the amount cited by the first instance court, the appellate court shall not indicate the order that the part of the judgment of the first instance against the plaintiff, which corresponds to the additionally accepted part of the appellate court or that the defendant's appeal is dismissed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da127, Jul. 22, 1980; 96Da25449, 25456, Jun. 10, 197).

According to the records, under the premise that the plaintiff originally filed a lawsuit of this case seeking damages in lieu of defect repairs against the above defendants pursuant to the former Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings (amended by Act No. 7502 of May 26, 2005, hereinafter "the Aggregate Buildings Act"), the plaintiff had a right to claim damages in lieu of defect repairs against the defects as stated in the judgment of the court below, but it became known that the lawsuit of this case was changed in exchange for the claim for the proceeds of transfer after acquiring the right to claim damages in lieu of defect repairs from the co-owner of the apartment managed by the plaintiff at the time

Therefore, in accordance with the above legal principles, the lower court erred by either cancelling the part against the Plaintiff, which was cited by the lower court in the first instance judgment, or indicating the Defendant’s dismissal of the appeal, on the premise that the first instance judgment, which became invalidated due to the exchange change of litigation, still remains valid.

Of the judgment of the court below, the parts of the judgment of the court below as to Defendant Samdo Community and Yangyang cannot be exempted from the whole reversal.

B. Regarding the assertion that since the above defendants' defense disputes are reasonable, damages for delay should be added to 5% per annum until the date of pronouncement of the judgment below.

As seen earlier, the plaintiff, before the first instance court, filed a claim for damages on the premise that he has a claim for damages in lieu of defect repairs under the Aggregate Buildings Act, and subsequently transferred the claim for damages in lieu of defect repairs from the sectional owners, and the court below subsequently accepted only a part of the claim, and even though such lawsuit is obviously due to the dispute of the above defendants, the court below determined that the above defendants' dispute over the cited part of the judgment of the court of first instance among the cited amount is reasonable until the date of the judgment of the court of first instance. In light of the above litigation situation, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the scope of application of Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (hereinafter "Promotion of Legal Proceedings Act"), which affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles as to the scope of application of the above defendants' claims until the date of the judgment of the court of first instance (see Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2641, Apr. 12, 1988).

C. As to the assertion that there was an error in the initial date of damages for delay

The liability for damages in lieu of the defect repair of a contractor under Article 667 of the Civil Act, which is applied mutatis mutandis by Article 9 of the Aggregate Buildings Act, is the liability for delay from the time of receipt of the claim for performance.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below added damages to the above Defendants from the date following the date when the application for modification of the purport of the claim submitted by the plaintiff at the court of first instance (the application purporting to increase the claim amount according to the appraisal of defect defects, not to the purpose of exchanging the lawsuit) was served. However, as seen earlier, the plaintiff claims for the amount of damages from sectional owners after acquiring the damage claim from the above Defendants. Thus, inasmuch as it is not acknowledged that the plaintiff acquired the damages claim from the above Defendants before delivering the application for alteration of the above purport of claim to the above Defendants in lieu of defect repair, the above Defendants shall not be deemed liable for delay from the day after the date when the application for alteration of the above purport of claim was delivered. The court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the date of commencing the liability for delay of the obligation for which the deadline

D. As to the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the requirements under the amended Housing Act

Article 6 of the Addenda to the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings (amended by Act No. 7502, May 26, 2005; hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Aggregate Buildings Act") provides that the special provisions of the Housing Act on the method of management of aggregate housing and standards shall be effective unless they conflict with the Aggregate Buildings Act and infringe on the basic rights of sectional owners, but Article 46 of the Housing Act shall be applied to the liability for warranty of collective housing and the repair of defects, and Article 46 (1) of the Housing Act (amended by Act No. 7520, May 26, 2005; hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Housing Act") provides that Article 67 through 671 of the Civil Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the liability for warranty for the sale of a building, and Article 9 of the Aggregate Buildings Act provides that the project owner shall make the tenant's request for repair, damage, etc. due to a defect caused by mistake, damage, etc. within the period prescribed by Presidential Decree within ten years from the date of inspection or approval for use of collective housing.

However, prior to the enforcement of the amended Housing Act, Article 29 of the Housing Act or Article 18 of the Building Act provides that Article 3 of the Addenda of the amended Housing Act provides that the provisions of Article 46 shall apply to the inspection of use under the provisions of Article 29 of the Housing Act or the liability for warranty and repair of defects of the apartment house for which approval of use under the provisions of Article 18 of the Building Act shall become null and void due to the Constitutional Court Decision 2005HunGa16 Decided July 31, 2008, which declared that the provisions of Article 46 shall apply to the warranty liability and repair of defects of the apartment house. In addition, the inspection of use or approval of use of the apartment building becomes null and void due to the Constitutional Court Order 2005HunGa16 Decided July 31, 2008, and it is reasonable to ask the owner of the apartment house for warranty liability under the provisions of Article 46 or 67 of the Housing Act applicable mutatis mutandis in accordance with the provisions of Article 67 of the Housing Act.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the amended Housing Act applies to the plaintiff from July 2007 to September 11 of the same year, on the premise that the amended Housing Act applies to this case pursuant to paragraph (3) of the Addenda of the amended Housing Act, on the following premise: (a) each of the defects, such as the list 1 and list 2 attached to the judgment below, occurred within 5 years and 10 years from the date of inspection of the use of the apartment of this case; and (b) some of the sectional owners of the apartment of this case, who constructed or sold the apartment of this case, were liable for damages in lieu of the above defects; (c) the amended Housing Act applies to the defect in the proof structure structure; and (d) the new Housing Act provides that the new apartment of this case is likely to collapse or collapse due to the defect in the proof structure, and that the new apartment of this case is not liable for damages within the scope of 10 years from the date of the inspection of the use; and (d) the business entity is not liable to compensate for the defect in the structure and its importance.

According to the records, it is clear that the plaintiff filed a claim against the above defendants, the seller of the apartment of this case, for compensation for damages in lieu of defect repair under Article 9 of the Aggregate Buildings Act, and as recognized by the court below, the apartment of this case has undergone a pre-use inspection on April 25, 1995, which is prior to the amendment of Article 6 of the Addenda to the Aggregate Buildings Act. Thus, notwithstanding the amendment of Article 6 of the Addenda to the Aggregate Buildings Act with respect to the apartment of this case, there is no application of the amended Housing Act, and the contents and scope of the warranty liability pursuant to Article 9 of the Aggregate Buildings Act and Articles 67 through 671 of the Civil Act which are applicable mutatis mutandis by Article 9 of the Aggregate Buildings Act as well as by it. However, the court below's decision to the same purport is justified in its conclusion.

The ground of appeal is without merit, on the premise that the application of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings is excluded with respect to the repair of defects and the warranty liability of the apartment in this case, and only the amended Housing Act applies.

E. As to the assertion that the cracks not more than 0.3m are the same as permitted cohesion, it cannot be viewed as a defect, and that there is no need for a complete color.

After recognizing the fact based on the employment evidence as stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that there is a defect in the apartment of the instant case as stated in its reasoning, and that remuneration is necessary for it as stated in its reasoning.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, we affirm the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below as just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

F. As to the assertion of extinctive prescription

(1) After compiling the evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning. The plaintiff asserted that some of the above sectional owners of the apartment of this case acquired the right to claim damages in lieu of the defect repair of the apartment of this case, and that the above defendants' right to claim damages against the above defendants was not 5 years' extinctive prescription, but 10 years' extinctive prescription period under Article 162 (1) of the Civil Act, and that the starting point of calculating the extinctive prescription period for the above defendants' right to claim damages was 5 years' warranty period against the above defendants' above sectional owners' right to claim damages against the above defendants' 4 years' warranty period (referring to the defect that is 5 years' warranty period under the Housing Act; hereinafter the same shall apply). Since the plaintiff's right to claim damages against the above defendants' 20 years' extinctive prescription period against the plaintiff's above sectional owners, the above sectional owners' right to claim damages against the above defendants' 4 years' warranty period, which was 5 years' expiration of the extinctive prescription period from April 25, 1995.

(2) Article 9 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings provides that the provisions of the Civil Act on the warranty liability of a contractor of an aggregate building shall apply mutatis mutandis to the warranty liability of a seller of an aggregate building in order to induce a seller or a seller of an aggregate building to build a solid building and to further protect the owner of an defective building. Meanwhile, the liability under Article 9 of the above Act is a mandatory provision, and the seller of an aggregate building is not a contractual liability based on a sale contract but a seller of an aggregate building is legally liable to a seller of an aggregate building (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da4733, Feb. 11, 2003). Accordingly, the ten-year extinctive prescription period for a claim for damages arising therefrom shall be applied in accordance with Article 162(1) of the Civil Act. Accordingly, it is reasonable that the court below's judgment applies the ten-year extinctive prescription to a claim for damages in lieu of defect repair in the same purport, and it shall not be deemed that there is an

(3) However, on the premise that the date of interruption of extinctive prescription for the above right to claim compensation should be the date of the instant lawsuit, the part of the court below determined that the extinctive prescription was interrupted by the instant lawsuit filed on December 24, 2004 is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

The period of extinctive prescription for a claim for damages in lieu of defect repair is separate from the time when each defect occurs. Moreover, if the council of occupants' representatives changes the cause of the claim to the claim to the claim to be taken over during the course of a lawsuit claiming damages based on its title, it shall be an additional or interchangeal change of the lawsuit and the effect of the lawsuit has arisen at the time when the above application for change was submitted to the court (see Article 168 subparag. 1 of the Civil Act). Meanwhile, the period of extinctive prescription has the effect of interrupting prescription upon a judicial claim, etc. within six months (see Article 174 of the Civil Act). In the meantime, if the council of occupants' representatives takes over the right to claim damages from the sectional owners and notifies the assignment of the claim to the court within six months from the time of notification, it may be deemed that the interruption of prescription

According to the records, on December 24, 2004, the plaintiff, who is not a sectional owner but a council of occupants' representatives of the apartment of this case, filed the lawsuit of this case against the above defendants, claiming that he is a right holder to claim damages in lieu of the defect repair of an aggregate building. On September 14, 2007, the plaintiff submitted a preparatory document claiming the cause of claim that some of the sectional owners of this case received the right to claim damages from some of the above defendants. The above preparatory document was delivered to the above defendants' representatives around that time. Some of the sectional owners of this case entered into an agreement on the assignment of claims with the plaintiff and notified the above defendants of the assignment of claims on September 4, 2007. The above notice was delivered to the above defendants around that time. The plaintiff and the above defendants stated on the second date for pleading of the court below that "the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff 1 and 2 against the plaintiff was a claim for the acquisition of the right to claim damages, not based on the right to claim damages under the related laws and regulations, and there are no special circumstances as seen earlier.

Meanwhile, the obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our civil law. Thus, the obligor is not allowed to assert the completion of the statute of limitations as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith if there are special circumstances, such as: (a) the obligor has made it impossible or significantly difficult for the obligee to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription before the completion of the statute of limitations; (b) the obligor has acted to believe that such measures are unnecessary; or (c) the obligee has objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising his right; or (d) the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations; (b) there is a great need to protect the obligee; or (e) other creditors have received the repayment of the obligation under the same condition; and (c) there is considerable need to recognize the refusal of the performance of the obligation as an abuse of rights (see Supreme Court Decisions 95Da29895, Dec. 12, 1997; 202Da3232).

Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the date of occurrence of defects, the date of interruption of extinctive prescription and whether there was a violation of the principle of good faith in the claim for the completion of extinctive prescription, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

G. As to the assertion that changing the limitation of liability constitutes a violation of the good faith principle or a violation of the right to trial

In a case where the court recognizes liability for damages and limits the amount of damages in light of the ideology of the damage compensation system, the fair apportionment of damages in consideration of all the circumstances, the fact-finding or the ratio of such liability mitigation is within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da19603, Nov. 30, 2007, etc.).

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the records, the lower court’s fact-finding or its determination on the grounds for mitigation of liability is within the scope acceptable and it cannot be deemed as considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal on this point

2. As to the grounds of appeal against the Defendant Housing Guarantee Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Korea Housing Guarantee”)

A. As to the allegation that the above defendant's appeal is reasonable, 5% of the damages for delay should be added to the above defendant's appeal until the date of pronouncement of the judgment below.

With respect to the amount additionally quoted in the appellate court from among the cited amounts of the appellate court, it shall be deemed reasonable that the defendant raised a dispute over the existence and scope of the obligation to perform. However, with respect to the part of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance and maintained as it is, the appellate court determined that the plaintiff's claim is well-grounded in the appellate court's purport as stated in the judgment of first instance. Since it is obvious that the defendant's appeal concerning this part is groundless, it cannot be said that the defendant's objection against it is reasonable (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da42892, 42908 delivered on December 26, 1997). In addition, Article 3 (2) of the Promotion Act provides that "when it is deemed reasonable that the debtor raises a dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation to perform, the issue of whether it is reasonable to dispute above is reasonable or not is related to the fact-finding and evaluation of the court of first instance (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da4254, Apr., 2002).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below maintained the remainder except for the damages for delay reduced by the reduction of the plaintiff's claim, which are cited by the judgment of the court of first instance, and ordered the above defendant to pay damages for delay at the rate of 20% per annum from the day following the date of the judgment of the court of first instance, as to the cited amount.

Upon examining the records in light of the above legal principles, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of application under Article 3 (2) of the Promotion Act, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

B. As to the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the requirements under the amended Housing Act

Article 43-5 (1) 1 (a) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16283, Apr. 30, 199; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that the housing project mutual aid association [it shall be amended by Act No. 5908, Feb. 8, 199 (it shall be effective from March 1, 199) shall provide for the basis for the establishment of a guarantee for the defendant's housing, and all property and rights and obligations belonging to the housing project mutual aid association at the time of the establishment of the above defendant shall be comprehensively treated as the warranty liability of the above defendant] shall be divided into the defect warranty liability and the long-term defect warranty liability of the old Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16283, Dec. 31, 198; hereinafter the same shall apply] shall be limited to the defect warranty liability of the above apartment house for which the defect warranty liability has occurred or may not exist within the warranty period of Article 16 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that, in full view of the contents of the contract of this case's guarantee and the revision of the Housing Act and the relevant provisions of the Enforcement Decree thereof, the defendant's house guarantee is limited to significant defects in proof structures, on the ground that the defendant's house guarantee is within the warranty period stipulated by the amended Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act with respect to the apartment of this case, and as a guarantor under the contract of this case, the defendant's house guarantee is obligated to pay damages for the apartment of this case in lieu of the repair of defects that occurred within the warranty period of the contract of this case, in lieu of the repair of defects that occurred within the warranty period of the contract of this case.

Examining the records in light of the above legal principles, since the above defendant's liability for the warranty of defects under the warranty contract of this case covers all defects arising from the load-bearing structure, it is justifiable in the conclusion of holding that the above defendant's liability for the warranty of defects is subject to all defects arising from the load-bearing structure.

The ground of appeal is not acceptable on the premise that only the amended Housing Act provision applies to the repair of defects and the warranty liability of the apartment of this case, and it is merely an error in the judgment of the court below.

C. As to the assertion of extinctive prescription

The period of extinctive prescription and initial date of the Plaintiff’s claim of this case shall be determined by the Act which had been enforced and applied at the time of the occurrence of the claim and its subsequent amendment or new Act, or applicable Act may not be determined by the new Act or new Act (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da2453, Jun. 28, 1996). However, Article 47-12(2) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act, which had been enforced and applied at the time of the instant contract for defect repair liability, provides that the period of warranty liability shall be determined by the former Rules No. 10 for the defect warranty liability management stipulated in the Rules No. 9 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act [this case’s provision] and the period of warranty management stipulated in the Rules No. 196 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (see Supreme Court Decision 200, Feb. 8, 199; 200Da19664, Feb. 9, 200).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, under the premise that it is reasonable to view that the ten-year extinctive prescription is applied not to the above defendant's claim, but to the 10-year period pursuant to Article 162 (1) of the Civil Act, and its starting point is the date when the defect liability period as prescribed by the amended Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act expires, the damages claim in lieu of the defect repair in the 5-year period against the above defendant by the owner of the apartment of this case against the above defendant shall proceed from April 25, 1995, the date when the usage inspection of the apartment of this case was conducted from April 26, 200, which is the date when 5-year period for the warranty liability expires, and since the plaintiff filed the lawsuit of this case on December 24, 2004, which is the 10-year period for the extinctive prescription, the above defendant's defense of extinctive prescription is not acceptable. Furthermore, even if the above claim is considered to fall under commercial claims and the period of prescription expires, the plaintiff rejected the above defendant's defense.

Examining the record in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the period of extinctive prescription shall expire unless the right is exercised for five years from the expiration date of the defect liability period pursuant to the provisions of this case, which occurred until February 28, 1999, when the provisions of this case were enforced and applied. Thus, although the court below’s explanation is not appropriate, it is just in its conclusion that the period of extinctive prescription and the initial date of the judgment on this part of the secured claim were

However, in the case of a guarantee claim that occurred after March 1, 1999 when the amended Act, in which the provision of this case was deleted, the period and commencing date of the extinctive prescription cannot be determined pursuant to the provision of this case. Thus, the period and commencing date of the extinctive prescription should be determined pursuant to the general principles. Since the guarantee claim of this case constitutes a claim arising from commercial activities and thus the five-year commercial extinctive prescription is applied. Thus, barring any special circumstance, a guarantee claim that occurred after March 1, 1999 should be deemed to have expired unless the right is exercised for five years from the time it

Nevertheless, the court below held that the statute of limitations has been interrupted by filing the lawsuit of this case before the lapse of five years from the date when the provision of this case was enforced or applied, with regard to the whole of the plaintiff's guaranteed claims, without examining whether they are guaranteed claims arising when the provision of this case was enforced or applied. The court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the statute of limitations period and initial date of the guaranteed claims borne by the Housing Business Mutual Aid Association according to the mandatory defect liability warranty contract and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations,

In addition, the above defendant asserted the extinctive prescription only for the guaranteed claim regarding the five-year defect in the judgment of the court below, and there exists a ground for reversal only for the guaranteed claim arising after March 1, 199, among them, but the court below did not distinguish between the five-year defect and the ten-year defect, and did not determine when and when the date of occurrence of the guaranteed claim, and calculated the total cost of defect repair for each construction section as stated in its reasoning. Thus, the part against the above defendant in the judgment of the court below should be reversed.

D. The assertion that equal heat below 0.3m is equal to that permitted, and that the whole color is unnecessary, and the court below's change of the limitation of liability constitutes a violation of the good faith principle or a violation of the right to trial.

The argument in the grounds of appeal on this part is not acceptable as it had already been accepted in the judgment on the defendant Samdoo community and the establishment of a panion.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, among the judgment of the court below, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant Samdo Community, Yangyang, and the part against the defendant's house guarantee is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to Daejeon High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)